‘Not Drowning but Fighting’: Faith, Activism, and Climate Change Narratives in the Pacific Islands

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Thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

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April 2018

DECLARATION

I, Hannah Fair, confirm that the work presented in this thesis is my own. Where information has been derived from other sources, I confirm that this has been indicated in the thesis.

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Word Count: 95,566

ABSTRACT

Climate change is a critical issue for the Pacific Islands, in terms of its current and future impacts. However, many journalistic and academic accounts reiterate an 'inevitable inundation discourse': a narrative that represents Pacific Islanders as hopeless and helpless victims of climate change and their homelands as already lost to rising seas. To further critique this inaccurate and disempowering discourse, this research explores counter-narratives that can be offered in its place. Emphasising the status of those affected by climate change as political actors, and recognising the shortage of research into civil society responses, I concentrate on the understandings and practices of Pacific Islander climate activists.

Ethnographic research and interviews were conducted with a Pan-Pacific network of Islander climate activists – Pacific Climate Warriors – who had converged in Australia to campaign against coal. Analysed using Hau'ofa's 'Sea of Islands' vision, these Warriors embodied forms of Oceanic regionalism through the forging of kin-like connection and expressions of composite Pan-Pacific identities and enacted forms of world enlargement, countering the belittlement of the Pacific perpetuated by the inevitable inundation discourse. Their manifestation of regionalism was predicated upon difference rather than homogeneity, in terms of their 'relative altitudinal privilege', complicating representations of them as equally on the front lines of climate change.

Further research was conducted in Vanuatu, with a particular focus on priests. Reductive analyses that present religion as a barrier to climate change adaptation are challenged. Instead, the complexity and heterogeneity of religious responses to climate change are demonstrated through the identification of multiple articulations of the Noah story and their corresponding ethical and political imaginaries. All these retellings in their own ways foreground Islander agency, providing locally meaningful and morally compelling counter-narratives of climate change in the Pacific Island region.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I am indebted to 350 Pacific and the Pacific Climate Warriors for sharing their stories with me and allowing me the honour of accompanying them during such a powerful and transformative campaign. I am also deeply grateful to 350 Vanuatu and GIZ for welcoming me and working with me in Vanuatu, and to all of the friends and participants who kindly gave their time to be part of this research.

Enormous gratitude goes to my supervisor Sam Randalls for his comprehensive, insightful, and supportive advice throughout the PhD, and his flexibility and encouragement at times when I doubted myself or this project. I would also like to thank my second supervisor Ben Page, my upgrade examiners and the other members of UCL Geography who have provided comments, suggestions and support over the years.

This research was greatly enriched by undertaking an Overseas Institutional Visit. I am grateful to the School of Social Sciences and the Oceania Centre for Arts, Culture and Pacific Studies for jointly hosting me at the University of the South Pacific, providing me with the opportunity to share my work, and to learn from the staff and students around me. I hugely appreciate all those who took the time to discuss ideas with me while in Fiji, particularly Kambati Uriam, Frank Thomas, Eberhard Weber, Helene Jacot Des Combes, Thomas White, Richard Davis, Silja Klepp and Andreas Kopf. Deep gratitude goes to Max Quanchi and Keri Mills, for befriending and accommodating me, and introducing me to the highlights of life in Suva, as well as providing comments on chapters. Hunter, Keri, Iaka, Stephanie and V Solutions were all an enormous help in sourcing and producing Bislama transcription and translation. Great thanks to Ruth, Ellen, Darragh, James, Derek and Aaron for your fantastic proofreading.

Many thanks to the Economic and Social Research Council for funding this research, and to the Mead Travel fund for enabling me to present my work at the Undisciplined Environments conference in Sweden.

This research wouldn't have been possible without the friendship and support I received in many parts of the world. Love and thanks to all the friends in Australia, Vanuatu, Fiji, and the UK who have been there for me throughout this process.

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1. Not drowning but fighting: searching for counter-discourses of climate change in the Pacific Islands

October 7th 2015, Vatican City: Pope Francis rides out into St Peter's Square to deliver his Papal Audience, surrounded by throngs of believers, and encircled by guards. Three guards refuse a missive offered from the audience until eventually a fourth guard accepts it, following the Pope's assent. The bundle, proffered by Sylvester Loloa from Tonga, consists of a traditionally woven mat from Sylvester's home island which he and his companions have sat upon during prayer vigils for the past two days, and a handwritten supplication addressed to the pontiff, thanking him for his leadership on climate change. Affixed to the back of the letter is a bright orange sticker bearing the words 'Pacific Climate Warriors'. The letter is signed not with the names of the Warriors but their countries of origin: Kiribati, Niue, Samoa, Fiji, Vanuatu, Solomon Islands, Marshall Islands, Tokelau, Tuvalu, Palau, Nauru, Federated States of Micronesia and Papua New Guinea.

This moment of encounter between an assortment of Pacific Island climate activists and the Bishop of Rome points to many of the questions and ideas that permeate through this research. Exploring why these Warriors would travel 17,000 kilometres to share their words opens up questions of responsibility and accountability for climate change. What does it mean for Pacific Islanders – who are often positioned as being on the front line of climate change – to bring their concerns home to those nations historically responsible for ever-increasing carbon dioxide emissions? What connects these Warriors who come from so many different island nations? What does it mean to be and become a Warrior, and thus what does climate activism look like in a Pacific Island context? And given the spiritual focus of their pilgrimage, what is the role of faith in terms of institutional capacity, scriptural knowledge and personal belief in responding to climate change? Can prayer be seen as a form of action? In what ways are Pacific Islanders expressing agency in the face of climate change, rather than passively accepting their fate? And how do Pacific Islander understandings of climate change compare with media portrayals of drowning islands and prospective climate refugees?

1. Climate change as a critical issue

The 5th Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has declared that there is 'clear' human influence on the climate, with 'unequivocal' warming caused by concentrations of carbon dioxide as well as other greenhouse gases that are

'unprecedented in at least the last 800,000 years' (IPCC 2014: 2, 4). The IPCC identifies the diminishing of glaciers, ocean acidification, increasing ocean temperatures and sea level rise as current and future potential consequences of this warming. This scientific concern has been mirrored by recent responses on an intergovernmental level. The Paris Agreement, that emerged during the 21st Conference of the Parties (COP) of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), ambitiously declares a commitment to 'holding the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels' (United Nations 2016) in order to reduce the impacts of climate change.

Concern regarding climate change extends well beyond the plethora of aforementioned acronyms. Climate change is not only a paramount issue of our times but has 'become an idea that now travels well beyond its origins in the natural sciences' (Hulme 2009: xxvi). It has been forewarned by economists that climate change presents risks to economic growth as dire as 'the great wars and the economic depression of the first half of the 20th century' (Stern 2006: ii). It has become a rallying point for social justice activists, who declare that climate change will change everything about our current ways of life, and thus necessitates social, political and economic transformation (Klein 2014). And it has even become a matter of spiritual concern. Part of the rationale for the Warriors' presence at the Vatican in October 2015 emerged from the release of the encyclical *Laudato si': On Care for Our Common Home* by the Pope earlier that year. This text directly addresses issues surrounding climate change, biodiversity loss and global inequality, and argues that these issues cannot be under the purview of scientists alone. Instead the Pope issues a demand for 'a conversation which includes everyone, since the environmental challenge we are undergoing, and its human roots, concern and affect us all' (Laudato si' § 11).

Recognising that climate change is a critical issue not just for natural scientists but has the potential to affect many areas of social life, an interdisciplinary response is imperative. Social science has a fundamental role to play in the project to 'reclaim climate from the natural sciences' (Hulme 2008: 6), and to recognise the local meanings, understandings and responses different communities bring to climate change. Consequently, I am not attempting to address climate change purely on a global scale, but to explore responses to it on a regional and local level, situating my analysis in one of the areas often deemed most vulnerable to climate change impacts: the Pacific Island region.

2. Focusing on the Pacific

First, a note on terminology. Jolly (2007) highlights the extent to which discussions of the 'Pacific Rim' have marginalised and occluded that which is contained within the rim: the Pacific Islands (see Figure 1). Throughout this research my usage of the term 'Pacific' seeks to re-centre that peripherialised centre, referring as shorthand to the Pacific islands, including both sovereign countries and territories of larger states. I recognise the larger nations of Australia and New Zealand are situated ambiguously in relation to the Pacific Island region, and this ambiguity is explored empirically and analytically during the thesis. I synonymously deploy the term 'Oceania', based upon eminent Tongan anthropologist and novelist Epeli Hau'ofa's (1994) formulation of the term as one that embraces the sea, land, and people of the Pacific Island area as an interconnected continent, not a fragmented patchwork of isolated pockets of land. This understanding of Oceania will be further examined in Section 3A of the literature review and will form the conceptual background of the first empirical chapter. Oceania is frequently subdivided into its three constituent sub-regions (Melanesia, Polynesia and Micronesia), illustrated in Figure 1. These categories have been problematised, as I will explore further in Chapter Four.



Figure 1 - The Pacific Island region

2A. Climate change and the Pacific: projected impacts

The countries of Oceania exhibit clear geological differences, encompassing low-lying coral atolls, volcanic islands with highland areas and plate-boundary islands (Barnett and Campbell 2010), yet all fall within the category of Small Island Developing States (SIDS). Oliver-Smith identifies the three primary threats climate change presents to SIDS: 'a loss of ecosystem services', such as food, water supply, and cultural connection to the natural environment, 'loss of land', and 'increase in the intensity and frequency of climate-based natural disasters' (2009: 117–118). The IPCC Fifth Assessment Report elaborates upon these dangers. According to Working Group II, Chapter 29, which focuses upon climate change impacts, adaptation and vulnerability in small islands, these major risks include 'sea-level rise, tropical and extra-tropical cyclones, increasing air and sea surface temperatures, and changing rainfall patterns', in addition to the loss of adaptive capacity and ecosystem services (Nurse et al. 2014: 2). There is 'high confidence' that the global rate of sea level rise is accelerating and that this, in combination of with extreme sea-level events, puts low-lying coastal areas at severe risk from sea-flooding and coastal erosion (ibid). The report is similarly confident that island communities will be negatively affected by the salinisation of groundwater sources and arable soil through waves and storm surges, and the degradation of coral reef systems (a source of livelihood and storm protection) caused by increased sea and air temperatures. Barnett and Campbell (2010) highlight the predicted increase in intensity and decrease in frequency of rainfall as particularly harmful to the Pacific, as it could result in floods, droughts and unreliable agricultural irrigation. These geophysical changes are also likely to have significant negative health impacts and economic consequences through the increase in vector-borne diseases, risk of increased food insecurity and the erosion of livelihoods and loss of infrastructure. Concerns regarding the impacts of sea level rise should not be limited to the atoll states: while many Pacific Island countries are mountainous (such as Fiji, Vanuatu or Tonga), populations, economic activity and roads tend to be concentrated along coastlines (Nunn and Mimura 1997).

The 22 Pacific island states and territories encompass a population of less than ten million (Barnett and Campbell 2010: 5), out of a global population of seven billion. Despite its relatively small population, however, further research on this area remains crucial. Consequently, I will now explore what makes these places important and meaningful in a global context.

2B. Oceania: political, academic and moral significance

The logic for focusing this research on the Pacific is threefold. Firstly, there is much to be learned from islands, and island nations in the Pacific in particular. Secondly, there is a moral responsibility to do so. And thirdly, while there is already a substantial body of literature on the Pacific and climate change, some of this literature could have unintentional consequences, and may in fact be harmful to those that it depicts.

Firstly, research in Pacific Islands has ramifications beyond Oceania. Kelman (2007) argues that other marginal or remote communities adapting to climate change have much to learn from island examples. For instance, threats of coastal erosion and sea level rise are not limited to islands, as ten percent of the world's population live in the 'low elevation coastal zone' (less than ten metres above sea level) (Oliver-Smith 2009: 118). According to Lazrus (2012) islands and climate change are a critical focus both because of the extremity of socio-environmental threats and their role in the global imagination. This significance is evidenced through the permeation of ideas of islands and islandness throughout popular culture (Mezzana et al. 2012), and particularly through the influence that literary and cultural representations of islands as paradisiacal, isolated, small or primitive have had upon contemporary climate change discourses (Farbotko 2010; Barnett and Campbell 2010).

Island countries are also significant on a geopolitical level, due to their forthright stance on tackling climate change. As part of the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) at the annual UNFCCC negotiations, the Pacific nations have been some of the most vocal about the need to curb emissions (Farbotko and McGregor 2010). Evidence of their influence can be seen in the COP21 summit, with Pacific Island delegations playing a crucial role in successfully securing reference to efforts to prevent a temperature rise of greater than 1.5 degrees above pre-industrial levels. Fiji's chairing of the 23rd COP, held in Bonn, further magnified the role of Pacific Island nations in climate geo-politics.

Secondly there is the question of moral responsibility. From a climate justice perspective, (Chatterton et al. 2012), the inequity between the responsibility for anthropogenic climate change (in terms of emissions) and the severity of impacts can be seen in some of its starkest terms in the Pacific. As Dasgupta and Ramanathan note, the world's poorest three billion people are responsible for only 5% of emissions, yet are most at risk of climate change impacts, both due to their 'direct reliance on natural capital' and their limited financial capacity to contend with extreme weather events (2014: 1458). While countries such as Tuvalu have not

been entirely innocent of environmental degradation (Connell 2003), within a global context the negative atmospheric impacts of Pacific Island countries are negligible (Barnett and Campbell 2010: 10), as they are responsible for 0.04% of global emissions, compared with the United States' 30.3%. The concept of 'climate debt' illustrates how wealthier nations owe a debt to Global South countries both through damages caused by climate change, and disproportionate levels of emissions. This argument is not without sound criticism (Simons and Tonak 2010), yet there is a clear case for the moral responsibility of the Global North to the Pacific. Conducting further research that tackles existing research gaps and is guided by affected communities' concerns is one small way of beginning to address this debt. However, that research should not be based on the assumption that the communities in question share the same analysis of responsibility and blame - this nuance is explored throughout the empirical chapters.

Finally, while Oceania's population may be small, the same cannot be said of the journalistic and academic consideration that it has received in relation to climate change. SIDS have been a focus of especial attention although many of the threats they face are not unique to island communities (Mortreux and Barnett 2009). It seems that Pacific islands are often presented as 'an archetypical "vulnerable-to-climate-change" place' (Webber 2013: 2717). Central to this is the dramatic potency of sea level rise (Mortreux and Barnett 2009), even though many other climate impacts are more imminent and can occur regardless of rising sea levels (Barnett and Campbell 2010). The prospect of entire nations being engulfed under the waves appears to have captured cinematic, journalistic and academic imaginations. The status of the Pacific as a climate *cause célèbre* does not in itself legitimate further research. Yet there is the potential to problematise how much of the debate is currently framed. There is a common scholarly and media narrative of inevitable loss, victimhood and island expendability - the 'inevitable inundation discourse' - that should be both empirically and politically challenged. It seems that this current dominant narrative is not facilitating effective action in terms of mitigation or adaptation, nor is it enabling a sympathetic understanding of the meaning of climate change for threatened communities. Thus, much of the current representation may be doing greater harm than good.

3. Drowning islands and Anthropocenic story-telling

Following Rudiak-Gould's assertion that climate change can be understood as 'a yardstick, metonym, or epitome of the Anthropocene more generally' (2015: 48), I situate this concern

about representations of climate change and Pacific Islands within literature exploring relations between narrative and the concept of the Anthropocene (the notion that we have entered a new geological epoch in which humans are acting as a dominant force upon the Earth's systems). Acknowledging geological debates regarding the epoch's starting date and social science contestations over the nomenclature of this new age, I focus on authors who contend that the Anthropocene needs new narratives (Tsing et al. 2017; Haraway 2016a) and is itself produced through narratives (Buck 2015). I outline Buck's presentation of 'horror stories' of the Anthropocene, those that centre the apocalyptic, that exclude forms of knowledge beyond the natural scientific, and those that isolate humanity from the richness and wonder of everyday life. I recognise the resonance between this critique of current stories of the Anthropocene and Bennett's (2001) idea of enchantment, as well as Hulme's (2009) emphasis upon multiple framings of climate change.

I return to a regional concern with the Pacific, recognising that the drowning island or inevitable inundation discourse – the dominant media narrative that presents Pacific Islands as already doomed due to climate change and their inhabitants as passive, prospective climate refugees – is itself a horror story of the Anthropocene. I unpick this horror story further, exploring how it relies upon a simplistic and environmentally determinist understanding of migration, discourages effective responses to climate change, and disempowers and silences those it depicts. Fortunately, this dominant discourse has received substantial critique, from academics such as Farbotko (2005; 2010) Baldwin (2012; 2013), Bettini (2013a) and Barnett and Campbell (2010). Through a focus upon Oceania, this research contributes to this critical scholarship. However, I do not wish to just reiterate and refine existing refutations of this dominant narrative. Critical researchers have clarified why the current discourse should be rejected, but not highlighted existing counter-discourses that could go in its place. This work thus aims to break through this academic impasse, exploring what alternative framings or narratives regarding Oceania and climate change are being circulated by Pacific Islanders.

4. Research aims, questions and objectives

To reiterate, my overall research aim is to explore narratives of climate change and the Pacific Islands that challenge or contest the inevitable inundation or drowning islands discourse. Narrowing from this broader aim, and through engagement with the literature, three key areas for exploration were identified with regards to potential Pacific Islander-led counter-narratives: Epeli Hau'ofa's highly influential 'Sea of Islands' vision and manifestations of Oceanic

regionalism; Pacific Islander-led climate justice[1] activism; and faith-based understandings of and responses to climate change, all of which are discussed at greater length in the literature review (Chapter Two).

Turning to the first key aspect, Hau'ofa (1994) argues that there is a persistent belittlement of the Pacific Islands, emerging from the colonial subdivision of the region and persisting to this day. This belittlement is exacerbated by the inevitable inundation discourse. Yet Oceania is far larger, stronger and more powerful if understood as a united and interconnected continent of land, sea and air – 'a sea of islands' - as opposed to an assortment of fragmented and isolated sites; 'islands in a far sea'. Linked to this, I also draw upon his concept of 'world enlargement', as he argues that through the movements of the Oceanic diaspora further territories are enveloped within Oceania as a large and ever-engulfing growing continent, a further rebuttal of representations of the Pacific Islands as insignificant, weak and small.

Secondly, I focused upon climate justice activism for three reasons. Firstly, it addresses a current gap in the literature: much of the existing scholarship regarding climate change and the Pacific Islands concentrates largely on governmental actions and perspectives, with limited attention to civil society responses. Consequently, the narratives produced and disseminated by grassroots climate activists are under-researched. Secondly, it theoretically responds to two interlinked concerns: the depoliticisation of environmental discourse (Swyngedouw 2010) and extent to which narratives of island vulnerability entail a 'foreclosing [of] alternative and empowering political identities' (Webber 2013: 2720). I seek to counter these two tendencies by concentrating upon the understandings and practices of Pacific Islander climate activists as explicitly political subjects, a perspective currently lacking in the Pacific Islands and climate change literature (Ransan-Cooper et al. 2015). Thirdly, it builds upon my pre-existing academic and personal interest in climate activism. My background in UK-based environmental campaigning provides both the contextual understanding to recognise the distinctions and convergences between Western and Pacific modes of activism and a basis of connection between me and my research participants.

Finally, the focus on religious perspectives emerges as a response to the shortage of social scientific research into how religious understandings inform what people are saying and doing about climate change (Haluza-Delay 2014), the failure of existing secular approaches to climate

[1] I explore the contested and polysemous nature of 'climate justice' in Chapter Two, Section 3B.

change adaptation in the Pacific Islands (Nunn 2017) and the reductive approach of many academic accounts of religious responses to climate change in Oceania, which tend to homogenise religious understandings and treat them as a barrier to climate adaptation (Kempf 2017), as opposed to as a resource (Hulme 2017).

Thus, the focus upon these three areas in turn is designed to address re-evaluations of the power of Oceania as a region vis-a-vis climate change, to rethink the capacity and attitudes of those within the region confronting climate change, and to challenge the purely scientific framings of climate change that underpin the inevitable inundation discourse.

Consequently, my three research questions are:

1. To what extent can contemporary climate justice networks in the Pacific be understood through the Sea of Islands vision, as a form of Oceanic regionalism?

2. How does engagement with climate change activism in a Pacific Island context shape political and activist identities and subjectivities?

3. How do religious beliefs inform understandings of climate change in terms of responsibility and the capacity for action?

Through answering these questions, my research makes original contributions in three areas. Firstly, that of Pacific Studies, through the empirical and analytical evaluation of Hau'ofa's Sea of Islands vision. Secondly, I wish to contribute to the critical literature (that straddles Human Geography, Anthropology and broader social science) that is challenging the inevitable inundation discourse, through providing not just further refutations, but empirical examples of counter-narratives, and particularly highlighting political agency. In doing so, I wish to contribute to the broader literatures concerning narrative and the Anthropocene and the different communicative framings of climate change, through documenting locally meaningful stories and understandings of climate change, and actions and practices that emerge from those. Finally, I wish to further the field exploring the relationships between religious perspectives and climate change, and in doing so, showcase both the heterogeneity of religious viewpoints as well as challenge their academic marginalisation.

5. Research design

As detailed in Chapter Three, I ascertained that verbal, face-to-face methods would be

necessary to elicit the data required regarding practices, narratives and understandings of climate change in the Pacific Islands. After considering and eliminating alternative approaches I concluded interviews and participant observation were the most suitable methods. In determining a field site and case studies, I reasoned that my analytical emphasis upon regionalism and interconnection also methodologically necessitated multi-sited research (Marcus 1995), as while the connection between mobility and Pacific identity is regularly noted, a lot of research still concentrates on single areas, perpetuating an isolated understanding of them (Teaiwa 2005).

My desire to explore regionalism and activism as well as faith in the Pacific Island region drew me to the Pacific Climate Warriors, who I first encountered via their youtube videos. They are a network of Pacific Islander climate activists from across the region, who cohere around a campaign slogan of 'we are not drowning, we are fighting', which suggests some level of contestation of the inevitable inundation discourse. In accordance with my first two research questions, I wished to explore the perspectives and actions of this group in terms of regionally-coordinated manifestations of climate activism. This therefore took me to Australia for the first leg of my fieldwork, where during October 2014 members of the Pacific Climate Warriors from twelve different countries assembled for the 'Stand Up for the Pacific' campaign, a mass demonstration and awareness raising tour. While this first period of fieldwork (Phase I) gave me some insight into the impact of Christian faith on climate responses, to investigate my third research question in sufficient depth I needed to conduct research with a broader range of participants and be immersed in a Pacific Island context, and thus conducted four months research in Vanuatu (Phase II).

6. Background to case studies

6A. Phase I case study: the Pacific Climate Warriors

Throughout this thesis I predominately use the phrase 'Pacific Climate Warriors' or 'Warriors' to describe those volunteer activists who came from different parts of the Pacific Island region to participate in the campaign and actions in Australia (detailed below), and the phrase '350 Pacific' to refer to the paid employees of that group who had a managing and co-ordinating role in the campaign[2].

The Pacific Climate Warriors are members of 350 Pacific, a regional chapter of 350.org.

[2] During this period three of the four 350 Pacific staff/ organisers were Pacific Islanders.

350.org - named after their target number of parts per million of CO_2 in the atmosphere - formed in 2008 and organises online petitions around climate issues, coordinates global days of protest, and has a substantial presence at UNFCCC negotiations as a civil society organisation. 350 Pacific, which at the time of my fieldwork (2014-2015) had a small paid staff of four and many active volunteers, emerged in 2009, and prior to the Climate Warriors campaign organised a number of workshops around climate change leadership in Fiji and New Zealand.

The initial idea for the Pacific Climate Warriors campaign emerged in 2012 and culminated in a 'day of action' in March 2013. Based on that day of action, a three-minute video 'We Are Not Drowning – We Are Fighting' (350 Pacific 2013a) was produced, that premièred at 350.org's international climate activist gathering Global Power Shift in Istanbul in June 2013, bringing 350 Pacific's campaign international attention. The Not Drowning but Fighting day of action involved activists from 14 different Pacific island states and territories performing ceremonial dances and performances of defiance towards the threat of climate change, deliberately invoking and identifying with warrior imagery, in a manner that was tailored to the different cultural traditions of the respective islands (Figure 2).

Figure 2 - The Tokelau 'We are not drowning, we are fighting' day of action

Having first viewed the Not Drowning but Fighting video in mid 2013, I was intrigued by the Warrior narrative, one that explicitly presents images of strength and power, as opposed to reproducing a narrative of victimhood. It stands in bold contrast to the inevitable inundation discourse perpetuated by many academic and media sources. Through it aspects of confrontation and antagonism are explicitly incorporated into 350 Pacific's strategic approach. This is evident in the proposed qualities of a Pacific Climate Warrior: 'A warrior stands their ground against an adversary, against injustice and against oppression' (350 Pacific 2013b: 4). While antagonistic, the violent associations with the phrase 'warrior' are explicitly rejected, as a Climate Warrior is defined as 'not aggressive, but is assertive' (ibid).

Following the launch of the campaign, 'Warrior trainings' were held across Oceania, educating communities about the threats climate change poses to their particular country, and encouraging them to establish their own local 350 groups and participate in the upcoming tour in Australia. As part of 350 Pacific's three-year campaign strategy, April 2014 saw a traditional canoe building day of action, in which different communities identified suitable trees, performed preparatory blessings or began felling the selected tree (see for example Island Reach 2014a).

The campaign climaxed in October 2014, when thirty Warriors from twelve different island nations gathered in Australia for two weeks of training (explored in detail in Chapter Five), including a visit to Maules Creek, in northern New South Wales. Maules Creek is the site of the Tarrawonga coal mine as well as the location where, in 2014, Whitehaven Coal were planning to open one of Australia's largest open cast mines and were facing fierce resistance from local Aboriginal and environmental activists. The training was followed by a series of direct actions. Direct action can be defined as 'a matter of taking social change into one's own hands, by intervening directly in a situation rather than appealing to an external agent (typically the government) for its rectification' (Gordon 2009: 254-255). There is often in practice an overlap between direct action and civil disobedience, yet the two are not synonymous. While the latter by definition involves deliberately refusing to comply with a law and openly accepting the consequences of that, direct action can but does not need to involve these components, and instead the emphasis is upon the direct remedying of a problem (Trapese Collective 2007: 263). However, in many cases actions labelled 'direct action' are in effect still mediated, symbolic and form part of an appeal to an external authority (Graeber 2009). The actions taken by the Pacific Climate Warriors and their supporters combine elements of symbolic action, governmental

lobbying, direct action and transformation of the self (as discussed in Chapter Five).

The largest action - and primary focus of my first and second empirical chapters - took place in Newcastle, New South Wales, the site of the world's largest coal export port. There the Warriors, supported by a few hundred local Australian activists, blockaded the coal port for most of the day, using a flotilla of hand-carved canoes (produced during the aforementioned canoe building day of action) and kayaks, and managed to prevent the majority of coal ships from leaving or accessing the port. While there is some debate over the precise numbers, it has been claimed that ten coal ships and 578,000 tonnes of coal were prevented from leaving the port by the flotilla (Fox 2016). This is the standard numeric of success shared by the Warriors, and suggests a direct impact of the action. This flotilla was the sixth of its kind to take place in Newcastle Harbour, but the first to be led by Pacific Islanders. The use of the flotilla as a site-specific tactic can be situated within a clear Australian activist genealogy (Evans 2010), stretching back to the 2008 Camp for Climate Action held in Newcastle, New South Wales, a week-long radical environmental protest camp held to coincide with the British-based camp of the same name that operated annually from 2006-2010, and which, coincidentally, was my entry point to climate activism and to grappling with understandings of climate change.

Following the main action in Newcastle, pairs of Warriors (who had been trained as media spokespeople) departed for Perth, Canberra, Sydney, Brisbane and Melbourne (with the remaining nineteen Warriors holidaying or visiting family in Sydney). In each city a speaking event was organised for the general public, the Warriors met with members of the Pacific Island diaspora and sometimes additional influential figures (such as one of the Green members of parliament in Canberra) and a solidarity action was held, targeting different aspects of Australian fossil fuel infrastructure. In Canberra this was at the National Minerals Council; in Sydney the offices of Whitehaven Coal (who were constructing the Maules Creek mine); Melbourne, the headquarters of ANZ Bank (who were helping to finance the mine); Perth, Buru Energy's offices (due to their involvement in unconventional gas in Western Australia), and Brisbane (where they participated in another flotilla). All these actions (with the exception of the symbolic Brisbane flotilla) were intended to risk the arrest of Australian participants but not the Warriors themselves, unlike the Newcastle flotilla.

The Pacific Climate Warriors have received some coverage in academic literature. Steiner (2015) discusses the early stages of the Pacific Climate Warriors campaign, conducting a close reading of the Tokelaun and Fijian performances that formed part of the 'We are not drowning,

we are fighting' day of action in 2013. I wish to build upon Steiner's work in a number of ways. Firstly, chronologically, as she only discusses the campaign up until the building of the canoes. She pays significant attention to the potential of the Fiji to Australia voyaging dimension of the campaign which did not in the end materialise. In my work I have the opportunity to discuss the next stage of the campaign: the Newcastle blockade.

Secondly, Steiner invokes Epeli Hau'ofa's most famous work – *Our Sea of Islands* – in her title 'A Sea of Warriors' and applies his ideas in terms of emphasising the importance of connection between Pacific Islanders and drawing a parallel between the dichotomy of the Sea of Islands/ Oceania and drowning islands/ united Warriors. However, as will be discussed in Chapter Four, I believe his ideas can be taken much further, in terms of unpicking how these connections and regional identities are formed, how this strengthened Oceania manifests, and identifying empirical shortcomings of Hau'ofa's vision. Steiner also signposts the significance of faith and controversy surrounding the story of Noah, which will be explored further in Chapter Six.

Thirdly, I wish to expand upon her work methodologically. Similar to McNamara and Farbotko (2017), Steiner contends that through the use of war dances, the Warriors are 'constructing an identity of unity and empowerment' (154), an analysis that I generally concur with, and which adds further justification to my choice of case study. However, I wish to look beyond the press releases and campaign videos, and through the use of interviews and embedded participant observation more deeply understand the lived practices of the Warriors as they generate these alternative narratives, including obstacles they encounter that may be excluded from their media messages. My project is consonant with Steiner's, as she concludes with the hope that her piece will inspire the sharing of further stories.

Meanwhile, McNamara and Farbotko (2017), two scholars who are key to the contestation of the inevitable inundation discourse, contend that the Pacific Climate Warriors are a group that are challenging the inevitability of climate migration, reaffirming their suitability as a case study for my research. Indeed, there is congruity between my own objectives and that of the Pacific Climate Warriors. While I argue the existing framing of the Pacific Islands in relation to climate change is insufficient within academic and media accounts, the Pacific Climate Warriors are also explicitly trying to challenge and reframe the narrative. As one 350 Pacific organiser described in a speaking event after the blockade, the campaign's focus was on 'owning the narrative and challenging what we're told about the future of the islands in the media, and fracture the direction we're told we're going in'. Thus, my research responds to this by

documenting this alternative narrative and channelling those voices, rather than producing a new narrative myself.

I also wish to build upon the existing literature's initial examination of the Pacific Climate Warriors as political actors. As McNamara and Farbotko (2017: 21) note 'the Pacific Climate Warriors have been acclaimed in climate debates for their clear assertion and exercise of political agency'. The question of their 'political agency' deserves further investigation. I concur with McNamara and Farbotko that the category of 'Warriors' can be unpicked further, but while they explicitly focus upon 'the *image* of the Pacific Climate Warrior' (21), I wish to go beyond presentation and explore the process of becoming and being a Pacific Climate Warrior, in terms of political subjectivity, as documented in Chapter Five.

6B. Phase II case study: climate advocacy and adaptation initiatives in Vanuatu

While I concentrate on the Pacific Climate Warriors campaign in the first two empirical chapters, in Chapter Six I turn to my second case study: climate advocacy and climate adaptation initiatives in Vanuatu, with a particular focus upon religious responses. Vanuatu is an archipelago of 82 islands, 65 inhabited, located in the South West Pacific Ocean, approximately 1,750 kilometres east of Australia. It has a population of 272,459, of which just under 25% live in an urban centre, including 50,944 in Port Vila (Vanuatu National Statistics Office (VNSO) 2017), the capital city on the island of Efate, where I conducted the majority of my fieldwork. It is a lower middle income country, with a gross national product of US$ 774,000,000 (World Bank 2016) and its major industries are tourism, forestry, fishing, exporting coffee, kava (a narcotic root) and copra, and offshore financial services. However, a majority of the population wholly or primarily engage in subsistence agriculture (Government of Vanuatu 2011a).

Vanuatu, which has a tropical climate and experiences the El Nino-Southern Oscillation, is affected by earthquakes, volcanoes and cyclones (Walshe and Nunn 2012), and is considered vulnerable to a number of climate change impacts including increased droughts, flooding and sea level rise (Government of Vanuatu 2011b). The country was struck by a category five cyclone – Cyclone Pam – in 2015, just a few months before the beginning of my fieldwork, which was the severest the country had experienced since Cyclone Uma in 1987, and was explicitly linked by the nation's prime minister to climate change (Walker and Farrell 2015).



Figure 3 - Map of Vanuatu

Vanuatu became an independent nation state in 1980. Prior to that it was a joint colony of the French and British empires – the Anglo-French condominium of the New Hebrides. As a consequence of its dual imperial heritage it has three official languages: English, French, and Bislama. Vanuatu also boasts at least 80 native languages, giving it the highest per capita indigenous language density in the world (Crowley 2004). Bislama emerged as a pidgin

language in the late 19th century, as an evolution of South Seas Jargon, as plantation workers from linguistically diverse parts of the archipelago sought a means of mutual intelligibility (ibid). While its vocabulary is close to English, its pronunciation and grammar are very distinct, and it acts as the *lingua franca* of the nation. As a further consequence of its colonial past, the Ni-Vanuatu population is overwhelmingly Christian, but there is also strong maintenance of pre-colonial beliefs and practices (known in Bislama as *kastom*). The different belief systems of Vanuatu are discussed in greater length in Chapter Six.

Early anthropological accounts of the New Hebrides paid significant attention to the phenomena of cargo cults, predominately those that emerged in the southern island of Tanna (Guiart 1956; Worsley 1968; Lindstrom 1981). These cults were millenarian, centred around charismatic individuals, and have been interpreted by some as a form of anti-colonial resistance. The most famous of these cults, the John Frum movement, still has an ongoing spiritual and political presence on Tanna, though its membership has significantly waned. Due to the small size of the remaining cults and their geographical location (far south of where I conducted my fieldwork) they do not feature in my thesis, yet they highlight the continuing academic interest in religious movements in Vanuatu and their visions of the future, a tradition that I continue in Chapter Six. Since independence there has been greater academic attention on the role of *kastom* in nation-building, as well as its relationship to Christianity and modernity (Tonkinson 1982; Jolly 1992; Taylor 2016a).

There is substantial research into climate change responses and understandings in Vanuatu. This includes explorations of networked governance approaches to disaster management in Vanuatu, particularly the integration of disaster risk reduction and climate change adaptation by governmental and non-governmental actors (Vachette 2017), as well as examinations of local knowledge, including traditional calendars, that can facilitate effective responses to climate change (Granderson 2017; Mondragón 2004). Meanwhile Warrick (2011) has focused on community-based adaptation to climate change in the northern island of Mota Lava, noting the discrepancy between international discourses of adaptation that determine the causes of vulnerability to be biophysical climatological phenomena that demand technical solutions, compared with local understandings that emphasise the social basis of vulnerability. Already this indicates the diversity of narrative framings and epistemologies of climate change in a Vanuatu context. There is an opportunity to explore religious responses to climate change further, while also building on the traditions of earlier anthropological work.

7. Outline of chapters

In Chapter Two, my literature review, I begin by highlighting the role of narrative in debates surrounding the Anthropocene, and the significance of how climate change is narratively framed. I introduce the 'inevitable inundation discourse' as a Pacific Island example of an apocalyptic 'horror story' (Buck 2015) of the Anthropocene, and highlight its various shortcomings as an inaccurate and disempowering narrative.

Having established the value of investigating alternative discourses and counter-narratives of the Pacific Islands and climate change, I identify three key areas to explore. Firstly, I consider the contributions of Pacific perspectives, focusing on Epeli Hau'ofa's highly influential Sea of Islands vision, and its challenges to the belittlement of the Pacific, a belittlement exacerbated by the inevitable inundation discourse (Section 3A). Reflecting upon the post-political critique of dominant climate migration discourses outlined in Section 2, I turn to literature concerning climate activist movements (Section 3B), pairing this with a focus on the emotional geographies of climate change and the role of affect in social movements (Section 3C), noting the absence of literature that explores activism in a specifically Pacific context. Finally, I explore the potential for religious understandings of climate change in the Pacific Island region (Section 4), looking to redress the shortage of literature concerning religious practices and climate change, as well as challenging reductive analyses of religion as a barrier to climate action.

Turning from the theoretical to the empirical, I begin Chapter Three, my methodology, by presenting my research method rationale and reviewing my data collection process. My qualitative case study research was conducted in two phases, in two different sites, working in partnership with two main civil society organisations and one international development agency. I used participant observation and semi-structured interviews as my primary research methods. Using 'purposive non-random sampling' (Davis et al. 2007: 166) I interviewed over 60 individuals from a range of demographic categories: active and former members of 350 Pacific and 350 Vanuatu; governmental and chiefly authorities; local and ex-patriate NGO workers involved in climate change adaptation and advocacy; and priests and religious authorities.

For the final section of my methodology chapter I reflect in greater depth upon the ethics of my research practice. In particular I examine three areas that emerge from the indigenous research methods literature: problematising anonymity, embracing sagacity and practicing reciprocity. While not claiming to situate myself as a practitioner of indigenous research

methods, I evaluate the efforts I have made in these three areas.

In the following two chapters, I focus on the Pacific Climate Warriors as a case study. In Chapter Four, I examine the Pacific Climate Warrior campaign through the lens of Epeli Hau'ofa's (1994) Sea of Islands vision. Recognising his vision's potential to contest the inevitable inundation discourse, as well as the region's general belittlement, I explore to what extent features of this Sea of Islands vision are being realised on the ground. I identify manifestations of Oceanic regionalism via the formation of familial bonds (highlighting the significance of kinship to a Pacific mode of activism) and through performances of fluid, composite pan-Pacific identities, using traditional garments, flags, song and dance. I also rework Hau'ofa's concept of world enlargement – the all-engulfing expansion of Oceania's reach to include diasporic Pacific communities – to consider the ways in which the Warriors' campaign subverted power relations between the Pacific Islands and Australia, as well as the rest of the world. I identify how the process of world enlargement manifests firstly via Pacific Island concerns being brought home to Australia, secondly through the Warriors acting globally, rather than only in their own nations' interests, and thirdly through their stance on re-educating Australia. Finally, I raise questions about inequalities in both Hau'ofa's model of regionalism and the Warriors' embodiments of it, in terms of power differentials along gendered and geographic lines. I introduce the concept of relative altitudinal privilege to highlight the manner in which the Warriors' model of regionalism is predicated upon difference in degrees of exposure to risks such as sea level rise, a predication that challenges representations of the Warriors as on the front lines of climate change.

I continue with this focus on the Pacific Climate Warriors in Chapter Five, examining the Warriors as political subjects, as a response to the depoliticisation of the inevitable inundation discourse, gaps in existing climate and migration literature, and the demand for the re-politicisation of the climate debate emerging from the post-politics literature. I combine ideas of the political from Swyngedouw (2010) with Bennett's idea of enchantment[3], through contending that activist identities that compel individuals to ethical action are produced through transformational affective encounters. I document three of the major emotions the Warriors experience – sorrow, fear and anger – and the effects of these affects on their actions and political identities, as well as the disciplinary acts involved in the processes of becoming Warriors. I contextualise the Warriors' experiences using literature on the role of affect and

[3] Concepts that will be fully introduced in Chapter Two.

emotion in social movements, yet note the Western bias in the majority of this literature. By contrast in this chapter I identify some of the potential defining features of an emergent Pacific mode of protest, including an emphasis upon connection to land, kin and faith. In foregrounding affectual encounters in this chapter, I also contribute to a rejection of purely rationalist, secular and science-driven narratives of climate change.

I take this rejection further in my third and final empirical chapter, in which I turn to my second case study – climate initiatives in Vanuatu – and build upon the recognition of the importance of faith in Pacific activist movements in the previous two chapters. Here I explore the potential for religious responses to climate change, particularly biblical narratives, as counterpoints to the inevitable inundation discourse. I establish the significance of Christianity in Vanuatu, and the tensions and convergences between Christian and *kastom* belief systems. I note the marginalisation within the literature of religious responses to climate change, highlighting concerns raised about the story of Noah utilised as a means of climate denial across the atoll states of Oceania. I follow Kempf (2017) in arguing that these academic responses to the Noah story have largely treated religion as a barrier rather than a resource and therefore insisted upon a purification of science and religion. Instead I argue for a *tufala save* approach, one that balances scientific, *kastom* and Christian epistemologies of climate change. I also contend that biblical stories are themselves polysemous and can be told in myriad ways to reach different political and ethical conclusions, demonstrating the heterogeneity of religious responses to climate change. To evidence this, I recount three tellings of the Story of Noah I encountered during my fieldwork – rainbow covenant as denial, Noah as preparation, and Islanders as unjustly outside of the ark. I examine the political imaginaries that are both generated and foreclosed by these different articulations of the Noah story, exploring questions of trust in the divine, the sin of carbon emissions and divine accompaniment in suffering. I conclude by recognising that each telling in its own way foregrounds islander agency and does contest the inevitable inundation discourse, highlighting the richness of locally meaningful and morally compelling counter-narratives of climate change in the Pacific Island region.

I conclude by outlining my five main theoretical contributions: i) contributing towards a 'third wave' of critique of the inevitable inundation discourse, by not further dissecting the discourse but highlighting alternative narrative framings of climate change and the Pacific; ii) interrogating Hau'ofa's work in light of an empirical case study and expanding his notion of world enlargement; iii) combining Swyngedouw's notion of the political with Bennett's vision of affect and enchantment in order to further discussions of those who experience climate

change impacts as political subjects; iv) documenting the diversity of religious narratives of climate change in the Pacific, thereby demonstrating the compatibility of climate change adaptation and biblical understandings, and the importance of balancing multiple epistemologies of climate change, an approach I dub *tufala save*; v) advancing the literature concerning the Anthropocene and narrative by demonstrating what Anthropocenic story-telling might look like, through an emphasis upon plurality and care.

In this final chapter I also unpick questions running throughout my thesis about representation and the process of representing, and identify further potential areas for investigation, including a focus on the more-than-human in the context of climate change in the Pacific, and a further appreciation of the heterogeneity of religious responses to climate change through greater engagement with evangelical Christian denominations.

2. Anthropocenic narratives, drowning islands and religious responses: a literature review

I open by exploring three central debates surrounding the Anthropocene (Section 1): questions over its starting date, nomenclature and the role of narrative. Focusing on this latter question, I critique existing dominant narrative framings of the Anthropocene and recognise that the same lessons apply to narrative framings of climate change. I establish that a purely science-led approach to climate change is insufficient, and instead encourage a focus upon ethics and enchantment.

I then situate these theoretical concerns in a Pacific context (Section 2), highlighting the pervasive nature of the inevitable inundation discourse, an example of the 'horror stories' or inadequate dominant narrative framing of the Anthropocene discussed in the previous section. I dissect this dominant discourse that presents the Pacific Islands as already lost and Pacific Islanders as helpless potential climate refugees. I outline the first wave of critique, focusing on miscalculation and environmentally deterministic understandings of migration. I then turn to the second wave of critique, which emphasises the political disservice the inevitable inundation discourse performs for those it represents, in terms of the disempowering of Islander communities.

Based on this examination of the literature, I establish my overall research aim, which is to explore narratives of climate change and the Pacific Islands that challenge or contest the inevitable inundation discourse. I contend that rather than refining existing refutations of this discourse, highlighting alternative existing narratives could form the basis for a third wave of critique. Consequently, I identify three key areas to explore with regards to potential Pacific Islander-led counter-narratives. First, I consider the contributions of Pacific perspectives, focusing on Epeli Hau'ofa's highly influential 'Sea of Islands' vision and its challenges to the belittlement of the Pacific, a belittlement exacerbated by the inevitable inundation discourse (Section 3A). Reflecting upon the post-political critique of dominant climate migration discourses outlined in Section 2, I turn to literature concerning climate activist movements (Section 3B), combining this with a focus on the emotional geographies of climate change and the role of affect in social movements (Section 3C), and noting the absence of literature that explores activism in a specifically Pacific context. Finally, I explore the potential for religious understandings of climate change in the Pacific Island region (Section 4), looking to redress the shortage of literature concerning religious practices and climate change, as well as challenging

reductive analyses of religion as a barrier to climate action.

1. Narrating the Anthropocene: challenges and possibilities

The Anthropocene, as both a geological epoch and wider sociopolitical construct, is at the centre of multiple intersecting debates. I begin by navigating two of the main areas of debate: when the Anthropocene began and what we call it, noting how both are underpinned by questions regarding the attribution of moral responsibility. Anchoring my research in the third area of debate – what narratives the Anthropocene requires or generates – I explore the power of narrative, noting the limitations surrounding dominant framings of the Anthropocene. Understanding climate change as a metonym for the Anthropocene, I focus in on the significance of narrative framings of climate change. As an alternative to these dominant framings, I examine calls for a focus upon care, ethics and enchantment, and to move from understanding climate change as a problem to recognising what work it can do for us.

1A. Beginnings, nomenclature and narrative assemblages: debating the Anthropocene

Ever since Paul Crutzen's famous announcement in 2002 that we have left the Holocene behind, and are now living in an age where humans are acting as a geological force upon the planet (Zalasiewicz et al. 2008), the question of when such a time began has been pivotal. While a minority of scholars advocate an early starting event such as the megafauna extinction or the Neolithic revolution (see for example Ruddiman 2003), the most popular theories all centre on actions within the past five hundred years. Thus the major contenders include the mixing of previously separated biota in the early 17th century initiated by European imperialism (the 'Orbis' theory as proposed by Lewis and Maslin 2015a), the rise of carbon dioxide emissions resulting from the invention of the steam engine and the Industrial Revolution (Crutzen 2002), the Great Acceleration of economic growth, technology, communications and fossil fuel consumption from 1945 onward (Steffen et al. 2015), and the peak in levels of radioactive isotopes, following two decades of nuclear testing (Lewis and Maslin 2015b). Central to this debate is a question not just of metrics (with Steffen et al. (2011) advocating the use of a Global Strategic Section Age in contrast with Lewis and Maslin's (2015a) commitment to a Global Boundary Strategic Section and Point) but also morality, as the choice of starting date shapes one's understanding of who constitutes 'the Anthropos' and who consequently should be held to account for our current ecological predicament, particularly with regards to anthropogenic climate change.

Consequently, it is unsurprising that this controversy exceeds the merely geological. Not just the starting date, but the very nomenclature of the Anthropocene is a site of contention. Geographical and anthropological literatures currently abound with alternative eras. While some authors favour an emphasis on the complicity not of our entire species, but particular socio-economic systems, be it the 'Capitalocene' (Moore 2016; Altvater 2016; Parenti 2016) or the 'Plantationocene' (Haraway et al. 2016), others hold culpable specific sub-sets of humanity, with the terminology of the 'Anglocene' (Bonneuil and Fressoz 2016) or the more sardonic 'Manthropocene' (Raworth 2014). By contrast, McBrien (2016) reframes the debate in terms of consequence rather than cause, championing the 'Necrocene' as a recognition of the mass biological and cultural extinction that characterises our current epoch.

Through this research, I do not intend to add another name to the pile. As Bonneuill and Fressoz (2016) have illustrated through structuring their work around a succession of neologisms (including the increasingly poetic 'Thanatocene' and 'Polemocene'), the potential variations in nomenclature appear endless. Instead, I wish to acknowledge my relationship to this literature in three ways.

Firstly, when referencing these debates regarding our current unprecedented epoch, I favour the language of Anthropocene, as opposed to its many alternatives. In this I follow Chakrabarty (2009), who critically interrogates the figure of the Anthropos as agent, recognising a need to bring histories of capitalism into our understanding of the Anthropocene, while not making it synonymous with capitalism. He recognises the role of capitalism in the intensification of fossil fuel consumption as well as critiques of the Anthropos, namely that poorer nations and poorer populations within richer countries should not be equally blamed for the climate crisis, yet argues that a species view is not incompatible with a recognition of the workings of capitalism and imperialism, and with a common but differentiated responsibility approach. Moreover, he argues that there are boundary conditions for human life on our planet (such as temperature and ocean acidity) that are not connected to the logic of capitalism or any political ideology or form. While not all of humanity is equally responsible for our current state, he takes a species viewpoint in terms of our 'shared catastrophe that we have all fallen into' (219). However, as well as diversely differentiated responsibility, I would argue that we also need to recognise diversely distributed outcomes: that some have fallen further into this catastrophe than others, irrespective of their degrees of responsibility, something which Chakrabarty does allude to in his acknowledgement that climate change has the potential to exacerbate existing capitalist inequalities. Chakrabarty draws a distinction between the climate crisis and other forms of

capitalist crisis, with the argument that the wealthy are less able to use the forces of capital to extract themselves from the former. However, with respect to the politics of climate adaptation, the discrepancy between the adaptation of the rich and the poor must still be acknowledged. In Chakrabarty's work there is also a convergence between a concern with climate change and with the Anthropocene, one that my work mirrors, following Rudiak-Gould's recognition that climate change is often embraced as a 'yardstick, metonym, or epitome of the Anthropocene more generally' (2015: 48).

Returning to a geological lens, this combination of anti-capitalist and anti-imperialist critique with a species-level analysis is also found in Lewis and Maslin's 'Orbis' theory (2015a), as they propose 1610 as the beginning of the Anthropocene, both due to the mixing of previously continentally-separated biota and because of the dip in carbon dioxide concentrations occasioned by the enormous loss of indigenous human life in the Americas. These two factors are temporally aligned and united by their origins in European colonialism, which is also recognised by the Orbis proponents as a foundation for the development of industrial society, and thus the ensuing acceleration of fossil fuel consumption.

Secondly, while many scholars are engaging in discourses of the Anthropocene, there is a question over whether it is a publicly circulating discourse, particularly for my research participants. They are actively receiving, engaging, constructing and contesting discourses of climate change, yet all the many 'cenes' appear absent. Yet, as noted above, there is a theoretical convergence between ideas of the Anthropocene and understandings of climate change. Thus, through this research, which is focused upon discourses of climate change, I recognise that debates around climate change can be conceptually contextualised in wider discussions about human-planetary relations without claiming that my research participants are themselves intentionally debating the Anthropocene. Consequently, throughout this research I will primarily focus upon narratives of climate change, but intend that their wider Anthropocenic significance remains clear.

Finally, having reconciled my use of the term Anthropocene with my participants' lack of direct engagement with it, I wish to look beyond questions of date or name. It is a third dimension to the Anthropocene debates that concerns me: understanding the relationship between the Anthropocene and narrative. I follow Donna Haraway, Anna Tsing, Elaine Gan, Heather Swanson and Nils Bubandt in understanding the Anthropocene as both requiring narrative (Haraway 2016a; Tsing et al. 2017) and as an assemblage of narrative (Buck 2015).

Story telling for earthly survival (Terranova 2016), a feature-length documentary focused upon Donna Haraway's most recent work, as well as Tsing et al.'s (2017) project *Arts of Living on a Damaged Planet* with its call for 'new creativities for worlds that are possible' (2017: 176M[4]), both suggest narratives play a crucial role in negotiating our way through this new epoch. Moreover, this desire for narrative extends beyond the social sciences. Tsing et al. (2017) also recognise the value of fiction as an Anthropocenic endeavour as they argue that 'creative writing invites us to imagine the world differently, to listen beyond newspaper headlines to hear those quiet stories about the Anthropocene whispered in small encounters' (2017: 9M). Similarly, Donna Haraway (2015) invokes the thoughts and works of Ursula Le Guin and Octavia E. Butler, famous figures of feminist sci-fi, for her Cthulucenic enterprise. In her coinage of the 'Chthulucene', Haraway brazenly rejects the starting date debate, instead declaring this epoch an 'everwhen'. This alternative neologism decentres the anthropos and invokes the ancestral and ongoing connections between beings, crystallised in the metaphors of spider webs and tentacles, thereby suggesting a blueprint for interspecies care and compassion. In this work, Haraway explicitly resists explanation of the acronym 'S.F.', utilising it to simultaneously evoke speculative fabulations/ feminisms, science-fiction and string figures (one of her latest core metaphors), again suggesting the centrality of narrative.

Meanwhile, Buck captures this notion of Anthropocene as narrative most succinctly in her claim that 'it is more useful, though, to see the Anthropocene as a collection of multiple, related stories, each calling up the reference of another… the whole narrative assemblage adding up to something more than its pieces' (2015: 369-370). Similarly, Haraway (2016b), explicitly positions the Chthulucene as a third story, in contrast to the stories of Anthropocene and Capitalocene, indicating the inextricability of this debate from questions of narrative. Akin to this, Pratt invokes the notion of the Anthropocene as chronotope 'a particular configuration of time and space that generates stories through which a society can examine itself' (2017: 170G), particularly as it positions itself from the future looking upon our present. Thus, at once the Anthropocene is seen as a collection of narratives, the generation of narratives, and a requirement for narrative.

Amongst the different dimensions of the Anthropocene, it is the spectre of climate change I

[4] *Arts of Living* is divided into two halves – Ghosts and Monsters – that each begin at different ends of the book and work towards the centre. Consequently, most page numbers appear twice. To clarify citation, I include a G for Ghosts or an M for Monsters to identify the respective half of the volume.

wish to focus on. Understanding the Anthropocene as both requiring narrative and being itself discursively produced resonates with Hulme's (2016) understanding of climate as always cultural. I wish to follow Hulme (2009) in pinpointing and elucidating different narratives of climate change, and in recognising climate change as both a narrative and physical phenomenon. Moving from the broader concept of the Anthropocene to the specificity of anthropogenic climate change helps to highlight the next key aspect of discussion: the power and importance of narrative.

1B. Framing climate change: the power and potential of narrative

A thread that seems to connect the work of Haraway, Tsing et al., Hulme and Buck is the centrality of narrative to either living with climate change or living through the Anthropocene. For instance, with *Arts of Living on a Dying Planet*, narrative is presented as inextricably entangled with the potential for ethical action. Tsing et al. move away from definitions, and towards ethics, asking 'not what the Anthropocene is but how it will be lived' (Pratt 2017: 170G). This ethical practice is intimately tied to the production of narrative as 'the question of how to live the Anthropocene is inseparable from the question of how to write it. Indeed, writing becomes the way of posing the question of how to live' (ibid). This relationship between ethics and narrative will examined in greater detail in Section 1C.

Meanwhile, Buck emphasises the importance of narrative through recognising the power and material impacts of discourse. She argues that 'Anthropocene storylines have fiscal, ecological, psychological, and other practical effects. These imagined futures shape present and future human and nonhuman ecologies, and geographers are well poised to examine them' (2015: 370). Tsing et al. concur, arguing that 'material worlds and the stories we tell about them are bound up with each other' (2017: 10M).

The importance of narrative is also particularly apparent with respect to climate change, especially if one accepts Hulme's thesis that climate change now has more power 'as a mobilising idea than it does as a physical phenomenon' (Hulme 2009: 328). He argues that the idea of climate change can now be found across the full spectrum of human 'endeavours, institutions, practices and stories' (2009: 322), but that this idea is far from unitary. The spread of climate change as a polysemous idea is evident in the upsurge of 'creative carbon compounds' (Koteyko et al. 2010), new lexical combinations that use carbon as a base (e.g. carbon footprints, carbon guilt), and that through different metaphorical associations shape understandings of climate change in terms of financial processes, lifestyle choices or sceptical

attitudes. Mundane everyday objects, such as cattle grids, are also embroiled in different storylines about climate change and landscape (Leyshon and Geoghegan 2012). The polysemous nature of climate change is particularly pertinent to the case studies that I explore, as Hulme argues that 'the diversities of meanings attached to this expression expands further if one moves outside these formalised webs of exchange, into communities less exposed to globalised knowledge, politics and entertainment' (2009: 325). There is increased academic interest in indigenous communities' varied understandings and framings of climate change (Rudiak-Gould 2012; Crate and Nuttal 2009), as well as multiple, potentially contradictory ontologies of climate change (Goldman et al. 2016).

Thus, climate change according to all these authors is a powerful idea, and one that can carry many different meanings. Yet the power to enlist climate change in service to a particular meaning or agenda is not equally distributed: what is central to this is the control of climate change narratives, particularly through the media. As a case in point, in a study of the US prestige press, Boykoff and Boykoff (2004) found that journalistic norms of balance in representations of climate science and climate denial had led to significant discrepancies between public and scientific climate change discourses. The prestige press' attempts to situate themselves as neutral on the validity of climate science had led to inaccurate coverage in terms of informational bias, and impeded proactive responses to climate change. Indeed, Hulme argues that no climate change narrative is neutral, as different aspects of a story can be framed, filtered and amplified in different ways to emphasise or de-emphasise different aspects, thereby encouraging or discouraging certain courses of action and designations of responsibility. Thus, he emphasises the need to 'understand who controls these narratives and the way they influence what people believe about climate change and its significance' (2009: 215). The significance of media narratives will be reiterated in Section 2 in relation to dominant media portrayals of the Pacific Islands and climate change.

One way of negotiating the many different meanings climate change holds is through story-telling, as through the telling of new stories, we can embark on different projects, directions and solutions, and understand climate change in a different way (Hulme 2009). The increasing volumes of climate change fiction, theatre and poetry (Johns-Putra 2016; Tuhus-Dubrow 2013), as well as recent work to rethink classic literature in the light of climate change (Martin 2016), suggest that ever-expanding numbers of authors and academics are engaged in this project of climate story-telling. This emphasis upon the need for new stories suggests some discontent with the existing framings of climate change in circulation, leading to my next area of enquiry: what

problems do these authors find with current tellings of the Anthropocene?

The problems these authors highlight with existing dominant narratives centre on three key concerns: an emphasis on the human in isolation from the rest of the living world; on the rational and scientific at the expense of wider cultural meaning; and upon the doomed and inevitable as opposed to narratives of hope and wonder.

The first concern is highlighted with respect to the problem of 'hero stories', which through their preoccupation with a central human protagonist neglect the richness and wonder of everyday life. For Haraway (2016a), stories of the Anthropocene and the Capitalocene both fall into this trap, as they centre the destructive actions of the human in a way that replicates the human exceptionalism that has seemingly guided us on our course towards anthropogenic climate change. Tsing et al. concur with the damage wrought by hero narratives, explaining that 'modern heroes – the guardians of progress across disciplines – are part of the problem' 2017: 8M), as 'liveability in the Anthropocene is threatened by just those heroic story lines and practices that are thought to have made Man great' (2017: 10M). As an alternative, Haraway advocates Ursula Le Guin's (1996) carrier bag theory of fiction as a model for Chthulucene storytelling (2016b: 39). The metaphor of the carrier bag (used for transporting children or food) in opposition to the spear (the symbol and apparatus of the violently rapacious hero) conveys a need for storytelling as world-building, which collects up the many components of life and all their rich interconnections. It also speaks to Jane Bennet's (2001) emphasis upon the moments of wonder found within everyday life, a source of enchantment, as she invokes an everydayness that can be captured in the carrier bag, but eludes the hero's tale. As she explains it, 'The experiences that I recycle…are not invaders of the major tale but underground or background residents of it' (2001: 8). Meanwhile Tsing et al. (2017) use the metaphor of weeds when they describe the need to gather up 'the small, partial, and wild stories of more-than-human attempts to stay alive' (2017: 6M), again a metaphor akin to the carrier bag and at odds with the spear.

The second concern is that, according to these researchers, the problem does not just lie with heroes, but the 'horror stories' in which they figure. Curiously, while images of horror suffuse through the work of Tsing et al. (2017), whose project is framed around themes of 'Ghosts' and 'Monsters', and Haraway's alternative epoch of the Chthulucene is littered with spiders, tentacular ones and denizens of the deep (at an uncomfortable and unresolved distance from H.P. Lovecraft's work), these figments of horror are antithetical to the horror stories Buck

invokes. For Buck, the Anthropocene 'horror stories' (370) that we must write against rely upon a Weberian notion of disenchantment, and domination of the planet: they are the tales of geo-engineering fallout, of numbing disconnection from the natural world, of the elevation of scientific knowledge above belief and ethics, and an emphasis upon the secular, rational and bureaucratic. For Buck, central to this disenchantment is an alienation from our own labour, and its consequences upon the planet. As she frames it, 'in popular representation, the more alienated a phenomenon is, the more Anthropocene it gets. Gathering firewood seems quite Holocene in its immediate labor' (2015: 372). For me, this opens the question of what an alienated, disenchanted Anthropocene looks like from a non-Global North or non-Western perspective. Focusing on subsistence agricultural societies – where the gathering of firewood is a contemporary reality – might bring into view some of the alternative Anthropocene retellings that Buck seeks, a contribution that I aim to make.

This latter problem with Anthropocenic narratives – that they focus exclusively upon the scientific, secular and rational – is also pertinent to narratives of climate change. Hulme argues that a purely scientific framing of climate change is insufficient, as 'science may be solving the mysteries of climate, but it is not helping us discover the meaning of climate change' (2009: 325). The provision of greater scientific information alone cannot resolve the political and ethical questions climate change poses, as they are fundamentally questions about how we wish to live in the world. Barnett and Campbell (2010) concur, arguing that while natural science has enormously furthered our understanding of global warming, its dominance is inhibiting the generation of other forms of knowledge about climate change. As an alternative, drawing upon the work of Anderson (2015), Geertz (1973) and Ingold (1994) in his understanding of culture, Hulme argues for the need to move away from a disenchanted view of climate change and instead begin 're-situating culture and the human spirit at the heart of our understanding of climate' (2009: xxxvii), as, through this cultural perspective climate is rendered meaningful, since 'all knowledge of climate is cultural' (Hulme 2016: 7). For this to be achieved, Hulme believes the full gamut of disciplinary expertise is needed to really understand 'the phenomenon and discourse of climate-change' (Hulme 2016: xiii). This concern for interdisciplinary breadth is shared by Tsing et al. (2017) in their collaborations forged between novelists, biologists, archaeologists and anthropologists.

As a third concern, there is a particular strain of horror story that Hulme's (2009) work highlights and rejects: the apocalyptic. In his development of four mythic forms of climate discourse, he identifies 'presaging Apocalypse', a narrative utilised by journalists, campaigners

and politicians, and conveyed through the language of fear, impending disaster and irreversible 'tipping points' cascading into collapse. While this narrative communicates a sense of danger and urgency, Hulme remains uncomfortable with repeated recourse to it as it can be disempowering. According to Salvador and Norton (2011) this can be seen in the case of early 2000's blockbuster *The Day After Tomorrow* whose framing of climate apocalypse and emphasis upon individual survival rather than collective action can actually discourage pro-environmental behaviours. This stance is reinforced by O'Neill and Nicholson-Cole (2009), who contend that catastrophic representations of climate change can distance and desensitise the public or provoke feelings of fatalism or apathy. Instead they advocate visual and iconic framings of climate change that are personally salient: representations that individuals can meaningfully engage with on an everyday basis.

Thus, the work of these authors suggests a need to cast out the hero-protagonist, along with the stories of 'calculability or control, as well as stories of despair and tragic guilt' (Buck 2015: 376). Crucially, these works also help us to think through what sort of stories can go in their place, and the other ways we can think about, feel and narrate climate. As Buck (2015: 370) so succinctly frames it, 'If the Anthropocene was not an anthology of scary tales, drawn from an awkward bricolage of science and preternatural fears, what else could it be?'.

One answer emerges in the form of the many contributions to *Arts of Living on a Dying Planet* (Tsing et al. 2017), with stories of tomatoes flourishing in borderlands in cracked cement, nuclear ghosts post-Chernobyl, lichen lifeworlds and new non-hierarchical biological metaphors. Meanwhile Haraway, as an example of speculative fabulation and multispecies storytelling has co-created 'The Camille Stories: Children of Compost' and demands that we interrogate 'Which stories story stories' (2016b: 39). Similarly, Buck (2015:369) argues for 'aesthetic and cultural production' around alternative visions of the Anthropocene, premised on Jane Bennett's concept of enchantment and an ethic of care.

Enchantment, as envisioned by Bennett, is premised upon 'a reawakened sense of wonder' (Buck 2015: 369), which is accessed through affective sensory experience – allowing one to be struck with wonder in everyday life – and a rejection of cynical alienation and fatalism. Bennett identifies moments of 'crossing' or sensuous (as opposed to purely rational) encounters with objects or other beings as generative of enchantment, and consequently transformation through wonder, enabling ethical life. Moreover, Bennett's work also reveals an underlying preoccupation with narrative, as she describes her rejection of discourses of disenchantment

and her retelling of the situation as an 'alter-tale' (2001: 8) or 'counterstory' (2001: 9).

While the concept of enchantment is not directly addressed, Tsing et al.'s (2017) emphasis upon the curiosity needed to limit environmental destruction and survive the Anthropocene echoes Bennett's idea of wonder and being alert and open to the particular singularity of the natural world. They define curiosity as 'an attunement to multispecies entanglement, complexity and the shimmer all around us' (2017: 11), which resonates with Bennett's command to cultivate enchantment through honing 'sensory receptivity to the marvellous specificity of things' (2001: 4). One of the contributors, Mary Louise Pratt (2017), also partially echoes Bennett's words, as she presents the production of narrative as a process of enchantment, as landscapes are created through writing. Meanwhile, Nils Bubandt's (2017) essay in the volume concerning Lusi, an Indonesian mud volcano, whose causes are mired in a mix of spiritual revenge, geological activity and political corruption, suggests what an account of the Anthropocene that is awake to everyday moments of wonder might look like. Appeals to enchantment are also present in literature concerning narratives and framings of climate change. De Goede and Randalls bring together this present concern with enchantment with ideas of post-politics, to be discussed in Section 2. They explore the 'banality of catastrophe' (2009: 871) produced by the connected discourses and practices of climate change precaution and security preemption, a banality that could both depoliticise and lack enchantment, and thereby, according to Bennett's analysis, inhibit ethical action. Moreover, Smith (2014: 23) echoes previously mentioned concerns about discourses that exclusively focus upon the scientific and rational. He argues that new stories need to be told about climate change that reject the emphasis upon scientific research as a completed project. Instead climate change research could itself become enchanting, through transparently revealing the uncertainty and processes of risk assessment involved in climate change research, across all disciplines.

1C. Ethics of care and ethical choices

Having established the potential for enchantment as a counterpoint to the horror stories of the Anthropocene, I further unpick the role of ethics, both as a crucial dimension of enchantment and as a broader concern of the climate change and narrative literature. A key dimension of this alternative Anthropocene as demanded by Buck is an underlying 'ethic of care' (2015: 369), as engendered through a renewed sense of enchantment. According to Buck's adaptation of Bennett's principles, enchantment springs from intimate and unmediated relations with nature, which then act as a springboard to care and/or revulsion, which in turn inspires action. Here

Tsing and Haraway's projects again both resonate, in terms of demands for an ethics of compassion for human and non-human others, as well as a recognition of species and bodily interdependence, what Haraway sees as 'making kin' (2016a: 5).

However, this is far from the only relationship that can be found between ethics and climate change narratives. Hulme's (2009) analysis of framings of climate and climate change also considers the place of ethics, but not in terms of a pre-given emphasis upon care, but as an examination of the ethical choices open to us as humans in terms of how we choose to live with climate change. Central to this again is Hulme's emphasis upon the limitations of scientific and economic framings of climate change: these articulations provide some insights, but they cannot tell us what constitutes the 'good life' that we should aspire to. The place of narrative and representation is again central. For Hulme, the arts have the potential to 'provoke reflection on the profound questions climate change presents: the good life to be admired, the future to be aspired to and the responsibilities they have to others, both human and non-human' (Hulme 2016: 9). Miles (2010) has questioned the extent to which art can engender a shift in thought and attitudes surrounding climate change, postulating that art could reinforce the distance between the viewer and climate change as a phenomenon. However, Dunaway (2009) takes a more hopeful stance, arguing that art can be used to produce new perspectives on climate change. As well as the catastrophic, art can showcase hopeful and empowering visions of how life could be sustainably lived, and in doing so, move beyond treating climate change as an abstract global issue, instead locally situating it. However, Hulme (2016) disputes the didactic nature of the arts, suggesting that these can provoke reflection, but neither they nor climate science provide easy answers for us, suggesting a limitation to the role of narrative. This is even the case with regard to what he highlights as explicitly moral and ethical framings of climate change, as will be discussed further in Section 4, exploring the relationship between climate discourses and religious understandings.

Consequently, as well as recognising it as a narrative assemblage, we reach the conclusion that an alternative Anthropocene requires alternative tellings, counter-discourses and new stories that potentially embody these ethics and qualities of wonder and care rather than defeat and despair, or at least guide us in our search for a good life in a climatically changing world.

1D. Further directions for research

Thus, in following these authors it is possible to conclude that narrative plays an essential, powerful, and potentially destructive or restorative role with respect to the practices of living

with climate change and in the Anthropocene. Yet Buck (2015) concludes that narrative alone is insufficient. She issues a call for both storytelling and action, as she argues that 'we need to not just retell the Anthropocene but redo it' (2015: 372). For Buck, enchantment as an art of living (to borrow Tsing's phrase) in the Anthropocene can and should be combined with systemic political change, and can provide a momentum for it. Consequently, in this research I examine both discourses and practices, convergences and discord between theory and action, looking at those who are both advocating for systemic change and producing new discursive formations in resistance towards existing narratives.

When considering how to bring these ideas of the role of climate narrative from the theoretical to the empirical, it must also be recognised that that these calls for narrative themselves take narrative forms. For instance, with Tsing et al.'s (2017) project there are shades of both what Hulme (2009) has categorised as metanarratives of lamenting Eden, in their demand for a 'return to multiple pasts' (Tsing et al. 2017: 2G) and a presaging Apocalypse model of urgency, with their emphasis upon the need to 'protect the Holocene entanglements that we need to survive' (ibid). Consequently, Tsing et al.'s project still sits within a problem/ solution framing, envisioning climate change as a problem to be solved, as opposed to a condition under which we have to choose how we want to live. Yet, as Hulme highlights, with this problem framing there is a danger that climate change is fetishised: that it is blamed for all our contemporary woes, leading us to the naive conclusion that 'if climate-change can be stopped then the world would become a safer, more just and desirable place to live' (2016: 78).

By contrast, Hulme provocatively suggests that 'we need to ask not what we can do for climate change, but what climate change can do for us' (2009: 326), through recognising that 'the idea of climate change is an imaginative resource around which our collective and personal identities and projects can, and should, take shape' (xxxviii). Klein's (2014) polemical work takes heed of this potential, mobilising climate change as an opportunity for widespread socio-economic transformation.

Drawing upon Tsing and Haraway, I recognise the need for alternative narratives, and following Bennett and Buck, I also advocate the rejection of the apocalyptic and the embracing of enchantment and sensuous engagements that lead to action as a feature of these alternative framings. Moreover, I wish to bring these ideas in dialogue with Hulme (2009), by understanding these alternative narratives not as a solution, but as a facet of what climate change can potentially do for us. Bearing these concepts in mind, I now focus in on the Pacific

Island region and upon climate narratives, recognising climate change's metonymic relation to the Anthropocene (Rudiak-Gould 2015), as well as the prominence of the Pacific Islands in climate change debates (as discussed in the previous chapter). I look first at one particular horror story and then alternative possible framings that embody these concerns with ethics, enchantment and the more-than-scientific. I focus upon the inevitable inundation or drowning islands narrative, as an example of a fatalistic, apocalyptic and ultimately damaging dominant discourse. I also recognise the secularity of dominant climate discourse as a facet of the Weberian disenchanted rationalist horror stories, and recognise this absence of spiritual thought as a shortcoming of many approaches to climate change internationally, and particularly with respect to the Pacific. A recognition of biblical approaches also presents a further avenue for embracing the mythical potential of narrative (as advocated by Tsing et al. and Hulme) and adds a sense of spiritual wonder to Bennett's secular vision of enchantment. Following this, I focus on the work of Pacific theorist Epeli Hau'ofa and literatures of climate change and religion, in order to look the potential role these ideas play in the generation of alternative narratives that re-enchant, re-inscribe power relations, and open up theological possibility.

2. Helpless, immediate, inevitable: narratives of climate change in the Pacific Islands

Having established the power and significance of how climate change is narrated, as well as some of the shortcomings of dominant discourses and potential alternative approaches to storying the climate, I focus on these questions of climate and narrative in the Pacific. The Pacific Island region is a key site for exploring climate narratives, due to its visibility in discourses of climate vulnerability and the extreme disproportionality between its responsibility for emissions contributions and its exposure to potential and current climate change impacts. Consequently, I begin by outlining a horror story of climate change in the Pacific – the inevitable inundation discourse – and discuss many of its critiques, observing as a gap in the literature the need to explore alternative narratives of climate change in the Pacific, rather than merely further critiquing the dominant discourse.

2A. The inevitable inundation discourse

> High tide in Tuvalu: In the tropical Pacific, climate change threatens to create a real-life Atlantis.
> (Price 2003, cited in Barnett and Campbell 2010: 168)

Media outlets have been suffused with dramatic images of sea level rise and mass forced relocation in the Pacific, with the prospect of whole countries disappearing beneath the waves (Farbotko 2005). Academics, politicians and journalists have coalesced around this dominant discourse of inevitable total inundation and the creation of climate refugees (Farbotko and Lazrus 2012). Barnett and Campbell (2010) identify the key features of this discourse, which they claim has persisted for over a decade: that it often focuses upon geographical places (e.g. the islands), but not the people connected to them; that it homogenises islands and islander communities; that it is concerned with the environmental causes of vulnerability, divorced from social conditions; that in its emphasis upon climate change as a crisis, the potential for local adaptive solutions is overlooked; and that it presumes that island systems are small and powerless in the face of global forces. As a consequence, the ability to practically respond to climate change is jeopardised. But precisely where is this discourse articulated?

Firstly, there are some strong cinematic examples. According to Chambers and Chambers, Tuvalu in particular has become a 'poster child' for climate catastrophe (2007: 294), with at least five films made in less than five years about the threat of global warming to this country of less than 12,000 people. The film titles give an indication of the narrative that is dominating accounts: *Paradise Drowned, That Sinking Feeling, The Disappearing of Tuvalu* and *Before the Flood*. There is an undeniably eschatological tenor to these words. Moreover, many of these films emphasise the powerlessness of Tuvaluan communities, the imminence of Tuvalu's demise, and sometimes reduce documentary participants to 'a scripted dramatic device conveying the theme of impending loss' (2007: 299) rather than enabling islanders to speak for themselves. According to Chambers and Chambers, *Before the Flood* is one of the worst offenders. It portrays migration as inevitable, Tuvaluan culture as barely worth saving, and overlooks the responsibility of the Global North for the intensified environmental challenges that Tuvaluans face.

This discourse of helpless islanders and inevitable inundation is also a media favourite. As Connell wryly notes, 'within journalistic arenas...there is certainty that the demise of Tuvalu is imminent' (2003: 102). Farbotko's (2005) analysis of coverage of Tuvalu and climate change in the Sydney Morning Herald found that the country was repeatedly constructed as small, marginal and inevitably endangered. This representation was portrayed in contradistinction to presentations of Australia as strong and unthreatened by climate change. Moreover, migration was again presented as the only option, as Tuvalu's situation was framed in terms of helplessness and tragic loss. Notably, these representations did not acknowledge the role of Australia's fossil fuel heavy economy in Tuvalu's predicament. Similarly, Barnett and

Campbell's (2010: 168) analysis of media representations of the Pacific and climate change identified the trope of 'titanic states' inevitably sinking, a metaphor that reinforces the helplessness of the countries concerned. Meanwhile, other news accounts have treated island futures in an even more blasé way, such as in the flippant headline 'Tuvalu Toodle-oo' (Barnett and Campbell 2010: 169).

This narrative also has currency within academic analyses, as can be seen in Parenti's work. His book *Trophic of Chaos* dramatically explores climate change as a 'catastrophic convergence' (2011: 7) of political, economic and natural disasters. While he has a number of detailed geographically specific sections, the Pacific receives a glib reference as a victim of inevitable relocation. He claims that 'twenty-two Pacific Island nations, home to seven million people, are planning for relocation as rising seas threaten them with national annihilation' (ibid). The Pacific nations in question are unnamed, homogenised and characterised purely in terms of their relocation efforts.

This discourse appears not just as a means of analysing climate policy, but also seems to be perpetuated or even generated by those who are integral to the current climate governance system. Al Gore in *An Inconvenient Truth* displays images of a king tide[5] in Tuvalu and claims that 'citizens of these Pacific nations [of course unnamed] have all had to evacuate to New Zealand', which is in fact a convenient lie (Farbotko 2010). Similarly, McNamara quotes the Undersecretary General of the UN Office of the High Representative for Small Island Developing States, who claims that 'climate refugees for the small islands is a reality and they cannot deny it' (2008: 39). McNamara understands the mobilisation of this discourse as part of a pragmatic approach by UN diplomats to put the burden for responding to climate change onto small island states, through adaptation strategies, thereby evading the wider international issue of climate justice and the need for mitigation.

This discourse does not just appear to be deployed in order to avoid taking action. It also fits into a humanitarian narrative mobilised by Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) in order to encourage further emissions reductions. While largely rejecting this framework, Farbotko and Lazrus (2012) acknowledge that disappearing islands are a more accessible way of engaging with the threat of climate change than global mean temperatures. Discourses of climate migration crisis have been deliberately employed by the governments of some SIDS. Former

[5] King tides are particularly high tides that can be expected to occur around twice a year.

Maldivian president Mohamed Nasheed vowed to establish a Sovereign Wealth Fund in order to finance the purchase of a new homeland (Kothari 2014), Tuvaluan ministers have publicly evoked a sense of tragic vulnerability (Farbotko 2005) and the Kiribati government has also aired the need to possibly relocate (Loughry and McAdam 2008). Tuvalu has even begun exploiting the potential of last chance tourism (Prideaux and McNamara 2013). Shibuya argues that this narrative of 'apocalyptic urgency' (1996: 548) has been used in order to challenge the largely economic and sceptical framing of climate change proposed by developed nations. McNamara (2008) has also observed this approach by Pacific ambassadors, and interprets it as a counter to delay by wealthier countries.

However, the effectiveness of this approach must be questioned. As Barnett and Campbell (2010) highlight, this narrative of climate emergency has not been matched by an equivalent degree of governmental action, and in many ways this discourse could be harming rather than benefitting those it concerns. This narrative of inevitable loss, victimhood and island expendability should be both empirically and politically challenged, especially as in this discourse of drowning islands it is often the voices of Pacific Islanders themselves that are drowned out.

Fortunately, this alarmist narrative is not without its critics. While not belittling the threats posed by climate change, many researchers have sought to challenge this vision due to empirical uncertainties; its potential for justifying inaction or action that is damaging for affected communities; its emphasis on victimhood; and its failure to encompass the perspective of Islanders themselves, particularly their conceptions of mobility and their capacity to adapt.

2B. Questionable calculations

As Bettini (2013b) identifies, there have been two waves of critique, and this research attempts to formulate a third[6]. The first contests the inevitable forced migration narrative due to the empirical uncertainties and unpredictability, both in terms of climate change impacts and the processes of migration. For a start, the predicted number of climate migrants has been a point of contention. Former United Nations adviser Norman Myers' (2002) figure of 200 million

[6] My proposal for a third wave of critique is distinct from Arnall'a (2015) suggestion of a third wave of climate and migration research. Arnall advocates greater emphasis upon the experiences and perspectives of those potentially affected by climate change-induced migration, a concern I share, yet my focus is more upon the next step that can be taken in challenging the inevitable inundation discourse, as opposed to a general direction climate change and migration research could move in.

climate refugees by 2050 is commonly cited, with one million predicted to be faced with displacement in small island states (Myers 1993). Myers' overall estimate has since increased to 250 million by 2050 (Christian Aid 2007). Meanwhile, Parenti (2011) forecasts 700 million climate migrants by 2050, as well as 500,000 million deaths per year caused by climate change. Not only do these figures not match up, but the logic behind them is questionable. In Myers's work, Tacoli (2009) identifies a conflation of the number of individuals living in areas vulnerable to sea level rise with the expected number of migrants, implying an environmentally determinist relationship between climate change and movement. McNamara (2008: 33) also suspects that Myers' work relies upon an overly 'simplistic causal relationship' between climatic events and migration. There is a danger that these numbers can also conceal the extent to which many displaced individuals are likely to stay within national borders (Kothari 2014). They can also overlook immobility as a response to climate change (Randall et al. 2014) as many who may be motivated to move may lack the resources to do so (Tacoli 2009).

These numbers have been further problematised due to the challenges in precisely predicting climate change impacts. With regards to the Pacific in particular, climate modelling approaches have been critiqued due to their poor applicability to very small island locations (Kelman and West 2009; Lazrus 2012). There is uncertainty regarding where the impacts will be severest, and when the point of uninhabitability on different islands could be reached (Campbell 2010). According to Mortreux and Barnett, this narrative of inevitable migration is perpetuated through, rather than in spite of, this uncertainty, as 'this unhelpful sensationalism surrounding climate change and migration in the Pacific flourishes in the absence of evidence' (2009: 106).

These criticisms highlight more than a basic miscalculation. The challenge of meaningfully predicting the scale of climate-induced migration partly hinges on the difficulty of modelling the complexity of social, cultural and economic factors that affect individuals' motivations for moving or remaining. Castles (2011) situates this issue within a broader disciplinary divide. He identifies an academic schism between environmentalists who emphasise climate change as a new, primary motivating factor in migration, and social scientists, particularly migration researchers, who advocate a multi-causal approach. This is also mirrored by a methodological divide between the use of deductive methods to map and model future displacement, and localised understandings of vulnerability. Clearly aligned with the second camp, Tacoli (2009) argues that there are many other factors beyond the environment that impact the likelihood of migration. For instance, Paton and Fairbairn-Dunlop (2010), in their study of Tuvaluan migration, found that climate change was rated as the least significant motivation for moving,

ranked below that of education, work, health and family. This suggests that climate change is not seen as such an imminent risk in Tuvalu as it is represented as being in international and governmental literatures. Smith's (2013) work on internal migration in Kiribati and Tuvalu also supports Paton and Fairbairn-Dunlop's findings, as again climate change was not the major motivation for relocating. The challenge of distinguishing between environmental and other factors in inducing migration, the lack of agreement over definitions and typologies of environmental refugees and the empirical weakness of many of the extant cases of environmental refugees has led Black (2001) to dispute the very efficacy of the term.

2C. A second wave of critique

But there is more to the critiques of the dominant discourse than just understanding why people migrate or getting the numbers right. As Bettini (2013b) highlights, there is a second wave of critique, which focuses on the political disservice this dominant narrative does to Pacific communities. This narrative disempowers islanders, committing an act of epistemic violence that deprives them of their agency. It enables countries such as Tuvalu or Kiribati to be used as poster children (Paton and Fairbairn-Dunlop 2010) for catastrophic climate change, rather than valued in and of themselves. And ultimately, through its invocation of total inundation, it presents the Pacific as already lost. I will explore these main critiques, looking at how the discourse reduces the incentive for action, and will consider the contentious figure of the climate refugee, the absence of Islander voices and the dominance of ethnocentric conceptions of migration.

Firstly, the dominant inevitability narrative can be challenged from a political perspective, on the grounds that it can reduce the motivation for acting on climate change. For a start, the effectiveness of harnessing fear in order to mobilise environmental action has been questioned. It can unintentionally result in disengagement and apathy (O'Neill and Nicholson-Cole 2009). The discourse of mass climate migration may also have its own particular unintended consequences. It could fuel xenophobic and racist fears about increased immigration, leading to reactionary, securitised responses, rather than encouraging action that benefits threatened communities (Hartmann 2010). Indeed, Hartmann argues that the alarmist narrative resonates so strongly because it draws upon racist fears. Instead, there is a need to interrogate the presumed and naturalised link between environmental degradation, migration and conflict (Bettini 2013a) and to beware of the increasing militarisation of climate change adaptation narratives (Hartmann 2010). Urgent responses also may not lead to the best decisions for island

communities (Kelman and West 2009). For instance, discourses of climate urgency can be used to justify unpopular internal migration policies. Kothari (2014) explores the example of the Maldives, where ongoing economically-motivated attempts to consolidate dispersed populations have been given a new legitimacy through being couched in environmental reasoning.

There are further issues. The propagation of an inevitable migration narrative can be seen as admitting defeat for many island nations (McNamara and Gibson 2009). It can also diminish support for further social and economic development, as countries such as Tuvalu can seem like a lost cause (Farbotko and Lazrus 2012). Through an excessive focus on climate change, the other current social and economic challenges faced by SIDS are occluded (Kelman and West 2009). And due to the future orientation of the dominant migration narrative and fascination with sea-level rise, more immediate and already occurring impacts of climate change, such as freshwater salinisation, are overlooked and adaptation strategies other than migration are marginalised (Farbotko 2005). This issue is critical, as while total inundation in the Pacific is not scientifically inevitable, many islands could still be practicably uninhabitable due to other impacts of climate change (Kelman and West 2009).

Prospects of migration are shaped by the political action that is taken now on climate change, both in terms of mitigation and adaptation (Hartmann 2010). Thus, the propagation of a climate refugee narrative, including humanitarian promises of protection for refugees, has the potential to become self-fulfilling (McNamara and Gibson 2009). The proposed inevitability of relocation also suggests mitigation efforts are hopelessly inadequate and thereby legitimises inaction by carbon-intensive countries. This enables the perpetuation of climate injustice, leaving those nations least responsible for anthropogenic climate change to experience the worse impacts.

Farbotko (2010) sees the use of an inundation narrative as more than a potentially counterproductive rallying cry. She argues that the threat of island inundation and population displacement is required in order to legitimise and maintain a global climate change narrative. There is both a desire to avert sea level rise and a degree of impatience and expectancy – of 'wishful sinking' – as Tuvalu is deemed as expendable and thereby an acceptable price to pay for the global wake-up call that its devastation would produce. Thus, Pacific nations become valuable through their loss.

For Farbotko, Tuvalu is indeed being treated as the 'canary in the coal mine'. It acts as a warning to the rest of the global community of the extremity of the threat of climate change, and like the proverbial canary, it can be sacrificed. Tuvalu acts as proof and validates the fervent predictions of environmentalists worldwide. It almost makes climate change comprehensible and manageable, bringing it forward in time, giving it an immediacy, and concentrating it in space, turning a cause of global concern into the affliction of one of the world's smallest sovereign states. This narrative draws upon ideas of islands as natural laboratories, understood as clearly bounded and isolated (a vision that is challenged in Section 3A). Tuvalu is discursively produced as a microcosm of global climate impacts, as can be seen in the display of 'We are all Tuvaluans' placards by participating NGOs at the 2009 Copenhagen climate change negotiations (Smith 2013). Smith argues that this an example of Tuvalu's future being co-opted to 'further the broader arguments of the international environmental movement' (2013: 27). This raises difficult questions. Tuvaluans are called upon by NGOs to speak for the climate, but what happens when Islander testimonies diverge from the preferred media message (Farbotko and Lazrus 2012)? Yet is it also possible to challenge the construction of 'the environmental movement' and Tuvaluans as mutually exclusive groups?

These attempts to frame Pacific islands as microcosms are part of an ongoing literal and political belittlement of Oceania (Kempf 2009). These contemporary discourses around climate vulnerability evoke former colonial representations of Pacific Islands as 'sites of backwardness, insularity, constraint, fragility and weakness' (Barnett and Campbell 2010: 2). Thus, the climate debate is reinforcing pre-existing notions of vulnerability, or even producing it. Mansfield (2013) argues that climate change is commonly presented as revealing and exacerbating the existing and inherently vulnerable nature of Kiribati, not causing it, thereby placing the blame for this vulnerability on Kiribati. In the case of Sri Lanka, Yamane (2009) found that discourses of climate vulnerability were used to reinforce existing narratives of certain places and groups of people as vulnerable, hazardous and disadvantaged. This approach overlooked the adaptive capacity of the communities designated as vulnerable, and the potential vulnerabilities of other areas, and thus reflected pre-existing stereotypes rather than responding to climate change as a new form of threat.

This last example can be understood through Webber's (2013) concept of 'performative vulnerability'. She explores how vulnerability is enacted by the Kiribati government in order to receive development funding. Crucially in Webber's view, vulnerability is performative and produced, and 'not simply an objective fact in the world' that can be ever more accurately

assessed (2013: 2718). This performance has some benefits in terms of funding secured, and can provide more opportunities for economic migration (Connell 2003). Yet this performance of vulnerability leads to the 'foreclosing [of] alternative and empowering political identities' (Webber 2013: 2720). And ironically, through performing climate vulnerability in order to access funding, in some cases other developmental concerns, such as maternal health, were sidelined, in a way that could in fact increase the overall vulnerability of Kiribati society. Thus, these performances of vulnerability can perpetuate existing notions of vulnerability, disempower and depoliticise, and unintentionally exacerbate existing socio-economic problems.

2D. Interrogating the figure of the climate refugee

Central to this second wave of critique is a problematisation of the figure of the climate refugee. This label and that of the 'environmental migrant' have been at the centre of academic controversy. Climate refugees are not legally recognised and are consequently not offered UN protection, partly because they are not experiencing persecution due to their membership of a particular social group (Farbotko and Lazrus 2012; McAdam 2011). Attempts in May 2014 by an I-Kiribati man, Ionae Teitiota, to seek asylum in New Zealand based on the threat of climate change to his island were rejected by the New Zealand court of appeal (Godfery 2014), a failure which Godfery attributes to the emphasis on climate change as external and environmental, as opposed to an internal source of social and political persecution. Teitiota has since been deported back to Kiribati (McDonald 2015), yet New Zealand Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern has recently mooted plans to introduce a Pacific Islander climate refugee visa (Pearlman 2017).

One response to the current lack of provision has been to advocate for extending existing refugee legislation to include environmental displacement (Kempf 2009). However, the practical impact of this legal adjustment has been questioned. McAdam (2011) argues that there is a serious issue around effective implementation, given the current crises experienced by existing legally recognised refugees. The attempt to expand the definition of 'refugee' could also be used as an opportunity to weaken states' responsibilities to displaced peoples (Hartmann 2010). There may also be significant political resistance to this extension as it could imply certain states are to blame for the existence of the refugees (McNamara 2008). Bettini (2013a) challenges the logic of the legal expansion demand, arguing that this small liberal reform is incongruous with the apocalyptic urgency of the narratives surrounding it. Godfery (2014) similarly declares the extension of refugee legislation as insufficient, arguing instead to

repoliticise the debate and extend the forms of political action involved, including 'social resistance'. Speaking as an indigenous journalist, he proclaims 'the missing link isn't some new legal rule, but mass action'. Godfery's words highlight one of the fundamental issues at stake: the question of how to extend the political vision of climate policy.

The focus upon refugee status can also be seen as politically and morally problematic. There has been an overemphasis upon the legal possibilities of migration and relocation, not the social and cultural aspects (Kelman 2011). Moreover, the label 'climate migrant' itself can be taken to imply that the environment alone caused the displacement, overlooking the wider political, economic and social causes of vulnerability (Farbotko and Lazrus 2012), or even naturalising them (Hartmann 2010). This sole emphasis on the environmental can further abnegate large polluting states of their responsibility for this vulnerability, given that political and economic vulnerability is often found in places that have a history of colonial domination (Lazrus 2009).

The label 'refugee' is also potentially disempowering. Bettini (2013a) argues that the imagery of waves of undifferentiated refugees is de-individuating and de-historicising. It also elides the differences between the varied contexts and impacts of climate change (Farbotko and Lazrus 2012). According to McNamara and Gibson (2009), the climate refugee narrative also denies affected communities their agency, instead confining individuals to a position of victimhood, although arguably becoming a refugee can itself be seen as an act of agency. Power inequities between island countries and wealthier continental nations can be maintained through the presumption that the former is helpless and must be protected by the latter (Farbotko and Lazrus 2012). Alternative framings of Islander identities, such as those that incorporate strength and resourcefulness, are marginalised (Farbotko 2005). Affected Islanders are denied political subjectivities (Bettini 2013a) or subject positions beyond that of victim or environmental protector (Farbotko and Lazrus 2012). Yet the active agency of affected communities is critical to successful responses to the threat of climate change (Lazrus 2012). While the speed and scale of environmental change threatened by global warming is unprecedented (Mercer et al. 2007), indigenous communities have been adapting to environmental changes for millennia, so should not be presumed to be powerless (Crate and Nuttall 2009).

The dominant discourse of climate refugees can also be seen as an orientalising and racialising narrative, according to Baldwin (2012). Drawing on the work of Edward Said and Franz Fanon, Baldwin argues that the climate migrant is produced as the differentiated Other to the environmental citizen. Through this process the climate migrant is racialised, yet what is distinct

from other instances of colonial and post-colonial otherings is that this discourse draws upon future possibilities rather than a colonial past. What is central is the potential to become a climate migrant, and thus a figure associated with ambiguity, displacement and crisis. Baldwin understands securitised climate discourses as an attack upon this potential, as environmental citizens mobilise to prevent its fulfilment, and thus as a war upon the very potentiality of race. Baldwin (2013) also incorporates humanitarian narratives into this approach, arguing that while not racist, the narrative of climate migration victimhood is still racialising, as it defines those affected in opposition to Whiteness. Thus, his work indicates the danger that existing discourses of inevitable climate migration may be perpetuating racial inequalities. However, Baldwin's framework seems to presume that one cannot occupy the position of environmental citizen and potential climate migrant, that of self and other, simultaneously. It fails to comprehend proactive responses to climate change in Oceania, by Pacific Island actors, a key aspect of the third wave of critique that I am articulating. My research challenges this supposed dichotomy, focusing on environmental advocacy groups and projects composed predominately of Pacific Islanders, those iconically positioned as potential migrants.

Not only is the refugee crisis narrative empirically contested and potentially politically counterproductive, it is also at odds with the views and wishes of many affected individuals. This is perhaps unsurprising given that displacement and relocation can in some cases be a 'second disaster' for those affected (Oliver-Smith 2009: 122). Farbotko and Lazrus (2012), Kempf (2009), McAdam (2011) and McNamara and Gibson (2009) all attest to a rejection of the refugee narrative by Tuvaluans and I-Kiribati. Maina Talia, a Tuvaluan climate advocate, clearly states that 'migration is not an option except as a last resort' (2014). McNamara and Gibson's (2009) work places this in context, as they argue that island perspectives and refugee narratives invoke very different visions of the future, with the latter assuming passivity and a requirement to adapt, compared with that of a sovereign and self-defining nation. This resonates with a broader concern within the literature: the need to actively incorporate local voices (Kelman 2010) and the perspectives and cultural understandings of affected communities (Hulme 2008), as Islander voices are currently marginalised in the debate (Paton and Fairbairn-Dunlop 2010).

Finally, it is not just the inevitability of migration that can be questioned, but the question of what migration means within different Pacific Island contexts. Here there is a potential to challenge Western conceptions of migration. Alarmist environmentalist narratives concerned with the number of potential migrants reinforce the notion that migration is 'intrinsically bad'

(Castles 2011: 416). Yet there needs to be a move away from migration being necessarily framed as a problem for receiving countries or the migrants themselves (Tacoli 2009). Rather than a failure of adaptation efforts, migration can be seen as a positive adaptation strategy that has historically long been adopted in the Pacific in response to environmental change (Oliver-Smith 2009). The movement of some workers overseas can be a positive and sustainable means of financially supporting communities in the country of origin. Simati and Gibson (1998) refute the remittance decay hypothesis in the case of Tuvaluan workers in New Zealand, demonstrating that remittances can be a stable source of income. Hau'ofa (1994), in his seminal work *Our Sea of Islands*, argues against an understanding of remittances as a relationship of dependency on larger states, but instead insists they are hard-earned and demonstrate reciprocity and continuing community interdependence. This highlights the extent to which migration is not necessarily an erosion of community identity or loss of culture. As Lilomaiava-Doktor argues, Western understandings of migration as the 'severance of ties, uprootedness and rupture' (2009: 1) can be at odds with local understandings of mobility. They can be seen to reflect a sedentary bias (Farbotko 2005) that normatively values remaining in one place. Instead it is vital to recognise the long history of mobility, migration and interconnection within Oceania, a history that is marginalised by climate refugee narratives (Farbotko and Lazrus 2012). Migration can be seen as an integral part of Pacific cultural practices, rather than a threat to them. This history of active ties and links as opposed to isolation will be explored at greater length in Section 3A. This further demonstrates that there is no simple formula for migration, but that the history and cultural meanings surrounding movement and attachment to land within particular communities must be taken into account.

2E. Oceania, climate change and the importance of the political

As a final aspect of this second wave of critique, I consider how the inevitable inundation discourse has been analysed using a post-politics perspective, suggesting that a focus on the political provides the basis for an alternative framing of climate change that contests this dominant discourse. I wish to follow Bettini (2013a) in understanding the dominant inevitability discourse as symptomatic of what Swyngedouw (2010), developing the work of Mouffe and Ranciere, identifies as the 'post-political condition'. Swyngedouw presents this condition as one in which truly political debates, decisions and disagreements have been displaced by technocratic managerialism. There is space only for a bureaucratic consensus on policy that is in the interest of a financial elite, not for dissenting politics. This is enabled through the use of a narrative of apocalypse and emergency, which is mobilised in order to short-circuit debate

and close off discussion of political options and alternatives. Thus, this eschatological approach depoliticises the governance of climate change. Appeals to the authority of science also play an important role in this political short-circuiting.

Swyngedouw argues that climate politics is not only indicative of the post-political condition but has also played a significant role in the maintenance of it. This is partly through the populism of climate change discourse. Social differences and inequalities are concealed through the presentation of climate change as a global humanitarian threat: everyone is in it together. Consequently, there is no one political or revolutionary subject, such as the working class, that has the ability to present its own conflictual demands. The creation of an external enemy – the fetishised object of CO_2 – also enables this populist approach, as it elides the extent to which the current crisis has emanated from features integral to the capitalist system. Environmental politics within the post-political condition patently lacks a clearly defined ideology. Thus, it becomes concerned with the management of small, distinct problems, rather than the formulation of an overall political vision.

The resonances between this concept and the dominant climate migration narrative are clear. Bettini (2013a) observes how capitalist, humanitarian and radical framings of climate change appear to have converged upon an apocalyptic narrative, again reminiscent of the critiques of the horror stories of the Anthropocene. This doomsday narrative hinders action, as the apocalyptic itself is normalised through its constant evocation and postponement, Swyngedouw's (2010) famous titular 'Apocalypse Forever'. Post-politics declares that radical change is necessary, while in practice changing nothing at all, enabling business as usual and the maintenance of the status quo. Bettini also understands attempts to legalise the status of climate refugees as post-political, as it naturalises these figures as victims and depoliticises them, establishing them as unproblematic and unquestionable.

While there are definitely ways in which the inevitable inundation discourse displays post-political tendencies, the post-politics literature has received substantial critique. Firstly, as Goldstein highlights, claiming climate politics is post-political is 'a decidedly post-political gesture' (2013: 31). It can be seen as too easily accepting the hegemony of neoliberal thought (McCarthy 2013) and can dismiss existing radical and antagonistic manifestations of climate politics (Featherstone 2013). For instance, Chatterton et al. argue that the excessive policing of the Copenhagen climate summit counter demonstrations, including the introduction of new temporary public order laws and the installation of cages to hold climate protestors, 'emphasises

the work that is done to push antagonism out of dominant constructions of the political' (2012: 9). Post-political analysis also seems to define the 'properly political' in overly narrow ways (McCarthy 2013), in particular through its almost exclusive focus on state level politics (Featherstone 2013).

McCarthy (2013) perceives a European bias in post-political analysis, arguing that the concept is not applicable to the US, as in North America there is not yet a positive political consensus around anthropogenic climate change (a point reaffirmed by the actions of the Trump administration with regards to the Paris Agreement). Yet, arguably, US environmental governance is still embedded in a neoliberal management framework that is governed by a post-political ethos. Swyngedouw himself recognises that since the financial crisis, climate change has become a more marginalised governmental concern (Swyngedouw 2013a). However, he sees a continuity in the use of apocalyptic rhetoric, as the decline of civilisation is now framed in terms of capitalist collapse. The temporality of the apocalyptic has also shifted in Swyngedouw's more recent work, as rather than an 'Apocalypse Forever' we have reached the point of 'Apocalypse Now' (Swyngedouw 2013b). He argues that the doomsday vision invoked in the Global North is already a reality for some of the Global South, in terms of natural disasters and food shortages.

I share these concerns about how Swyngedouw frames the political, and the population who are the audience of these apocalyptic narratives. While I recognise the value of a politics of antagonism, Swyngedouw's wholesale rejection of consensus has the potential to occlude solidarity and collaboration as forms of the properly and radically political. I attempt to remedy this through combining a concern with antagonistic politics with a focus on collaboration and connection through drawing upon the work of Epeli Hau'ofa (discussed in Section 3A). I also dispute the extent to which apocalyptic climate discourse is generalising and homogenising. For instance, Swyngedouw (2010) acknowledges that climate change is portrayed as having different impacts, geographically and socially, such as the poor being the worst hit, but argues that this invocation of 'the poor' is used to rally everyone to act and show that everyone will be affected. Yet, actually, this seems to suggest that this discourse is directed at a group that considers the poor as 'other', thereby disaggregating, not homogenising populations in relation to climate change. What analyses of representations of the Pacific in media, film and academic accounts has shown is that it is particularising: the Pacific is othered and objectified through its construction as a particularly tragic victim of climate change. This is perhaps part of a wider issue with the post-political condition as a generalised, abstract narrative that does not heed

different manifestations of climate politics on the ground. The fetishism of CO_2 also seems somewhat overstated, as it overlooks the other external enemies commonly invoked in securitised climate discourses, such as the menace of the climate refugees themselves. Moreover, some of the characteristics Swyngedouw highlights of the already occurring apocalypse, such as natural disasters and food shortages, are indeed already present in countries such as Vanuatu, partially as a result of climate change. Yet it would be inaccurate, if not hysterical, to declare Vanuatu already in the grip of an apocalypse, and would reinforce rather than refute the drowning islands discourse.

While I therefore would not propose it as an overarching framework for interpretation, there are certainly strengths to the idea of the post-political, particularly as a way of understanding certain discourses, as opposed to typifying an entire era as being 'post-political'. The dominance of the inevitable migration narrative shows that an alternative is necessary. And it is this aspect of Swyngedouw's work that I believe offers the most promise. He argues that we need to put the politics back into environmental politics and challenge the global social, economic and political structures that have enabled and continue to perpetuate environmental destruction. As activists, academics and concerned citizens we should be looking for alternative socio-natural visions of the future, visions that recognise difference and conflict and that can be mobilised to create change. This question regarding the future that we wish to see and create again speaks to the questions regarding ethics posed by Haraway, Bennett and Hulme. Consequently, I draw from Swyngedouw the importance of considering the political, but will place his work in dialogue with the above authors, particularly in terms of ideas of enchantment, as will be explored in Chapter Five.

Thus, I have established the prevalence of the inevitable inundation discourse and outlined the critiques it has received in terms of its empirical uncertainties, simplifications of the complexity of drivers of migration, disempowerment of affected communities, and depoliticisation of climate change as an issue. It resembles the horror stories of the Anthropocene in its invocation of the apocalyptic, and in its emphasis upon unavertable loss, and it fails to open up questions about ethics, care or the lives we wish to lead in the time of climate change. Consequently, I now turn to the question of what alternative narratives can be offered in its place. As Barnett and Campbell (2010: 2) observe, 'a new way of representing Pacific island capacities and potential is required'. In particular, this raises the question of how Pacific Islanders represent themselves. In order to explore these possible alternative framings, I begin with the work of Pacific artist and theorist Epeli Hau'ofa and his Sea of Islands vision (Section 3A); then,

maintaining a concern with the political, I consider analyses of environmental justice movements in the Pacific and elsewhere, and following Bennett, foregrounding the role of affect (Section 3B). Finally, in response to the critique of purely rational and scientific approaches to climate change in Section 1, I explore the potential for religious approaches to climate change (Section 4).

3. Reframing narratives: interconnection, activism and affect

In order to explore alternative narrative framings of climate change and the Pacific Islands, I begin by considering Tongan academic Epeli Hau'ofa's Sea of Islands vision (Section 3A). Having outlined the ways in which his work has been applied to the climate change debate so far, I explore the questions it raises in terms of geographical scale. Then, bearing in mind both Hau'ofa's insistence on bottom-up movements and critiques of the depoliticisation of climate discourse (Swyngedouw 2010; De Goede and Randalls 2009; Webber 2013), I turn to attempts to re-inject the political into climate change in the form of climate justice movements (Section 3B). Finally, in response to Bennett's model of enchantment (that intense affectual encounters spur ethical action), I consider the role of affect in protest movements as well as the emotional geographies of climate change, another challenge to purely rational and scientific framings of climate change.

3A. Oceanic interconnection: thinking through our Sea of Islands

As a first port of call, I want to think seriously about how climate change in the Pacific can be approached using Epeli Hau'ofa's (1994) Sea of Islands vision, a revolutionary text that attempts to rally the collective power of Oceania. Hau'ofa's thesis is that there is an ongoing marginalisation and belittlement of the Pacific, and at the core of this is an understanding of the Pacific as made up of small, fragmented, isolated islands. Yet he argues that this fragmentation is the product of the imposition of colonial boundaries and that it neglects the history of material, cultural and political interconnection; of movement and epic voyages that historically characterised the region. Moreover, it fails to recognise the power and potential of Oceania as a large and ever-growing continent composed of ocean, islands and the movements of people, things and ideas across water and land. In his words, 'Oceania is vast, Oceania is expanding' (1994: 160). The contemporary movement of migrants continues a 'world enlargement' (1994: 151), and the locations of Pacific Islander communities in Australia, New Zealand and the United States become enveloped within this enlarging Oceania. According to Hau'ofa, too much emphasis is placed upon the macroeconomic perspective of states and

international organisations in the analyses of island countries. He argues for a reassessment of the Pacific that focuses upon the experiences and practices of the everyday Islander, 'ordinary people, peasants and proletarians' (1994: 148) and that embraces the potential of Oceania's regional interconnection, cooperation and collaboration.

While highly influential within the discipline of Pacific Studies, Hau'ofa's work has received some criticism. Kempf (2009) highlights a regional bias, as seafaring traditions were perhaps more central to Polynesian and Micronesian experiences than that of Melanesia. There have generally been concerns raised about its romanticising tendencies and the overlooking of power differentials and relations of dependency between islands (Lazrus 2012). Perhaps that can be understood in light of the Sea of Islands' purpose. Hau'ofa's work is rousingly polemical, propagandist, and prefigurative: it acts as a vision of what Oceania could be, not necessarily a description of what the Pacific is. This blend of 'poetics, imagination, optimism and utopia' (Kempf 2009: 194) has the potential to challenge existing dominant representations of the Pacific.

Thus, this counter-narrative is undeniably relevant to the climate debate. Kempf (2009) posits that climate-induced migration could act as a further expansion of Oceania, although Mansfield (2013) disagrees, arguing that Hau'ofa's vision of migration is based on choice, not compulsion. Barnett and Campbell (2010) see Hau'ofa's work as a means of understanding adaptive capacity that does not conform to the economic norms and expectations of continental states, but instead draws upon reciprocity and kinship. Similarly, Lazrus presents the Sea of Islands as a means of describing the 'resilience and adaptive capacity of island communities that leverage global networks in the face of local environmental destruction' (2012: 289). This description highlights two pivotal aspects of Hau'ofa's ideas in this context: geographical scale and the potential of grassroots networks in creating change.

Firstly, Hau'ofa's work directly engages with the question of smallness, a key issue in representations of climate change and the Pacific, as islands are commonly presented as small and thereby inherently vulnerable (Barnett and Campbell 2010). Some academics have challenged the equation of smallness as weakness and embraced the Pacific's diminutive landmasses as sources of strength. For instance, Hereniko states that 'like the majority of Pacific Islanders I know, I see many advantages in being small, even dependent' (2001: 167) yet those advantages are not clearly articulated. Kempf's work resonates with Hereniko's statement, as he argues that Pacific Island nations have used their size as an 'argumentative resource' in

highlighting the moral responsibility of larger nations to tackle climate change (2009: 196). Meanwhile, Mansfield (2013) observes that I-Kiribati climate campaigners have been mobilising an alternative discourse, that of 'small-as-adequate', arguing that even though their islands are small, they have been sufficient to sustain their societies for centuries. Yet some of these re-evaluations of the potential of being small come close to the self-articulations of vulnerability seen by Pacific politicians, which so far have not engendered effective responses to climate change and, as discussed in the previous chapter, can actually inhibit action.

By contrast, Hau'ofa's work takes a radically different tack, rejecting the very notion of the Pacific as small through arguing that 'smallness is relative' (1994: 152). His stance is supported by Baldacchino (2008), who postulates that islands are only small when there is a normative presumption of largeness, a presumption created by the dominance of continental thinking. If one considers the proportion of sovereign states globally that are island countries, then small becomes average and normal. Moreover, through Hau'ofa's theory of 'world enlargement' little Pacific islands are transformed into the swelling giant Oceania. This subverts narratives of islands as laboratories or the climate-threatened Pacific as the world in microcosm, as instead Oceania becomes all-engulfing and macrocosmic.

Considering scale in a different way, Nicole George (2011) argues that despite the ubiquitous citation of Epeli Hau'ofa's work in Pacific Studies, not enough people have heeded his words. Few serious attempts have been made to positively reframe the Pacific as a region from a bottom-up perspective, focusing on 'ordinary people' as political actors. She highlights the need for more work on the 'informal sites of regional cooperation' (2011: 59) as there is an excessive focus upon connections forged through institutional relations. This is in spite of the strong history of Pan-Pacific community-level networks that have organised around militarism, independence, women's rights and other issues. Kelman and West (2009) also acknowledge that SIDS research suffers from a top-down bias, and there is a need to bring together top-down and bottom-up approaches.

If one considers the existing academic accounts that foreground island perspectives in relation to climate change, there seems to be a disproportionate emphasis upon governmental representatives. For instance, Farbotko and McGregor (2010), Shibuya (1996) and McNamara and Gibson (2009) are all concentrated on the perspectives of intergovernmental advocates, either within the context of the UNFCCC negotiations or regional bodies such as AOSIS. Due to the reliance on formal spokespeople many journalists' accounts also just reiterate a state-level

narrative on climate change (Farbotko and Lazrus 2012). Yet as Farbotko and Lazrus highlight in the case of Tuvalu, there can be significant distance between dominant civil society framings of climate change, focused around human rights and global citizenship, and governmental narratives that exploit images of vulnerability. The failure to account for viewpoints below that of the ministerial, or that incorporate politics beyond the formalised and parliamentary, is a particularly interesting lacuna within the literature. Moreover, as Shibuya (1996) observes, in countries with very small populations, single individuals can have significant impacts. Hence governmental approaches can be significantly affected by changes in appointments or administration. Consequently, so are academic accounts, if they concentrate only on these governmental levels of practice.

Slatter and Underhill-Sem's work on the relationship between the Pacific Plan (a framework agreed by Pacific Island leaders to work towards regional integration) and economic restructuring provides further evidence of the need for bottom-up approaches. They argue that 'the challenge is to reclaim Pacific regionalism from the clutches of neoliberalism' (2008: 208). They contend it has undergone a shift from political solidarity to forms of market and labour liberalisation that could be very damaging for sustainable development in Oceania and undermine the region's self-determination. Critical to this is the role and position of civil society, as the main challenges to the neoliberal agenda are coming from regional NGOs and their enactments of political as opposed to market regionalism. Similarly, Smith (2013), quoting a member of Kiribati Climate Action, notes the frustration with the current intergovernmental political process, and how greater attention is shifting towards NGOs, civil society and community-led action. In terms of scale, therefore, focusing on civil society can address both an academic shortcoming and an emergent political trend.

Kuletz's (2002) research into the Nuclear Free and Independent Pacific (NFIP) movement demonstrates what analyses of bottom-up regionalism can look like. She documents the movement's combination of anti-nuclear and anti-colonial campaigning that emerged from the legacy of nuclear testing in the Pacific and resistance to attempts to dump nuclear waste in Island territories. As an independence movement, NFIP sought freedom and self-determination not just in terms of legal status, but also cultural and economic independence from former imperial powers, and saw this as only achievable through breaking the shackles of nuclear colonialism. While Kuletz does not directly reference Hau'ofa, her analysis shows a clear affinity with his. She argues that involvement in NFIP enabled a redefinition of identity beyond the local and national, creating a pan-Pacific identity politics based on challenging nuclear

waste. Moreover, she understands inter-island and inter-community cooperation as a form of 'globalisation from below' (2002: 127). Kuletz situates NFIP as part of a global indigenous rights network, thus understanding their campaigning as a form of local resistance supported by global solidarities. Having established the significance and neglect of bottom-up approaches, I now turn to further examples of environmental activism and the alternative narratives of climate change activists are generating.

3B. Movements for climate justice

Focusing on activism and climate justice movements helps to address the concerns previously raised regarding the depoliticisation of climate discourse. While there have been numerous ethnographic studies of climate justice networks in the UK (Woodsworth 2008; Schlembach 2011; Saunders 2012), the same cannot be said for the Pacific. This absence is tackled later in the thesis, as I recognise Pacific Islander modes of climate activism as distinct and emergent. Yet there is potentially much to be learned from European accounts of radical environmental activism. In particular, I explore the different meanings of 'climate justice' social movements have employed, the place of antagonism and scales of solidarity.

Firstly, the polysemic nature of 'climate justice' must be addressed. As Chatterton et al. (2012) highlight, interpretations can include tackling the inequity of climate change through market mechanisms, the Global South's right to emit or the relative power between the Global South and Global North in the UNFCCC negotiations. However, their definition of climate justice, and the one that is employed by grassroots networks such as Climate Justice Action (CJA), highlights the inequality of climate change's impacts combined with a demand for social justice, participation and democracy. It explicitly embraces an antagonistic framing of climate politics, one that challenges the post-political consensus. Evans (2010), looking at Rising Tide Australia, an antipodean manifestation of a global climate justice network, presents a similar understanding. He argues that climate justice is not a simple goal that can be achieved, but a political practice that involves connecting with other issues, empowering communities and addressing the systemic causes of climate change in terms of capitalist growth and corporate power. Employing a complex systems analogy, he claims that victories are achieved through many small disturbances to the system, that can, for instance, erode the coal industry's social licence to operate. For Russell et al. (2012) the critical question is not how the term 'climate justice' is used, but whether it is useful. They argue that the massive street demonstrations at the COP15 temporarily disturbed neoliberal framings of climate change, but that these were

reasserted at the Cancun negotiations one year on. From Evan's perspective, these small disturbances are integral to how the politics of climate justice functions, yet for Russell et al. it is not enough. They contend that perhaps 'climate justice' does not present a strong enough rallying point in order for movements to confront the capitalist system that is the source of anthropogenic climate change.

A further key tension in the social movements literature is over the place of antagonism and attitude towards the state, an issue I explore empirically in Chapter Five. At the COP15 counter demonstrations the issue of whether to work with or against the state became highly divisive (Russell et al. 2012). Activists were torn between using direct action to shut delegates into the conference centre, in order to pressure them into reaching a decisive agreement, or to shut them out. The logic of the latter approach is that decisions made within the context of the COP would not impede runaway climate change but would simply bolster neoliberalism. This tactic was a keystone of the alterglobalisation movement, an antecedent of the climate justice movement, yet within a climate justice context a simple narrative of 'us versus them' was not so easy. One solution was a 'diagonalist' approach (i.e. combining the efforts of both vertically and horizontally organised groups), in which activists descended upon the Bella Centre, while sympathetic delegates who recognised the inadequacy of the COP process left the conference centre in order to meet and discuss with those activists. This would create a liminal meeting point, between the conference centre and the streets, of civil society and government, although this meeting was thoroughly undermined by the actions of the Danish police. Another response was a schism, with Never Trust a COP, a collective with an explicitly anti-capitalist ethos emerging out of the CJA network. This new group had felt that the confrontational politics of CJA were being compromised by the presence of reformist NGOs within the network. This raises questions regarding the limits to transgression agreed by different groups and issues that arise when these are odds with individuals' tactical preferences, as explored in Chapter Five.

Another vital idea to engage with from social movements literature is the generation and limits of solidarity. Hau'ofa's vision provides a model of solidarity that operates regionally. What Chatterton et al. (2012) present is one that is global and transcends differences of race, gender, class, and geography. They argue that there is not one global climate movement, but many networks that are connected through the idea of climate justice. International mobilisations such as at the COP15, can be powerful sites for generating these translocal solidarities. But they can also reveal disparities within these global supposedly horizontal networks. A case in point is the organisation of the Reclaim Power action at COP15. Organisers stipulated that tactics

should be non-violent (i.e. no property damage), as otherwise Global South activists would be put at significant risk in terms of their current or future visas. This attempt to negotiate an inequality between Global North and Global South participants occasioned a further one, as the latter were treated in 'paternalistic and unitary ways' (Chatterton et al. 2012: 14). They were spoken for, rather than giving a space to articulate themselves. This highlights a limit to solidarity, when it fails to challenge these inequalities and instead reproduces them. It opens the question of what happens instead when the boundaries of political action are defined in culturally meaningful terms by activists from the Global South, as I will explore in the case of Pacific Islander activists in Chapter Five. While existing social movement studies literature provides some insight into the actions taken and organisational structure of climate justice movements, to fully consider the re-injection of the political into climate discourse, I need to further explore the origins of the impetus for political action. In order to do so, I now focus on literature concerning the affects of social movements.

3C. Emotional geographies of climate and affects of activism

With regards to terminology, I follow Feigenbaum et al. (2013: 23), in exploring 'affect in encounters and interactions that move, stir or arouse something in us and produce a change', a gloss that resonates with Bennett's vision of enchantment. Meanwhile, following Clough (2012: 1669), I define emotion as 'consciously experienced feelings such as love, hate, fear, exhilaration'.

Early accounts of protest movements were concerned with emotions, but largely framed in terms of the irrationality of the mob. As social movement studies moved towards analyses that emphasised the rational and strategic mobilisation of resources and political opportunities by activists (Nicholls 2007), the place of emotion was largely ignored (Jasper 2003). However, since the very end of the 20th century, there has been increased interest in the role of affect and emotion in protest, both from social movement studies and geographers (Aminzade and McAdam 2002). This has included examination of emotional labour and emotional reflexivity in political movements (Brown and Pickerill 2009), as well as the visceral and bodily dimensions of emotional identification with a social movement (Hayes-Conroy and Martin 2010). Meanwhile, Gould (2002) has explored the role of grief in sustaining social movements, through the generation of an 'emotional common sense' (2002: 178) that encourages participants to feel and interpret events in the same way. The role of activism in generating emotionally intense experiences that can have a transformative impact on participants has been

documented (Razsa 2015; Feigenbaum et al. 2013; Clough 2012; Jasper 2003), and it is this process that I explore empirically in Chapter Five, observing the resonances between it and Bennett's concept of enchantment that identifies the link between affectual encounters and transformation leading to ethical action.

Affect is not only pertinent with respect to activism. Gorman-Murray (2010) argues that greater attention should be given to the emotional geographies of climate change, incorporating the emotional responses and meanings of climatic changes in specific localities and moving away from the rationalism of climate risk analysis. The 'emotional cost' (2010: 76) of climate adaptation needs to better accounted for.

Farbotko and McGregor (2010) explore one such emotional geography in their account of Tuvaluan delegates crying at COP15. They argue that this action by government negotiators challenged the clear demarcations between emotion and science and the presumed rationalism underpinning the UNFCCC negotiations. These emotional encounters and experiences create opportunities for change and alternative political possibilities, however fleetingly, as Farbotko and McGregor acknowledge that Tuvalu's affectual intervention was soon marginalised. These politicians' tears were also not simply an attempt to emotionally manipulate wealthier countries in order to receive aid, as they formed part of an active rejection of Australian financial assistance in favour of maintaining a target of no more than a 1.5 degree rise in global average temperature. Instead this could perhaps be better understood through Kempf's (2009) arguments about the strength of smallness, as the tears display a power and potency that is derived from the exposure of vulnerability and weakness. The powerful symbolism of tears in relation to the inevitable inundation discourse merits further enquiry, particularly in terms of how it relates to positions of victimhood, frustration at inaction, or sadness at potential loss of land. Clearly there is a need for further work in this area, and an exploration of the 'reformist or radical potential' (Farbotko and McGregor 2010: 164) of emotional responses to the prospect of climate change.

3D. Further directions for research

Returning to this section's opening considerations, Hau'ofa's work provides a much-needed corrective to representations of the Pacific as small, isolated and powerless. It could play a crucial part in a third wave of critique that doesn't just deconstruct islander marginalisation but highlights means of exploring and recognising islander strength. Thinking through Hau'ofa's work also enables a 'Nissological point of view' (McCall 1996: 78), one that studies islands on

their own terms rather than through continental frameworks. Yet in order to take Hau'ofa's vision seriously, further analysis of informal, bottom-up interconnections is needed. This can partly be achieved through a focus on protest movements and climate activism, which also brings into focus resistance to the depoliticisation of climate discourse. Recognising the limited extant literature about Pacific Island manifestations of climate activism, I am alert to the potential for specifically Pacific modes of activism, and what Western traditions of activism could learn from those, noting that the cultural importance of Christianity in the Pacific Islands might entail different modes of engagement to the overwhelmingly atheist movements studied for instance by Graeber and Clough. As a means of rethinking narratives of climate change and challenging the rationalist horror stories of the Anthropocene, I will also consider the place of affect and emotion, in terms of how it relates to activism, transformation and the political, as well as the feelings engendered by the prospective or current impacts of climate change. Three issues this section of the literature review has raised – understanding climate change on Islanders' terms, foregrounding the role of ethics in narratives of climate change, and contesting the secular rationalism of current climate discourse – suggest a further critical area of literature to consider: religious engagements with climate change.

4. Recognising the potential for religious engagements with climate change

> Science has universalised and materialised climate change; we must now particularise and spiritualise it. (Hulme 2009: 330)

At the beginning of this chapter, I established that a purely science-led approach to climate change is insufficient to tackling the horror stories of the Anthropocene, and then illustrated what those horror stories look like in a Pacific context, in terms of the inevitable inundation discourse. I then began exploring the literature concerning what alternative narratives of the Anthropocene might look like. Taking Hulme's above provocation seriously, I have particularised climate change narratives through a focus on Pacific Islander perspectives, through engaging with Epeli Hau'ofa's work. Now I turn to the final segment – the spiritualisation of climate change – and explore the potential for religious understandings of climate change, particularly in a Pacific Island context.

I begin by identifying the manner in which religion has been presented as a barrier to effective climate change responses by a number of social scientists, and following Kempf (2017) and Rubow (2009) contend that this rejection of religious approaches is premised upon attempts to

purify science from religion. I dispute both this purification and this rejection, with reference first to the potential of church-led responses to climate change on a global and regional scale, and then through presenting examples of positive climate change responses emerging from religious engagement in a Pacific context. Following Hulme (2009) and Nunn (2017), I argue not just that religious engagements with climate change have the potential to be beneficial, but that they are essential given the ethical dimensions of climate change and the shortcomings of secular messaging in Oceania. Following Haluza-DeLay (2014), I acknowledge a gap in the literature concerning not just institutional capacity, but how religious understandings inform what people are saying and doing about climate change, premised, as Hulme (2009) notes, on the need to recognise the heterogeneity of religious responses to climate change. Returning to the centrality of narrative and what stories story stories (Haraway, 2016b), I propose to begin addressing this gap through exploring the impact of religious narratives of climate change, noting the prominence of the story of Noah in the 'religion as barrier' social scientific literature, as well as in the potential counter-discourse supplied by Rigby (2008).

4A. Religion as a barrier and the purification of religion and science

Cultural and religious values have repeatedly been framed as 'posing limits to adaptation' (Graham et al. 2013: 8), a stance that I hope to challenge. Climate change has been interpreted as a form of righteous punishment by some island communities (Loughry and McAdam 2008; Rudiak-Gould 2009). This narrative of righteousness was very present in the Maldives following the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, with the creation of 'Wahhabi islands' dominated by radical imams who, having posed as aid-workers, attributed the tsunami to the island women's impiety (Maldives High Commission, personal communication). Meanwhile, cyclones have been interpreted as a divine punishment for moral transgression by Cook Islander clergy, an interpretation that Taylor (1999) dismisses as 'inappropriate and anachronistic'.

In a Pacific context, much of the controversy has centred around the utilisation of the Noah Story as a basis for climate change denial. For instance, Peter Rudiak-Gould (2009) observes cases of climate scepticism in the Marshall Islands, bolstered by the biblical promise that there would be no second flood (the Noahic covenant) and the belief that the Marshall Islands have been given to Marshallese by God. Similar biblical assurances have also been observed in Kiribati (Loughry and McAdam 2008) and Tuvalu (Paton and Fairbairn-Dunlop 2010; Mortreux and Barnett 2009). This particular biblical narrative is explored in far greater depth in Chapter Six.

Both denial and doomsday interpretations can inhibit proactive responses to climate change and can in fact legitimise new oppressive social relations. Doomsday narratives can lead to a form of 'climate change pessimism' through which the impacts of global warming are brought forward in time and exaggerated beyond scientific predictions, rendering them so overwhelming and inevitable that mitigative action is impossible (Rudiak-Gould 2009). Indeed, pessimistic attitudes towards the possibility of acting in response to climate change have been found to be incredibly widespread among University of the South Pacific (USP) students, suggesting that the inevitable inundation narrative is also shaping the perspectives of those it portrays (Nunn et al. 2016).

Donner (2007) contends that one of the reasons for limited belief in anthropogenic climate change is the extent to which it offends a distinction between earth and sky that has been found across organised religions and indigenous belief systems for thousands of years: through suggesting human influence over the climate it undermines the extent to which the sky is an unreachable domain of the Gods. While Donner suggests that this is a universal dilemma, he sees the problem as most intractable in a Pacific Island context, due to the presence of 'indigenous or strongly observant religious communities' (233), and notes that 'in most Pacific Island nations, educators argue that the commonly held belief that the Christian God controls the weather is greatest obstacle to educating people about climate change' (ibid).

However, I argue that the problems lie not with religious belief but with how it is being analysed and understood. I contend that these encounters with faith-based climate change denial have led to a dismissal of the potential for religiously-informed responses to climate change. This can be seen in the case of Kuruppu and Liverman (2011), who, based on their findings that 20% of I-Kiribati participants used religious convictions as justification for a lack of concern about climate change, consequently accuse their interlocutors of 'adopting avoidant behaviour such as faith in God' (2011: 666), suggesting the singular outcome of faith practices is inactivity and denial. Meanwhile McAdam, in reference to Tuvalu and Kiribati, refers to 'religion' as one of the factors that 'contribute to a certain degree of complacency about environmental change' (2011: 114). Indeed, as Kempf (2017: 23) notes, many social scientists appear to simply deem religious responses antithetical to the expression of Pacific Islander agency.

This belittlement of religious thought seems to mirror wider sentiments in the literature. For instance, this seeming antagonism between Christian thought and the capacity for pro-environmental behaviour echoes White's (1967) famous declaration that our current ecological

predicament is a consequence of Christianity's anthropocentricism and its imperatives for humanity to exploit nature. White argues that the only route out of the current impasse is the rejection of Christianity, and the finding of a new religion, or alternate value system. Moreover, Haraway, while so insightful of the need for new stories to comprehend the Anthropocene, seems to reject the possibilities of religious insights outright, as she patronises faith in God as a response to climate change, describing it as an example of 'touching silliness' (2016: 3), and invokes Christianity as an exemplar of inactivity and denial, claiming that 'avoidance of the urgency [of population growth] can slip into something akin to the way some Christians avoid the urgency of climate change because it touches too closely on the marrow of one's faith' (2016: 6). Klein's (2014) otherwise comprehensive and inspiring volume *This Changes Everything* has also been similarly critiqued for its myopia when it comes to religion (Hulme 2014a).

This rejection of religious perspectives appears to emerge from both a misunderstanding of religious thought and a desire to enforce the boundaries between the religious and the scientific. Kempf in his review of the existing 'religion as barrier' literature, notes how the attempt by communities to bring religious understandings to matters of climate science is often treated by social scientists as 'an illicit melange of elements best left separate' (2017: 23). According to Kempf, faith-based climate denial is treated by scholars such as Gemenne and Shen (2009), Paton and Fairbairn-Dunlop (2010) and McAdam and Loughry (2009) as a problem and a consequence of a deficit of scientific knowledge, to be rectified by an increase in scientific information and a rejection of religious knowledge in order to 'counter any religious positioning of this kind' (Kempf 2017: 23). The Noah Story is delegitimised by reference to climate science, as the latter is treated as unquestionably epistemologically superior. Thus, social scientific responses to this biblical narrative centre around a purification of scientific and religious knowledges, and an epistemological hierarchisation, which places religious knowledge on the very bottom tier, associated with 'deviation, ignorance, passivity and maladaptivity' (Kempf 2017: 30). This purification of knowledges is evident in Reed's (2011) account of Kiribati, which somewhat sensationally portrays the atoll nation as an ideological battleground, describing it as 'a place where science clashes with religion', suggesting the homogeneity and irreconcilability of both concepts. Yet, ironically, many of the same authors who are marginalising religious understandings are themselves also calling for greater recognition of local understandings of climate change, and culturally appropriate and locally-led responses to it (Kempf 2017).

Kempf's conclusions are supported by the work of Rubow, who analyses a number of studies

that emphasise how Christianity in the Pacific negatively impacts 'attentiveness towards climate change and the ability to recover after a natural hazard' (2009: 99). She particularly directs her critique at Taylor's (1999) work on cyclone recovery in the Cook Islands, which has presented some religious understandings of cyclones as an impediment to effective recovery. However, Rubow identifies some crucial analytical flaws in Taylor's work. She firstly warns against his conflation of the metaphorical and the literal, while recognising the difficulty of distinguishing the two. She also highlights the importance of acknowledging that community members may and often do hold self-contradictory beliefs, and that the application of beliefs is contextually contingent. Following Rubow's thoughts on this matter, in my exploration of narratives, I recognise that participants may engage in different narratives at different points, occupying multiple points of ethical understanding, some of which are at odds with others.

Moreover, Rubow rejects the presumption that divine causation mirrors direct processes of scientific causation. Instead she suggests that the two forms of explanation occupy different domains, and that 'the two domains are not competing, but remain as different traditions of knowledge kept at different levels of social reality (or kept together as unsolved paradoxes)' (2009: 102). This acceptance of multiple and divergent knowledges counters the orthodoxy of knowledge purification within the literature (as highlighted by Kempf 2017), resonates with Kempf's relational ontology approach and indicates a path by which religious knowledges can be embraced as part of a response to climate change and natural disasters.

Bubandt's vision of 'symbiopolitics' (2017: 137G) goes one step further, suggesting not that religious and scientific knowledges should both be acknowledged in their respective domains, but that they cannot be disentangled: any attempt at purification is hopeless. He cites the case of the explosion of the Indonesian mud volcano known as 'Lusi' as an inextricable mixing of geology, politics and spirits, and therefore demonstrates the indeterminacy of the Anthropocene and the porous boundaries between humanity and nature, science and faith. Meanwhile, Donner (2007), while providing explanations for religious rejections of climate change, also refutes the need for purification. Rather than use the 'domain of the gods' as an opportunity to condemn the place of religion in scientific matters outright, Donner instead recommends partnerships between scientists and religious figures, arguing that 'scientists should not be afraid to embrace religious or philosophical initiatives to address the fundamental understanding of the human relationship with the climate' (2007: 235).

Thus, while many existing studies of the relations between religion and climate change in the

Pacific present religious thought merely as a barrier, and thereby marginalise its place in climate responses, a minority of scholars do advocate the entanglement rather than purification of scientific and religious knowledges, and I will follow this latter group in exploring the balancing, enmeshing and tensions of multiple knowledges in my Chapter Six, through the notion of *tufala save*. Moreover, given the centrality of the Noah story to the dismissal of religious knowledge, I will pay heed to this and other biblical stories, and the impacts they have on the reception of climate discourses.

4B. Religious responses to climate change: institutional capacity and positive impacts

Despite the aforementioned scepticism regarding faith-based engagements with climate change, other scholars have noted the positive potential for religious engagements with climate change, and encourage further efforts in this regard. I begin by outlining institutional engagement in climate change efforts by religious organisations, and then turn to the role of theology more explicitly. Partnerships between conservation organisations and religious groups have been advocated (McLeod and Palmer 2015) and in *Science* magazine religious institutions have been called upon not only to engage in climate change responses, but to offer moral leadership (Dasgupta and Ramanathan 2014). Pacific Island churches have been importuned to step up in the face of climate change and spread a message of hope, but one that is truthful about the dire predicament Tuvalu faces and that voices the concerns of the people (Fusi 2005).

Religious organisations have been identified as crucially influential actors in a Pacific climate change context, and many authors contend that they should be on the front line of climate advocacy (Nunn et al. 2016). Part of the potential for religious organisations to respond to climate change stems from their significant financial, political and institutional power (Hulme 2017: 15). Reale's (2014) work in the Solomon Islands highlights the importance of the church's role, arguing both that Christianity is an important part of Pacific Island identity and that the church fills a 'governance void' (94) left by the more limited reach of Pacific Island states, as the Church alone has influence stretching from an international to village level. She argues that churches build resilience to climate change through the other development work they are already engaged in, and may be able to engage most effectively when partnered with NGOs or government (2014: 107), suggesting a practical means of channelling the Church's potential for climate change adaptation. Douglas also affirms the role of NGOs and the Church in providing welfare services in Melanesia, given the existence of weak states, and the consequential 'official institutional vacuum' (2007: 165).

However, a number of authors have also noted limitations to the Church as an institutional actor in a climate change context. Rubow and Bird (2016) note that Pacific Island churches often do not prioritise climate change because of budgetary restrictions, shortages of technical knowledge, or the lessened immediacy of climate impacts compared with other threats parishioners face. Meanwhile, Reale (2014) acknowledges that during disaster recovery there can be a danger that communities favour rebuilding churches over and above their own wellbeing, leading to a greater emphasis upon the needs of religious institutions compared with other facets of community life. Moreover, a village's religious composition can strongly impact the effectiveness of church-based delivery of disaster recovery efforts (McDougall et al. 2008: 29), with villages united by a single church found to recover faster due to increased organisation, as compared with those divided between multiple denominations, suggesting a practical limit to ecumenicalism. These questions regarding organisational influence, the relative strength of the Ni-Vanuatu state and denominational difference inform my research into religious responses in an empirical setting. However, it is insufficient to merely highlight the institutional capacity of religious bodies, but, as Rubow and Bird argue, attention must also be paid to the meanings religion imbues climate change with, what they refer to as the 'cultural modelling of climate change' (2016: 150).

And turning from religious institutions to the impacts of theology and religious thought, there are some examples of positive 'cultural modelling': religious understandings can inspire rather than inhibit adaptation. Rudiak-Gould (2009) found that a minority of Marshall Islanders combined scientific knowledge and religious faith as a springboard for action, positioning themselves as God's stewards who were responsible for defending the planet. The promise to Noah that there would be no second flood also legitimated, rather than detracted, from scientific arguments, as it indicated that sea level rise was clearly anthropogenic rather than sent by God. However, such a conclusion would only be palatable within certain theological frameworks, therefore necessitating further empirical research into different Christian understandings in the Pacific.

The biblical story of the flood has also been recuperated as a basis for interspecies compassion, care and concern, as opposed to climate change scepticism, by environmental humanities scholar Kate Rigby (2008). She re-envisions the ark as a site of counter-utopian possibility, and an example of how we can positively transform ourselves. She does not accept it as a premise for denial, or for the premature ushering of end times. Instead, in it she sees a model for a new form of compassion and cosmopolitanism that transcends the anthropocentric. She sees the

flood as a model of hope, because at the centre is human agency, that of Noah, who achieves the impossible: he offers hospitality to a diverse multitude of strangers, of non-human others, when he is without a home of his own. Rigby sees this radical act of hospitality that considers the needs of all species as instructive for how we can act in the face of disaster, and one that resonates with Tsing et al. (2017) and Haraway's (2016) calls for multispecies connection in the face of the Anthropocene.

Eco-theological texts in Oceania are also explicitly incorporating ideas about responding to climate change into a specifically Pacific context. Rubow and Bird note that these particular manifestations of contextual theology draw on 'traditional natural-cultural worldviews and practices, which include notions of interconnectedness, belonging, sharing and reciprocity, respect, and the sacredness of the land-sea-air domain' (2016: 153). They reference Janet Guyer's 'evacuation of the near future', the notion that the Western 'public culture of temporality', evident in macroeconomic theory and evangelical prophecy, is polarised by a focus on 'fantasy futurism' and 'enforced presentism' (2007: 409-410). Rubow and Bird apply this concept to climate discourse, noting the emphasis on 'urgent presentisms' (the focus upon immediate mitigation and adaptation actions) and apocalyptic futures, leaving a temporal gap (Rubow and Bird 2016: 152). They argue for incorporating the notion of 'time as *waiting*' (2016: 153) to fill that gap, building upon Amanaki Havea (1986)'s 'coconut theology', which emphasises living and being in the present with the movements of the natural world. In a way this also acts to mitigate the 'Apocalypse Forever' Swyngedouw (2010) identifies, which is replicated by the inevitable inundation discourse. Upolu Vaai's (2015) embodied theology brings Samoan notions of interconnected communality into theologies of the Cross in order to make a religiously-based and specifically Oceanic argument for climate justice. However, while these are important contributions, Kempf (2017), among others, argues that this gap in the social science literature cannot be filled by theology alone. Instead there is also a need to understand how people are articulating their understandings and acting in response to these religious narratives (Haluza-DeLay 2014), and what some of their implications for political action are.

4C. Further directions for research

Clearly, there is a significant gap in the existing literature. Despite the imperative of engaging with religious understandings of climate change, particularly in a Pacific context, there has been little work in the field to date, and much of it has sought to marginalise religious

understandings. Social science research into relations between religious organisations and climate change has so far been quite limited (Haluza-DeLay 2014). While there are some theological reflections upon climate change, not enough research concerns what 'the world's religions and their adherents are actually saying or doing about climate change' (ibid), and in my exploration of religious narratives of climate change and their implications, I seek to address this gap.

As Hulme (2014b) highlights, despite its significance, religious dimensions are largely absent from 'modernist accounts of climate change and its multiple causes' (xii), such as those of the IPCC. Yet, as highlighted in the context of the Anthropocene horror stories, science cannot manage all of the ways in which people engage with climate change, particularly as it is increasingly recognised as an ethical issue. Instead it is necessary to incorporate religious understandings because 'effective climate policy need to tap into intrinsic, deeply held values and motives' (xiii). Firstly, this is due to the 'long history of interdependency' (xii) between religion and climate, as the former is used to find meaning in the latter. Secondly, this is due to the 'thick' accounts of moral reasoning' (2017:15) religion provides, which are embedded in local norms and beliefs, giving them a motivational force not mirrored by economics or science and other secular messaging. Consequently, rather than as a barrier, religion can be embraced as a 'cultural resource' (Hulme 2017: 15). Thus, Hulme advocates further research into 'religious filters' through which scientific information is viewed and then transfigured into 'perceptions of climate change both consistent and not consistent with the scientific narratives' (2014b: xiv). The story of Noah, as will be discussed in Chapter Six, can be seen as a crucial one of these filters.

This need for 'thick' moral accounts rather than thin evocation of global values seems particularly pressing in the Pacific. Rubow (2009), in her study of the Cook Islands, strongly advocates addressing religious dimensions when investigating climate change and resilience in a South Pacific context, as existing literature fails to heed the extent to which responses to it, and to extreme weather events, are shaped by myth and religion. She notes that divine relations to environment, including the links between gods and storms, figure strongly across many Pacific mythologies. Moreover, Nunn (2017) contends that a reason for the limited success of many climate projects in the Pacific Islands is the secularity of the messaging, which fails to sufficiently engage communities. Instead he recommends that 'the most influential messages are those that engage with people's spiritual beliefs', and therefore more work is needed in this area, particularly through the use of messages that resonate with scriptural understandings.

Part of the value of religious messaging may stem from particular trends within Pacific Christianity itself, due to its lack of separation between nature and culture. As Nunn et al. highlight in a survey of USP students[7], those who attended church more regularly were more likely to feel connected to nature and to actively reflect upon their relationship to their environment, and also be most concerned about climate change. Again, Rubow and Bird's (2016) analysis of Pacific eco-theology gives further evidence of the potency of Christian climate messaging in Oceania.

In tackling the need to rethink ethical responses to climate change, I intend to be alert to the diversity of religious thought and experience. Hulme (2017: 17), while noting that 'religious engagement with climate change is both necessary and inevitable', recognises that not all religious groups approach the morals and ethics of climate change in the same way. Instead he highlights the potential for disagreements about possible responses, and the responsibility for delivering those responses, and on which terms and timescales (Hulme 2009). He therefore urges further research into 'the religious heterogeneity through which climate change is experienced' (2017: 17), an agenda I am contributing to through an examination of the multiple and conflictual narratives through which climate change is made meaningful in the Pacific Islands. The need for narrative has also been noted by some religious organisations committed to confronting climate change, such as the Alliance for Religions and Conservation (2007), who encourage an engagement with 'the narrative, the mythological, the metaphorical or the existence of memories of past disasters and the way out'. The story of the flood, one of the major focuses of the current 'religion as barrier' approach and of Chapter Six, can be seen as a manifestation of all of these categories. Moreover, as Kempf has highlighted, the Noah story is used by social scientists as an argument for the purification of science and religion. I wish to investigate this same story, but through a lens that recognises the entanglement of multiple forms of knowledge, and thereby use it as an argument against this same purification.

Moreover, following Stenmark's distinction between religion and theology, while the latter can be understood as doctrinal, the former is more engaged in story-telling, again highlighting the relevance of narrative. She argues that storytelling is imperative in the face of climate change as a 'wicked problem', as it works to 'increase the plurality of perspectives and open our minds to alternatives' and thereby 'help us judge and act in the midst of uncertainty' (2015: 935).

[7] USP students are not necessarily representative of many island communities, yet are a significant population as they represent 'future island decision-makers' (Nunn et al. 2016: 477).

Thus, my focus is not upon theological examinations of climate change, but the different stories told, and the different ways of seeing the world that they capture.

While there is some research identifying a productive interrelation of scientific and religious understandings in the Pacific, it needs to be taken further. As part of a third wave of critique, one that foregrounds of Islander understandings and agency, there is the potential here to rethink the place of religious belief as an enabler for action, and thereby a threat, not to scientific understandings or to effective adaptation, but to climate change itself.

5. From the theoretical to the empirical

I have established the significance of how climate change is narratively framed, and highlighted the empirical, political and ethical problems with the inevitable inundation discourse, the dominant narrative framing of climate change and the Pacific Islands. In doing so, I have made a case for exploring counter-narratives of climate change in Oceania. I have explored a series of literatures and areas – Hau'ofa's Sea of Islands vision, affect and enchantment, climate protest movements, and religious responses to climate change – that suggest potential avenues I could explore, in order to document these alternative narratives. Consequently, I now turn to the practice and process of doing so, recounting my methodological challenges and achievements.

3. Anonymity, sagacity and reciprocity: some methodological considerations

> Heaps of bush to be mulched. Improved machete swings. Seedlings sheltered by a canopy of dry banana leaves.

My early field notes from Vanuatu capture the minutiae of one community gardening project, replete with reflections, conversations and concerns regarding my own technical inadequacies. The pages are suffused with ambitious visions of the future: how many vegetables will be grown, how much land will be sustainably cultivated, how many local participants will be engaged. Then garden-based entries cease for a number of months as my fieldwork concerns and life in Vanuatu takes on new foci. When my notes finally return to the garden in question, the tone has dramatically shifted. My early hopes have been dashed. Failure by me and my friends to upkeep the garden has led to the forest's relentless return. Nature has reclaimed all the ground we cleared, the banana leaf shelter has shrivelled and fallen, and the majority of the seeds I shipped in from Fiji have perished. Instead of an abundant garden, teeming with a myriad of crops and vegetables, Moses and I are left with an armful of cabbages. I open with the memory of this disheartening horticultural endeavour, because then and now the parallels between it and the research process are evident. The act of research involves both a reconciliation between original visions of academic grandeur and more modest research outputs – one's armful of cabbages – as well as an honest appreciation of the value of the latter. Thus, in this chapter I reflect upon the deviations from my original research design, as well as my positive methodological achievements.

I begin by presenting my research design rationale and then reviewing my data collection process. I outline my approaches to sampling and negotiations with gatekeepers, justify my selection of semi-structured interviews and participant observation as my main research methods, and then discuss my experience of interviewing, analysing data and conducting fieldwork. For the final section of the chapter I reflect in greater depth upon the ethics of my research practice. In particular I examine three areas that emerge from the indigenous research methods literature: problematising anonymity, embracing sagacity and practicing reciprocity. While not claiming to situate myself as a practitioner of indigenous research methods, I evaluate the efforts I have made in these three areas.

1. Research design rationale

As established in the literature review, my overall research aim was to explore narratives of climate change and the Pacific Islands that challenged or contested the inevitable inundation discourse (the narrative that portrays the Pacific Islands as hopelessly lost to encroaching waves and thereby presents Islanders as helpless victims, and discourages proactive responses to climate change). Narrowing from this broader aim, and through engagement with the literature, three key areas for exploration were identified with regards to potential Pacific Islander-led counter-narratives: Epeli Hau'ofa's highly influential Sea of Islands vision and manifestations of Oceanic regionalism; Pacific Islander-led manifestations of climate justice activism; and faith-based understandings of and responses to climate change. Consequently, the three research questions I devised were:

1. To what extent can contemporary climate justice networks in the Pacific be understood through the Sea of Islands vision, as a form of Oceanic regionalism?

2. How does engagement with climate change activism in a Pacific Island context shape political and activist identities and subjectivities?

3. How do religious beliefs inform understandings of climate change in terms of responsibility and the capacity for action?

Thus, the three research questions in turn were designed to address re-evaluations of the power of Oceania as a region vis-a-vis climate change, to rethink the capacity and attitudes of those within the region confronting climate change, and to challenge the purely scientific framings of climate change that underpin the inevitable inundation hypothesis.

In determining a field site and case studies with which to pursue these questions, I reasoned that my analytical emphasis upon regionalism and interconnection also methodologically necessitated multi-sited research (Marcus 1995), as while the connection between mobility and Pacific identity is regularly noted, a lot of research still concentrates on single areas, perpetuating an isolated understanding of them (Teaiwa 2005). My desire to explore regionalism and activism as well as faith in the Pacific Island region drew me to the Pacific Climate Warriors, who I first encountered via their youtube videos. They are a network of Pacific Islander climate activists from across the region (described in detail in the introduction), who cohere around a campaign slogan of 'we are not drowning, we are fighting', which suggests

some level of contestation of the inevitable inundation discourse. In accordance with my first two research questions, I wished to explore the perspectives and actions of this group in terms of regionally-coordinated manifestations of climate activism. This therefore took me to Australia for the first leg of my fieldwork, where during October 2014 members of the Pacific Climate Warriors from twelve different countries assembled for the Stand Up for the Pacific campaign, a mass demonstration and awareness raising tour. While this first period of fieldwork (Phase I) gave me some insight into the impact of faith on climate responses, to investigate my third research question in sufficient depth I needed to conduct research with a broader range of participants than just the Pacific Climate Warriors and be immersed in a Pacific Island context, and thus conducted four months research in Vanuatu (Phase II).

Conducting face-to-face research, a mixture of 'verbal research methods' (Secor 2010: 194) and participant observation, was imperative. Many of the existing studies of the relationship between climate change, the Pacific and the spectre of forced migration rely on critical discourse analysis of newspaper articles (Farbotko 2005), popular and academic texts (Baldwin 2013) or the printed testimonies of relatively high-profile Pacific activists (Mansfield 2013). Central to my research contribution is a departure from this approach, as there is currently a disproportionate focus in this area on the public and the textual, as opposed to everyday lived practice, and it only through a focus on the latter that I would be able to explore the performance of activist identities and Oceanic regionalism, or recognise how religious beliefs shaped actions. I recognise that both participant observation and interviews have the potential to reveal knowledge about lived practices (Hitchings 2012), or at least about how participants represent themselves as engaging in practices (Secor 2010). An ethnographic approach would enable me to recognise the convergences and divergences between how participants presented their practices in interviews, and how they behaved.

Due to the small and specific research population in question, and the depth with which I wished to explore particular experiences and perspectives, questionnaires seem inappropriate, as they wouldn't have enabled me to spontaneously explore emerging ideas, or seek further explanations (Secor 2010: 196). I also decided not to use focus groups, partially due to concerns raised by Warrick (2009) about participant reluctance to engage in a Ni-Vanuatu context, and logistical concerns about the possibility of translating group discussions into multiple languages simultaneously, with the likelihood of breaking the flow of conversation (Bujra 2006). There was also the issue that I was working with pre-existing groups, and focus group participants can be less open when they are with a familiar set of people (Bedford and Burgess 2001). Instead

of artificially constructing a group scenario I was looking to observe the practices and dynamics of pre-existing groups in action, as well as exploring the understandings and motivations of individuals in greater depth outside of that group setting. Consequently, I determined that the most suitable methods were participant observation and semi-structured interviews.

These methods are also compatible with a qualitative case study approach (Kees van Donge 2006). Through my focus on particular groups of people at particular times, I am not attempting to generate results that are statistically significant, but ideas that have a wider relevance, and that can be applied to other cases (Kees van Donge 2006). In this I follow Baxter's (2010) argument that one of the main roles of case studies is to generate new theoretical insights, as well as confirming or challenging existing analytical viewpoints, which is therefore compatible with my overall research aim of highlighting narratives that challenge existing analyses in the form of the inevitable inundation discourse.

Through these case studies I therefore hope to meet my research objectives, which are to make original contributions in three areas. Firstly, that of Pacific Studies, through the empirical and analytical evaluation of Hau'ofa's Sea of Islands vision. Secondly, I wish to contribute to the critical literature that is academically challenging the inevitable inundation discourse, through providing not just further refutations, but empirical examples of counter-narratives, and particularly highlighting political agency. In doing so, I wish to contribute to the broader literatures concerning narrative and the Anthropocene and the different communicative framings of climate change, through documenting locally meaningful stories and understandings of climate change, and actions and practices that emerge from those. Finally, I wish to further the field exploring the relationships between religious perspectives and climate change, and in doing so, both showcase the heterogeneity of religious viewpoints as well as challenging the academic marginalisation of them.

2. Overview of data collection

Across the two phases of data collection, I conducted 61 recorded semi-structured interviews, in addition to three unrecorded interviews, and undertook five months of participant-observation, one month based in Australia, and the following four in Vanuatu. The Pacific Island based component of my fieldwork was greatly enhanced by conducting a three-month Overseas Institutional Visit to USP, Suva Fiji campus, which enabled me to build connections with relevant academic and research contacts, acclimatise to the Pacific Islands (literally and culturally) and conduct a week-long pilot scoping visit to Vanuatu, which was crucial for

securing a research visa, and furthering research connections.



Figure 4 - Gantt chart highlighting the different stages of data collection and research design (colour-coded by country).

Phase I of fieldwork consisted of one month of immersive participant observation with the Pacific Climate Warriors' Stand Up for the Pacific campaign tour in Australia, during October 2014, complemented by conducting fourteen semi-structured qualitative interviews, thereby interviewing just under half of the campaign's participants. Phase II of my fieldwork was based entirely in Vanuatu, where I acquired sufficient language proficiency to conduct all the interviews myself, either in English or Bislama, (although I hired a native speaker to transcribe the Bislama interviews).

The bipartite division of my fieldwork was designed to enable me to work with a broader range of participants, active on different geopolitical scales, and involved in a variety of organisations and institutions that engage with climate change in the Pacific Islands. Through using this model, I focused both on interviewing those who were most heavily involved in climate advocacy on an international level (through their paid employment or through their participation in the Stand Up for the Pacific tour – Phase I) and those who were active in the 350 Pacific network and other climate change adaptation or advocacy initiatives on a regional or local level (Phase II). This bipartite fieldwork structure was also designed to provide a longitudinal perspective to my research. Longitudinal research gives insight into which phenomena and explanations are enduring, and which are more mutable (Baxter 2010). Rather than just a brief ethnographic insight into the events of Autumn 2014, the plan was to explore how the practices of the campaign group and participants' perspectives developed in the intervening time period, particularly through the use of follow-up interviews.

3. Emergent research design: changes to my original plans

> The whole thing was sort of running on emergent design because there was just so much to organise and it was awesome not to have to stress about having everything planned out.
> (Daniel, 350 Pacific organiser)

In many ways the spontaneous and mutable nature of 350 Pacific's campaign and wider Pacific climate organising was mirrored by the emergent design of my fieldwork process, as many of my original plans and ideas did not materialise, and I was forced to respond and adapt my research design throughout the data collection process. The key features of my original research design are presented in Box 1.

Box 1: Original Research Design

- Multi-sited fieldwork in Australia and the Pacific
- Interviews (target: 40) and participant observation as primary data collection methods
- Phase I: Participate in the Warriors' voyage from Fiji to Sydney, and then in the Stand Up for the Pacific tour in Australia (target: 18 interviews)
- Phase II: Fieldwork in three island countries, just interviewing members of local 350.org groups in those different nations (target: seven interviews per country)

Phase I largely went as planned, although it did not include sailing with the Warriors from Fiji to Australia at the launch of the campaign as originally hoped, as the voyaging component of 350 Pacific's tour was dropped due to logistical and financial constraints. However, once I began preparing for Phase II during my Overseas Institutional Visit in Fiji it soon became clear that conducting the next stage of fieldwork in so many different national contexts was unfeasible. My Phase II Pacific Island fieldwork sites reduced to two and eventually to one, as I found the time and money constraints unmanageable. Within the scope of my project it wasn't possible to build a network of research contacts, establish a sound understanding of cultural, political and social context, and develop language skills across three different countries within the six months allocated. Thus, while trying to avoid understanding islands as small, fragmented and isolated, my data and the gaps in that to some extent embody that fragmentation. I also recognised that my research would benefit from greater depth rather than breadth in terms of fieldwork focus. Consequently, I chose to focus on just one field site for Phase II, yet still maintained a regional perspective through my engagement with other pan-Pacific NGOs based in Australia and Vanuatu. I also chose to engage with a far greater range of participants in Phase II (compared

with the original focus simply on the Pacific Climate Warriors) giving me a more nuanced and representative understanding of faith-based engagements with climate change.

Due to the narrower geographic focus of Phase II, I was only able to conduct follow-up interviews with a handful of Phase I participants. However, in these cases the process enhanced the validity of my research, as I provided participants with their previous interview transcripts and sought feedback, with one interviewee confirming that it was a 'pretty clear and accurate reflection of what I was thinking and feeling at the time'.

Vanuatu became my primary case study for five mains reasons. Firstly, I was informed that its local group was one of the strongest within the 350 Pacific network (350 Pacific, personal communication) and thus one of the most interesting examples of how contemporary Pacific climate activism can work in practice. The vibrancy of the Vanuatu group is evident in the videos documenting their canoe building in preparation for the Stand Up for the Pacific tour (Island Reach 2014a; Island Reach 2014b). Secondly, I had made particularly strong links with members of 350 Vanuatu during the Stand Up for the Pacific tour and meetings while I was in Fiji, and they very generously encouraged me and supported me in bringing my research to Vanuatu.

Thirdly, I wished to avoid conducting research in an atoll nation. In my choice of countries, I avoided Tuvalu and Kiribati, as there is already significant literature on these two nations, to the extent that some research participants in these communities are now suffering from climate research fatigue, which could be skewing research findings (Mortreux and Barnett 2009) and having negative impacts on communities. Moreover, I wished to concentrate on a volcanic, mountainous island nation whose exposure to climate change impacts could not be discursively assimilated into a simple threat of sea level rise and total inundation. Focusing on Vanuatu enabled me to avoid perpetuating a Polynesian bias in Pacific discussions of mobility (Hanlon 2009), although it is a crowded area academically, especially within Social Anthropology (Warrick 2011; Granderson, 2017; Hetzel and Pascht 2017).

Fourthly, there is also the interesting geopolitical context of Vanuatu to consider. Shibuya (1996: 547) claims Vanuatu can be seen as a 'leader among the island nations' due to its historically radical anti-colonial and anti-nuclear stances, and therefore has the potential for also leading on climate change. But these conjectures about Vanuatu's regional role are very much focused on a governmental level, as opposed to also considering civil society. This question around

leadership on climate change crystallised in the government and civil society responses to the devastation wrecked by the category five storm event, Cyclone Pam, which struck Vanuatu in March 2015 while I was conducting my Overseas Institutional Visit. Pam was the final major incentive for basing my research in Vanuatu, as it had made climate change a tangible point of discussion, following the Vanuatu Prime Minister's identification of the cyclone as a climate change impact (Walker and Farrell 2015), and I had been intrigued and impressed by the centrality of the 350 Vanuatu group in the early post-cyclone response (350 Pacific 2015). However, Cyclone Pam also presented challenges for my research, as many climate change adaptation projects had been diverted into cyclone recovery efforts, and both the Vanuatu Climate Action Network and National Advisory Board (on climate change) suspended almost all meetings during my period in the field because of their preoccupation with recovery. During my interviews, almost all discussions of climate change returned to Pam, making the cyclone a lens through which climate change was understood, and thus a specific focus to my research that I had not anticipated.

4. Access

One of the major potential challenges I faced was gaining access to participants, as I was seeking respondents from a relatively small pool of actors. My primary solution to this was to work through organisations as gatekeepers, namely 350 Pacific for Phase I and both the Vanuatu branch of Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit GmbH (GIZ), the German government's development agency, and 350 Vanuatu for Phase II.

4A. Gatekeepers: Phase I

Using my own social network of climate activist friends and contacts, I identified acquaintances who were familiar with one or more of the key 350 Pacific organisers, and encouraged them to set up a virtual introduction to some of 350 Pacific's staff, and began regular communication with 350 Pacific via email and skype in Spring 2014. I also contacted all activist friends and acquaintances who I knew to have some connection to Australia, and began communicating with those friends of friends. This gave me access to free accommodation across Australia during my visits and chunks of my first fieldwork period, built a friendship and emotional support network that was relatively nearby that was vital when fieldwork got tough, and familiarised me with many of the Australian climate activist networks who were supporting the Stand Up for the Pacific tour.

In April 2014, I conducted a pre-fieldwork scoping visit to Australia, holding a series of three face-to-face meetings with the core 350 Pacific organisers. Crucially these meetings introduced me to the idea of the flotilla, which had not yet been publically disclosed, and set in motion my plans for Phase I of research. This visit also gave me the opportunity to observe an Australia-based Warrior training, to familiarise myself with Newcastle, New South Wales, the site of the flotilla, as well as enriching my academic network through attending a Pacific Studies conference in Sydney, where I encountered staff from USP, laying the foundation for the Overseas Institutional Visit the following year.

During the April 2014 meetings I received approval and encouragement for my research from the 350 Pacific staff. I also received consent and encouragement from the Warriors participating in the Stand up for the Pacific tour in advance of the flotilla (see Appendix 3), and numerous invitations to conduct my follow-up interviews in the Warriors' home countries. I recognise that through establishing this relationship, 350 Pacific was acting as a gatekeeper. However, 350 Pacific is a voluntary organisation and volunteer advocates are offered no financial incentive to be involved in its advocacy work, although they are encouraged to participate through the possibility of otherwise hard-to-access opportunities for international travel. Unlike with some gatekeepers, there are far less issues of dominance, coercion or power imbalances, which minimised the risk that participants had been made to participate by 350, rather than actively consenting to be involved.

Yet working through NGOs can create further challenges. As Mercer (2006) highlights there is a danger that NGOs will seek to control research. However, given the very limited time and resources of 350 Pacific, I thought it was highly unlikely that they would attempt to manage my research, although as discussed in the later section on reciprocity, I was keen on being able to fulfil the NGO's wishes in gratitude for their support of my work. As a non-Pacific Islander, and as someone who came at a late stage to the group's activities and who was explicitly introduced and positioned as a researcher throughout, I feel there was very little danger that I would be perceived by participants as a representative of 350 Pacific, and that this would thus colour their responses.

Yet a more intractable issue is the extent to which my involvement with the campaign made it harder to reflect critically on their actions, due to feelings of potential betrayal (Taylor 2014). This impact is most keenly felt in terms of my research outcomes. Initially I had envisioned submitting a report to 350 Pacific with an evaluative dimension. Thus, I had hoped my research

would be constructively critical (Halvorsen 2015), highlighting issues that arose during the campaign, but with the purpose of helping 350 Pacific reflect on how they could improve their work, rather than as an *ad hominem* attack, as researchers have a responsibility to represent participants respectfully even if they are critiquing them (Secor 2010). However I discovered that the process of 'being useful' (Taylor 2014) in relation to 350 Pacific was far more challenging than it was with GIZ or 350 Vanuatu, and was accomplished largely through practical rather than academic outputs, as I recognised that my expectation of an evaluative contribution emerged from a misplaced sense of the additional perspective accorded by the Ivory Tower, and underestimated the extent to which these participants as members of social movements are already reflecting upon their own practices (Halvorsen 2015). Consequently, my acts of giving back consist of accounts of 350 Pacific's campaigning that are intended to bring awareness about their work to a broader audience, as opposed to that which is helpful for a process of internal review.

Working through 350 Pacific as a gatekeeper has also had some impact upon the contents and focus of my analysis. Unsurprisingly over the course of eighteen months of communicating and working with them, there were points of difficulty and disagreement, and for some time I was torn about how much I should incorporate a critique of this group's overall working practices into my thesis. Following consultations with my supervisor and other researchers working in similar fields, I reached the conclusion that those particular arguments and materials (which considered questions of the politics of the campaign's leadership) were neither pertinent to my research questions, nor breaking new academic ground and were not helpful to my participants (given the aforementioned existing processes of self-reflection). Thus, my entanglement with a gatekeeping NGO has impacted my research experience, in terms of provoking a moral quandary about my ability as a researcher to helpfully provide critique without 'betraying' those who have supported me, but has not negatively affected the material within the thesis, as these quandaries were incidental to the questions I was answering.

4B. Gatekeepers: Phase II

In Phase II, I worked through two organisations, 350 Vanuatu and GIZ, both of whom I was introduced to by my incredibly helpful main fieldwork contact. The same concerns regarding 350 Pacific are mirrored in terms of 350 Vanuatu, except that I felt more confident about achieving a mutually reciprocal relationship, as discussed further in Section 8C. With GIZ, the situation was less complicated. I was physically hosted by them (I was able to work in their

office), and through my volunteer work I gained first-hand experience of many climate adaptation initiatives and was able to positively and practically contribute to them. Volunteering with them also enabled me to embody the position of 'development volunteer' alongside the potentially extractive role of researcher. However little of my research directly reflected upon their work, and my recruitment of interviewees was also largely independent of them, so my relation to them does not present a moral quandary in terms of the results.

4C. Sampling

I used 'purposive non-random sampling' (Davis et al. 2007: 166) as interview participants in Phase I were predominately identified and recruited based on their involvement in or connection to the 350 Pacific advocacy network. I snowballed from my existing established contacts in the 350 network (two of the paid organisers), meeting people through their involvement in the Stand Up for the Pacific tour, and using those to build connections with 350 Vanuatu, and other climate change advocacy and adaptation organisations in Vanuatu. This approach was both a pragmatic one and to some extent reflected the phenomenon being observed, as I was looking at the different scales of a campaigning network, moving from international to regional and then local. Twelve of my Phase II research participants were current or former 350 Vanuatu members, reflecting the initial sample population I intended to interview in my original research design.

However, as a consequence of focusing Phase II solely upon Vanuatu I decided to also explore the impact and reception of 350 Pacific's advocacy work within a wider community setting. Therefore, I engaged with a much broader range of participants than in my original research design. I also included government officials (particularly from the Departments of Energy, Climate Change and Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR)) as well as figures of chiefly authority, and local and expatriate employees of national and international NGOs working directly or indirectly in the climate change adaptation and advocacy sector, particularly seeking those who had somehow interacted with the work of 350 Vanuatu. My identification of key organisations from which to source my NGO participants was greatly aided by Vachette's (2014) social network analysis report, which mapped relations between different actors in the Vanuatu climate change adaptation and DRR sectors prior to Cyclone Pam, and which included 350 Vanuatu as a node, which enabled me to follow the connections from it to other groups, forging a coherence between my selection of 350 Vanuatu-based participants and broader set of Phase II interviewees.

In addition to these categories of interviewees, while in the field I chose to also engage with priests and church officials. From my initial literature review and Phase I of my research it had been apparent that religious understandings of climate change were a key research concern, and in all interviews I asked participants for their views on how religion could be brought into relation with climate action. However, as it became clear how under-researched and under-utilised this approach was, I also sought to turn the question on its head, seeking to find how climate change as an issue could be brought into religious practice, thus soliciting views from those whose primary focus was the latter.

With the priestly participants I also snowballed from existing contacts and interviewees, but attempted to cover a particular range of denominations in my sample (all of the major churches) and also to engage with religious leaders from some of the smaller charismatic churches as well. As will be discussed in Chapter Six, in my analysis of religious responses to climate change I embraced the concept of *tufala save*, a balancing of multiple modes of thinking (secular, *kastom*, and Christian). In line with this model of *tufala save*, there is a distinct bifurcation within my pool of interviewees. For the majority I followed a movement from climate to faith, interviewing those actively and/or professionally engaged in climate change advocacy, awareness and adaptation. While our topics of discussion were broad ranging, it is specifically their views on and engagements with faith-based responses to climate change that forms the substance for Chapter Six, my Vanuatu-focused chapter. To complement this, I also conducted interviews that moved from faith to climate, soliciting the wisdom and reflections of pastors from a wide range of denominations with regards to church responses to and biblical interpretations of climate change. I contend that the first category of interviewees constitutes the dominant voices within Vanuatu with regards to climate discourse, whilst the latter category, the pastors, represent figures of great significance and social influence who are in many ways still at the margins of climate discussion. Consequently, my third and final empirical chapter does not just present a descriptive account of church engagements with climate change hitherto, but through the bridging of these two perspectives articulates the potential of what could be realised if the meeting of the *tufala save* is seriously attempted.

I exceeded my original target number of interviewees (40), although I interviewed fewer within Phase One than I had hoped for (14 as opposed to an estimated 18). With retrospect, the original interview plan (to just interview around seven people per 350 Pacific national group, with a total of three 350 Pacific national groups) would have created an overly narrow pool of people, with potentially too great a diversity of social and cultural contexts between them to be

able to situate their views meaningfully.

One limitation of my Phase II sampling is that it is almost exclusively Efate-based (the central island of Vanuatu). However, this reflects the phenomenon at hand, as the vast majority of the actors actively involved in constructing widely circulated climate narratives are based in the nation's capital.

One of the most challenging groups of interviewees to gain access to was the government officials, especially as I was seeking interviews with particular senior figures who had had some personal direct involvement with 350 Vanuatu. Although I was physically well positioned to meet them (I was volunteering in the same building as the Climate Change department), I encountered many of the issues commonly highlighted with elite interviewees; that of requesting their time and expertise in the manner of a supplicant, as there was little that I could offer them in return (McDowell 1992: Desmond 2004), and consequently I did not manage to interviewee two particularly key figures.

The broad demographic characteristics of my Phase I and Phase II interviewees are recorded in the table below.

Table 1 - Interviewee Demographics

Fieldwork Stage	**Number of interviewees**	**Demographics**
Phase I	14	Countries of origin: Federated States of Micronesia (1) Fiji (2), Kiribati (1) Marshall Islands (1) New Zealand (1), Niue (2), Samoa (1), Solomon Islands (1), Tokelau (1), Tonga (1) Tuvalu (1), Vanuatu (1).
Phase II	53	Positions: Former or current members of 350 Vanuatu (12), Ni-Vanuatu NGO workers (12), ex-patriate NGO workers (14), chiefly or governmental authority (7), priests and figures of religious authority (8).

5. Interviews

5A. Rationale for interviews

Interviews enabled me to explore in-depth the 'complex behaviours and motivations' of participants (Dunn 2010: 102), a crucial component to being able to understand and foreground Islander perspectives. Following Willis (2006) I used a semi-structured interview format, due to the balance between having clear topics to explore and the flexibility to follow new directions. I developed different interview schedules for use with the four main categories of interviewees (Pacific Climate Warriors, 350 Vanuatu members, NGO workers, figures of religious authority) (see Appendix 4). The use of interview schedules prevented me from having to formulate all my questions on the spot, without leaving me rigidly tied to these questions alone, unlike a structured interview. Following Dunn's (2010) recommendations, almost all my questions were open, and I began with relatively straight-forward and un-intimidating descriptive and story-telling based questions and moved onto more complex and potentially sensitive issues. As predicted by Dunn (2010), the interview schedule evolved from interview to interview as I became more attuned to which questions were effective and significant to participants, and which seemed less relevant.

5B. Interview practice

With the participant's consent, I recorded the vast majority of interviews, as it enabled me to engage more fully with the interview, facilitated a more natural flow of conversation, and helped me to retain verbatim responses, as opposed to being interrupted by note-taking (Dunn 2010). On the other hand, participants can find recording devices off-putting or intrusive (Barrett and Cason 2010), and that seemed to be the case for a few. In these situations, I instead used note-taking, although I wasn't able to capture as much detail that way. Some data was lost in the first phase of interviews due to recording them using inadequate equipment (my phone) in noisy environments, a misfortune I learned from, consequently purchasing a Dictaphone for the second phase.

Very few Phase I interviewees indicated a desire for privacy and most interviews were conducted in public spaces with many other participants around, including the locations where workshops had been held, or communal parts of the accommodation the Warrior team were staying in. This initially surprised me but provided a public accountability to participating in the process as a whole. In Phase II, I held the majority of governmental, NGO or faith leader

interviews in the participant's office or church. This both enabled the comfort of the interviewee, as we were on their 'turf' so to speak, and facilitated the sharing of materials, as they often had resources to show me near at hand. Otherwise I held them in cafes in the centre of Port Vila, where I was able to thank them for their time by buying them coffee or lunch. With the 350 Vanuatu volunteers, some of these interviews also took place in offices where they had previously been through their volunteering (as a number of large NGOs shared spaces with 350 Vanuatu when needed) or occasionally in outside spaces. These were also suitable interview locations, as they were familiar spaces to the participants, and also public, to avoid any accusations of impropriety.

On many occasions interviewees turned questions back on me, soliciting my thoughts, feelings and knowledge on issues. While these questions were sometimes unexpected and challenging, I enjoyed the extent to which the participants disrupted the power dynamics of the interview, ensuring that it was not simply following my agenda, but we were more actively co-constructing knowledge, in line with an indigenous research methods inspired approach (Chilisa 2011). The response of interviewees to the different research questions strongly influenced the direction of my research. For instance, some participants strongly affirmed certain questions, with one remarking that a question that brought in the place of prayer was a 'very, very important question', another responding that my question regarding the cultural significance of canoes on his home island was 'a really good question and I think I have some really good answer to that'. The affirmation of certain questions helped me to recognise what ideas were meaningful and important to my participants: indeed, it was the degree of enthusiasm for religiously-focused questions, and the additional inclusion of faith-based material in Phase I that encouraged me to focus upon that aspect in Phase II. I also recognised that in focusing upon questions of faith and biblical knowledge in relation to climate change I was in a small way readdressing the bias in existing climate research in the region on scientific modes of knowledge that may be less significant for participants.

While the vast majority of my interviews were with single participants, on three occasions I held conversations with multiple interviewees at once. On two occasions this was really successful as the two participants in question knew each other well, were able to bounce ideas off each other and the interview became more of a free-flowing discussion, and again involved a 'collective construction of knowledge', that is more in line with a postcolonial research methodology (Chilisa 2011: 206). However, on another occasion my field notes are filled with frustration at an interview gone awry. Holding the interview in a popular cafe with a Ni-

Vanuatu NGO worker, an expatriate NGO worker who I was familiar with unexpectedly joined us, and I was initially pleased because of the second interviewee's wealth of knowledge and experience, and I was hopeful that the free-flowing discussion format of the previous multiple interviewee scenarios would be replicated. However, the second interviewee soon dominated discussions, with my original interviewee adding little. The second interviewee began an *ad hominem* attack on a mutual acquaintance that put me in a very uncomfortable position, took the conversation completely off-topic to the extent that I gave up all hope of re-directing it, and at the end requested a retraction of all comments made about his work or any named individuals (a request I have complied with). I later heard from a mutual friend that the second interviewee had spoken positively of our interview, and how much helpful information he'd provided me with. This suggests the potential gulf between a participant's experience of the interview and that of the interviewer. Despite the calls of both feminist and postcolonial methodologies for the interviewer to relinquish control of the interview process, I realised I was actually very uncomfortable and unhappy with the results when things became totally out of my hands.

5C. Interview challenges

Many of those that I interviewed in Phase I were also acting as media spokespeople and were already giving many interviews to local and international news outlets, or had previous experience of giving interviews to researchers in their home countries. At one point an interviewee asserted the direction of the interview by beginning by giving her full name, age and country of origin, thereby mirroring an expected interview format. As a consequence of my participants' familiarity with interviews they seemed comfortable talking with me, although there is a danger that their statements rarely diverged from the group's agreed key messaging. One participant even highlighted the consistency of her own interview response, remarking 'like I've said in all my other interviews... I just wanted to remind everybody that…this is not a fight that's only for the Pacific'. In this the use of participant observation as a means to challenge or verify interview findings, going beyond simple soundbites was crucial. Indeed, with one interviewee I found direct contradictions between the positive statements he expressed in our interview about familial support for his actions and what he confided during our more informal conversations. A final danger of interviewing those who are also actively engaged in media work is that the words of a few prominent charismatic individuals can be used to speak for whole populations and to give an exaggerated impression of how large and active Pacific Islander climate movements actually are. I hope that I ameliorated this to some extent by

seeking a far wider pool of interviewees for Phase II, who were not as consistently media-savvy as the majority of Phase I interviews. On the other hand, a focus upon media spokespeople is justified if one considers the extent to which they are having an actively shaping effect upon climate narratives.

One ethical and logistical obstacle I encountered when conducting interviews were general cultural disinclinations both towards punctual appointment keeping and towards potentially displeasing others through direct refusal. Rather than explicitly saying no, sometimes participants would decline interviews through not attending them. Consequently, when participants cancelled meetings at short notice or simply didn't appear, it was difficult to determine whether they wished to not participate or whether they had simply forgotten or been unable to attend. My general approach was to attempt to reschedule all missed or cancelled interviews once, and if the same problem occurred a second time to interpret it as an implicit disinclination to participate, and thus I would no longer discuss meeting for an interview with those individuals unless they themselves proposed it, as I wished to avoid pressuring my participants or causing them distress.

6. Participant observation

6A. Rationale for participant observation

There are two main reasons I chose to undertake participant observation. Firstly, unlike the more artificial environment of the interview, participant observation provides an insight into 'social life as it unfolds in the practices of day-to-day life' (Kees van Donge 2010: 180). In Phase I it enriched my insight into the social dynamics, everyday experiences and lived practices of 350 Pacific activists in a way that could not be achieved through interviews or analysis of documents. Participant observation exposed me to new and unexpected developments that I may not have encountered through my selected interview questions. Secondly, one of the main purposes of participant observation is to provide 'complementary evidence' (Kearns 2010: 242). Thus, information gained through observation helped me to verify the conclusions I had reached based on the interviews. The combination of a formal interview method with more informal data collection via participant observation also has the potential to show the 'discrepancies between what people... say and how they act' (Kees van Donge 2010, 182). This is particularly pertinent given the emphasis upon both practice and discourse in my research questions, as I was exploring the shaping and performance of political identities, as well as religiously-informed responses to climate change.

6B. Participant observation: Phase I

Kearns understands participant observation as a form of 'strategically placing oneself in situations in which systematic understandings of place are most likely to arise' (2010: 246). I conducted my first period of observational fieldwork during the Stand Up for the Pacific campaign tour, a highly strategic time and location. The tour brought together activists from across the Pacific in an unprecedented way, to explicitly confront the role of the Australian coal industry in fuelling climate change. Thus, it gave me an almost unique opportunity to study climate activism in relation to Oceanic interconnection.

Participating in this tour also provided an opportunity to build rapport with participants, creating connections necessary for Phase II. Conducting ethnographic studies of activism is an established approach (Schlembach 2011; Saunders 2012; Chatterton et al. 2012), as sharing in and sympathising with activists' political experiences can be integral to forming research relationships of trust.

During the month of intense campaigning activity, I attended and engaged in workshops, training days, awareness raising events, publicity stunts, social events and planning meetings. I aimed to observe and record the social dynamics of the group, ideas expressed, points of contention within the campaign and practices enacted in relation to climate change activism. I took detailed observational notes whenever possible and appropriate (such as at the end of the day or through nipping to the bathroom), writing down 'scratch notes' (Allsop et al. 2010: 209) which I then expanded upon when typing up my field notes each night. However, I didn't use an audio or video recorder during participant observation, nor did I openly write extensive notes, as this can be disruptive and can distance the participant observer from those that she is working with (Kearns 2010). Indeed, some participant reactions suggested that avoiding overt note-taking was the right course of action. On my first day with the Warriors, one jokingly warned two of the others to tell stories in their own language as I'd be writing notes about it, suggesting through humour some level of discomfort about me acting as an observer. On another occasion one of the 350 Pacific organisers found me typing up notes by myself and questioned me about it, and then asked me to write a blog post about my experiences, which I willingly did. His request thus managed his seeming unease with my overt note-taking and made the process of writing both more transparent and productive, as I channelled my thoughts both into my research and the blog post.

In addition to the conducting of interviews and participant observation during the Stand Up

for the Pacific tour itself, I have also supplemented my understanding of 350 Pacific through reading and analysing their website content, publicly broadcast social media outputs and media coverage. As I am Facebook friends with many of the Warriors, the major means by which I maintain relations with them, I have also seen their posts over the past three years, some of which also concern their involvement with 350 Pacific. While these posts may have influenced my analysis somewhat, I do not directly quote or reproduce any material I encountered via Facebook, as while it can be seen as being within the public domain, it was not intentionally posted for a public audience (Zimmer 2010), and I do not have their consent to do so.

6C. Participant observation: Phase II

Rather than acting as a removed observer, I actively participated in the activities in which I was interested in, and contributed as much as to the groups in which I was interested as possible. This was in line with a Pacific research ethics approach. Consequently, during my four months in Vanuatu I acted as a full-time volunteer with one climate change adaptation project, and devoted considerable time to 350 Vanuatu, the original organisation I had sought to work with. As a participant observer I participated in workshops and workshop planning, created surveys, produced press releases, sorted seeds and transported wheelbarrows, as well as any other activities that emerged through my involvement in 350 Vanuatu or GIZ.

At points I encountered conflict between a desire to research and analyse, and a collaborative imperative to act. One key moment emerged when I was asked to help draft the next twelve-month strategic plan for 350 Vanuatu, a document which could have formed interesting material for analysis, but which I was now being asked to shape and essentially produce. Given the unfamiliarity of the rest of the 350 Vanuatu group with strategic plans (a reasonably alien concept which had been emphasised to them by the regional 350 Pacific organisers), their desire to have one, and my confidence in writing such a document, it seemed an unethical act to refuse to assist, even if it undermined my ability to analyse its contents.

Following calls to decolonise methodologies (Smith 1999), there has been significant investigation into specifically Pacific research approaches including informal, authentic and culturally meaningful discussion-based methods, such as *talanoa* and *faafaletui* in Samoa, Tonga and Fiji (Vaioleti 2006; Otsuka 2006; Suaalii-Sauni and Fulu-Aiolupotea 2014). However, there were obstacles to my incorporation of Pacific research methods, the first being the cultural specificity of the methodologies in contrast to the planned geographic breadth of my study. While *talanoa* has been applied across Polynesia, it potentially seemed inappropriate and

obscuring of cultural difference to try to implement it in Vanuatu. I also questioned the suitability of me as a white non-Pacific Islander utilising Pacific methods. However, through Warrick's (2009) work, I encountered *storian*, a Ni-Vanuatu practice of free-flowing sharing and discussion. Warrick (2009: 83) defines *storian* methodologically as 'an umbrella term indicating semi-structured interview, informal interview, and opportunistic discussion as part of observation', which is pleasurable, dialogic and builds rapport, as it is based upon *storian* as an existing highly valued cultural practice, which can be defined as to 'chat, yarn, swap stories' (Crowley 1995: 235). Consequently, as Warrick notes, it can be understood as a Vanuatu-based equivalent to *talanoa*. *Storian* was a feature of most days, as I chatted and discussed ideas with friends and new acquaintances over kava (a drink produced from a culturally significant narcotic root) either in the capital city, or when out in the islands.

7. Data analysis

Following Secor (2010), I recognise that my analysis did not simply begin once I had left the field and my data were neatly transcribed, but that analytical processes are part of the data collection process itself, in terms of how I chose to design my interview schedule, sought clarification during participant observation and how I then transcribed my interviews.

Once I had completed data collection, I thus moved onto the next stage of interpretation and understanding, beginning a formal process of content analysis, identifying the presence (and in some cases absence) of certain signifiers in my interview transcripts and field notes (Dixon 2004). Even though I worked predominately with the interview data in transcript form, I also repeatedly re-listened to the interview recordings in order to identify tone and nuance. To identify signifiers, I thematically coded my data, using both what Cope (2010) identifies as deductive and inductive or 'in vivo' codes, thus those themes that I had already identified through my engagement with the existing literature and preliminary analysis (such as 'regional identity' or 'familial solidarities'), and new ideas that emerged from the empirical material itself (such as the notion of 'Warrior Time'). As my analysis progressed, I began to group the different codes, and identify the links between them, running across the different interview transcripts and field notes, and noting which codes were present or absent in which demographic of interviewees (discovering for instance that the ex-patriate NGO professionals had the least engagement with biblical approaches to climate change). I began by coding manually, simply copying and pasting relevant portions of text into sub-divided Word documents, but when these documents became exceedingly long and unwieldy I transferred my remaining uncoded data

to NVivo instead. Using NVivo made it easier to move between the full transcripts and material ordered by codes, thereby retaining the context of all the extracts I focused on.

As I began to move from coding to writing, I retained my focus on narrative, and began to group some of the key themes into core narratives, such as the three tellings of the Noah story in Chapter Six. I also tried to highlight my participants' own stories and understandings of the flotilla, thematically grouping elements of their stories in the first two empirical chapters, while placing these stories in dialogue with my wider theoretical concerns.

8. Ethics

Having accounted for my methodological design and practice, I now wish to examine the ethical dimension of this project in greater detail. This project adopted both the principles outlined by the UCL Ethics Committee (with whom an application was approved in July 2014), and the human research ethics guidelines issued by USP (2009). The latter was incorporated due to the ethical particularities of conducting research with Pacific communities. The principle of respect for indigenous epistemologies, cultures, and traditional practices is fundamental to USP's guidance and an indigenous research methods approach (Homerang 2014). Through my focus upon the cultural significance of climate change, and Pacific approaches to climate advocacy this emphasis upon respecting indigenous knowledge was not just ethically significant but methodologically integral to my work.

Both models include the importance of informed consent, privacy and confidentiality. I ensured ethical practice in these areas through providing participants with clear information sheets (Appendices 1 and 2), obtaining consent from the group and from individuals in the group in advance of beginning my fieldwork, and through anonymising the names of participants.

8A. Problematising anonymity

However, this latter point, a mainstay of research ethics procedures proved more practically and morally challenging than I had anticipated. Many researchers are questioning the default presumption of anonymisation as positive for research subjects, as well as how achievable full anonymity is in the context of qualitative social science (Van Den Hoonaard 2003).

First there is the question of the extent to which anonymity can be guaranteed. As Tolich (2004) highlights, ethical codes of practice place a far greater emphasis upon 'external confidentiality' (ensuring that those outside of the research project cannot identify participants) as opposed to

'internal confidentiality' (guaranteeing that research participants will not be able to identify each other in the research outputs). The latter is far more challenging, particularly when working in small communities, as there may be breaches of confidentiality through processes of 'deductive disclosure' (Kaiser 2009: 1632) as fellow participants may decipher pseudonyms based on other pieces of contextual information. Breaches of internal confidentiality can be very damaging for the relations within the community and between the community and the researcher herself, as is illustrated in the case of Ellis' (1995) study of the Fisherfolk, where some of her participants' confidential disclosures were outed to their neighbours when the members of the community accessed her academic publications, highlighting the importance of recognising participants as a future readership (Brettell 1996).

Even if anonymity can be achieved, its very merits have been disputed. The use of pseudonyms can cause unintentional harm for participants if they feel that the false names undermine their ownership of their own stories (Grinyer 2002). Anonymisation can be particularly disempowering if participants are already in a position where they feel they are systematically denied a voice (Saunders et al. 2015). This is particularly sensitive in relation to working with indigenous communities, where the forced anonymisation of data could be seen as paternalistic or as a 'stealing' of stories (Svalastog and Eriksson 2010). Chilisa's (2011: 206) guide to indigenous research methodologies further affirms this point, insisting that if participants wish to be named their names should be included, as it enhances accountability, both of researcher to participants and participants to their community. However, this does not resolve the problem of internal confidentiality raised by Tolich (2004), namely the negative impact of participants being made accountable to their community, and thus potentially quashes the potential for participants to express dissenting opinions.

Attempts to remove all identifying information may curtail the usefulness of the findings that can be gleaned from research, as in the case of Kasier (2009) where suggestions for improving care for LGBT patients could not be communicated to healthcare providers out of fear of risking the anonymity of the one lesbian research participant. To resolve some of these issues Kasier proposes a more complex informed consent form, that discusses the different ways in which participants' information may be used and lets them consent to different degrees of anonymity in different contexts. This approach opens up an ongoing dialogue with participants about anonymity, which is vital given that all research outputs may not be anticipated at the beginning of the research process, and because the researcher may not be able to accurately discern what information would be embarrassing if shared under the participant's own name,

and what non-anonymised disclosures the participant would be comfortable with (Grinyer 2002).

These concerns, and particularly the recommendations of Chilisa (2011) and Svalastog and Eriksson (2010) that indigenous participants should be named if they wish to be so, presented me with an ethical conundrum. The vast majority of my research participants chose to reject anonymity, and suggested the use of their actual names. For many of those in Phase I I suspect this emerged from their role as media spokespeople, as they were already presenting similar statements to the press with their actual names attached. For others, it emerged from a sense of moral conviction. As one ecumenical official explained:

> Don't worry, just use my name. We are the church. We want to make known to the people everything we say or do or influence the world with.

In another case, it was not religious conviction, but divine guidance that resolved the question of interviewee anonymity. One interview concluded with the participants seeking holy intercession to determine whether or not their real names should be used, and received a direct message from Christ that 'it's good to have your name in this interview'. However due to the nature of the informed consent form I used (which does not specify in depth the manner in which different pieces of information may be used in different contexts), and my agreement to comply with UCL research ethics and data protection procedures, I cannot reveal the names of my participants, despite their desires for recognition. Yet choosing to both go against the recommendations of indigenous research methods scholars, and the faith-based resolutions of my participants in order to comply with UK data management regulations feels uncomfortably at odds with a model of *tufala save*. In hindsight, trialling a consent form modelled on the suggestions of Kasier (2009) would have been most appropriate to my research.

Consequently, I have used pseudonyms throughout for all the participants. Choosing appropriate pseudonyms can be challenging, in terms of reflecting the cultural background of the participant without revealing their identity or using a name that the participant may find it distressing to be labelled with (Grinyer 2002). Moreover, due to the wide range of participant nationalities there are many different cultural backgrounds to consider. To manage this, I have chosen to give all participants biblical, particularly Old Testament names, in recognition of the significance of Christianity in their lives and the prevalence of such names in their respective home nations, as well as the suitability of such names when considering religious discourses.

However, I have not anonymised the major organisation I have analysed (350 Pacific) due to the media visibility of the Stand Up for the Pacific campaign, which would make anonymisation impossible without major distortion of the data. My research does face issues of 'internal confidentiality', due to the small pool of participants, the use of snowball sampling and the documentation of the flotilla as a reasonably unique event (Van Den Hoonaard 2003). However, I am not unduly concerned about the risk of deductive disclosure, given that the majority of the participants are willing to be named, and therefore are likely to be happy to be recognised by others that know them (although for those participants who have requested anonymity far greater steps have been taken to remove all potentially identifying contextual information).

8B. Embracing sagacity

During the interview process, I encountered a number of hurdles concerning 'knowledge testing' questions. Many potential participants seemed unwilling to be interviewed due to a fear that I would be testing their knowledge of climate change as a scientific process, and other participants when asked directly about climate change impacts began a form of mechanical listing, that seemed divorced from their own personal experiences. One Phase I participant who was due to present at a speaking event later that day, explicitly defaulted to her prepared speech when presented with this topic, responding 'There's a lot of impacts. I will read it to you then. My impacts. Yeah. You gonna write it down?'. I suggested that I could take a photo of that part of her speech instead, which she agreed with, but I then failed to do so, and then during her presentation in the evening she chose to cast aside her prepared words, and instead 'speak from the heart', so the impacts were in fact never shared.

This reticence suggested that the forms of knowledge I was seeking weren't necessarily meaningful for my participants: rather than eliciting their particular perspectives and experiences, my questions were being interpreted as a request to recite information conveyed to them by an external Western authority. Consequently, I removed this topic from my interview schedule, and reflected upon how I could embrace principles of 'philosophical sagacity' (Chilisa 2011: 211), another element of an indigenous research methods approach, that involves invoking the 'wisdom and beliefs of wise elders of the communities', as opposing to appealing to natural scientific knowledge. Both as a response to this idea and to the repeated significance of religious ideas within my interviews and through my observational fieldwork, I chose to introduce priests as a new interviewee category, recognising them as figures of wisdom and

sagacity. Moreover, in our discussions of biblical approaches to climate change, the dynamic transformed from that of simply interviewer-interviewee, to mirror that of parishioner seeking guidance and pastor. Thus, the interviews emulated an existing form of interaction which challenged the power dynamics between us, making the encounter more akin to that of an elite interview (Desmond 2004; McDowell 1992), although I recognise that power relations that occur within an interview context are not as simple as the category of 'elite' can imply (Smith 2006).

It was in some of these discussions that I felt the interviews moved most towards a dyadic co-construction of knowledge, an approach to data collection that Chilisa (2011) advocates as part of an indigenous research methodology. While the priests were generous in the wisdom they imparted, they also sought my knowledge and perspectives on these issues. As I had recently read *Laudato Si*, the Pope's encyclical addressing climate change, as part of a small weekly Ni-Vanuatu Catholic reading group, I was able to share my knowledge about the Pope's words with those of other denominations, who had largely not engaged with the encyclical, as well as expressing my thoughts through participating in the reading group itself.

However, while attempts to engage with participant sagacity were largely successful in dialogues with priests, some participants became resistant to discussions centred around religious understandings, seeing it as the domain of priests alone and thereby outside of their area of expertise. As one participant explained 'I cannot put on my long socks as a pastor to respond…I'd prefer if the pastors answered this'. Therefore, attempts to engage sagacity left some participants feeling unable to engage with certain discussion topics. Yet its success with the priestly interviewees strengthens the case for focusing on religious figures. Akin to the recognition that the Warriors who were media spokespeople would have a particularly shaping influence on contemporary discourses, similarly priests are likely to have a significance influence over Christian narratives of climate change that circulate in particular communities.

8C. Practicing reciprocity

In terms of Pacific research ethics, one significant aspect is the development of meaningful and reciprocal social relationships between researchers and participants, based upon mutual trust. The two-part fieldwork structure (plus Overseas Institutional Visit to Fiji) enabled me to gradually build this trust, and to ensure a longer-term engagement with participants.

Part of this trust also depends upon an honest recognition of my positionality as a researcher,

in terms of the power dynamics between myself and my interlocutors. Kearns (2010) argues that in observational research an ideal status is between that of outsider and insider. While recognising the privilege I have as a white European researcher; privilege that makes me an outsider to the communities I was working with, I endeavoured to find points of commonality and connection through my background and experiences as a climate activist, and attempted to usefully share knowledge and experiences with the activist groups that I worked with. My liminal status as insider-cum-outsider was tested at points throughout the Stand Up for the Pacific tour. For instance, while the women Warriors were very welcoming, for instance encouraging me to join them in a photo with all of the female participants and in the women's dances, one of the organisers was keen that I maintain greater distance, and asked me to take a step back at points, which I then did. At points, participants were explicit about my positionality as a white researcher, and used it as a point of critique, with one interviewee (himself white) complaining that 'so often it's white people telling the stories of the Pacific Islands or like interviewing Islanders'.

My attempts at reciprocity had mixed results. In Vanuatu they seemed more successful, as I had an increasing sense of utility as my Bislama improved, I was engaged as a volunteer from day one, and I had a sense of where my skills would be most useful. Some of the most successful moments were contributing to 350 Vanuatu's strategic plan, developing an exercise to illuminate the links between ecological cycles and movements of capital, and the co-organisation of a youth climate summit. I also shared stories of UK climate activism with Ni-Vanuatu climate advocate friends, through sending them videos or topical news stories. On the other hand, attempts to bring UK examples into a climate campaigning workshop led to very little engagement (the session was excluded from the minutes, and seemingly forgotten in the closing feedback). Positively contributing to 350 Pacific over a longer term was more difficult, both due to the challenge of inserting myself into the NGO's more formal structures and also because of a personal falling out with some 350 Pacific participants, which demonstrated how precarious some of those relations of trust were.

The production of non-academic articles also formed a part of the Pacific research ethics process, as it was both a response to a request by a 350 Pacific organiser and an opportunity for openly feeding back ideas to participants, increasingly the transparency of my analysis. I received really positive responses from the Warriors about one online magazine article (Fair 2014), which many of them shared and commented on via Facebook. However, I was unable to promote and circulate my second article (Fair 2015a), as I was very uncomfortable with the

editorial choice of title, as I felt it perpetuated the inevitable inundation discourse that I was seeking to critique. While I eventually got the title amended, it made me recognise the challenge of inserting myself into the world that I was studying, in terms of media representations of islandness. I distributed printed copies of a third article (Fair 2015b) to contacts in both Vanuatu and Fiji, but received no feedback on it, suggesting that online materials more easily generated responses, and that there were limits to the extent to which participants wished to engage with my analysis. Through these short pieces of journalism, I also endeavoured to make links between Pacific issues and activist communities in the UK, publishing about the Pacific Islands in left and environmental UK-based publications. Thus, these pieces were both a means of forging international political solidarities and an attempt to reconcile those geographically estranged parts of myself.

At the outset of my fieldwork, I had aimed to make three main contributions to the groups I was working with: (i) to document their activities and (ii) to raise awareness through disseminating them to a wider audience, both of which I feel I have achieved through my thesis, forthcoming journal articles and journalistic pieces. I also aimed to provide constructive feedback and analysis of their practices, which would inform their future activism. However, as noted in the earlier discussion of gatekeepers, I feel that my greater contribution was through practical action rather than academic critique, for example through helping 350 Vanuatu produce a budget that could also be used by other 350 Pacific local groups, providing food and venue space for workshops, and helping with workshop planning. These acts of everyday assistance were the best means of reciprocating the enormous kindness and generosity my friends in the Pacific showed me.

9. Conclusion

Thus, although my research deviated from the original plans, particularly in terms of the number of field sites covered, I successfully used interviews and participant observation as my main means of data collection, conducting a greater number of interviews with a broader range of participants than initially envisioned, thereby placing me in a better position to address my research questions. Through this process I have wrestled with a number of challenging ethical questions regarding Pacific research: notably the tension between indigenous demands for participant recognition and the enforced anonymity of UK data protection procedures; the challenges of meaningfully enacting reciprocity while mediating relations with gatekeepers; and the avenues for the fruitful co-construction of different knowledges. Rather than being

contained within my methodological chapter, these concerns inform my work throughout the empirical chapters that follow.

4. Their Sea of Islands? Oceanic identities and world enlargement

Having established that the inevitable inundation discourse – the narrative circulating through journalistic, cinematic and academic accounts that portrays the Pacific Islands as helpless, hopeless and already lost to rising seas – can be seen as an example of an apocalyptic 'horror story' (Buck 2015) of the Anthropocene, across the following empirical chapters I explore three possible counter-discourses. Firstly, in this chapter, I examine the Pacific Climate Warrior campaign through the lens of Epeli Hau'ofa's (1994) Sea of Islands vision, as discussed in the literature review.

Central to Hau'ofa's thesis that the Pacific Island nations are 'not necessarily small or helpless' (Hau'ofa 1993: 128) or dependent on the whims of larger states, is the power that the region can grasp if interconnected and unified as a 'Sea of Islands', rather than vulnerable, isolated and irrelevant 'islands in a far sea' (1994: 152). This collective identity, power and place, Hau'ofa terms 'Oceania'. He distinguishes Oceania from former examples of Pacific regionalism, due to its emergence from ordinary lived experiences of travel, interconnection and exchange, as opposed to bureaucratic colonial imposition, and because it seeks to place Oceanic[8] interests first, rather than being mired in the politicking of individual nation states (Hau'ofa 2008a). Most simply Oceania is 'a world of people connected to each other' (Hau'ofa 2008a: 50). Hau'ofa also introduces the idea of 'world enlargement', reframing Oceania as both large and ever-engulfing, as through the movements of the Oceanic diaspora further territories are enveloped within this growing continent. In his words, 'Oceania is vast, Oceania is expanding' (1994: 160).

In order to recognise Hau'ofa's vision as more than a 'flight of fancy' (Borer 1993: 87), but as a credible alternative articulation of power and possibility in the Pacific, one that challenges the previously mentioned inevitable inundation hypothesis as well as the region's general belittlement, I explore to what extent features of this Sea of Islands vision are being realised on the ground. The Pacific Climate Warriors are an ideal test case, or vehicle to bring these ideas from the theoretical to the empirical, as many of them could be presented as 'ordinary Pacific

[8] Throughout this chapter the proper adjective 'Oceanic' is used to refer to things pertaining to the region of Oceania, as opposed to that which is more generally related to oceans, but also following Stone (2011: 257) to indicate the vision of interconnected regional identity envisioned by Hau'ofa.

Islanders' as opposed to the elite of 'politicians, bureaucrats, statutory body officials, diplomats' (Hau'ofa 1994: 148) that Hau'ofa claims are blind to the existence of Oceania. Moreover, they are explicitly engaged in an act of resistance, both against the impending impacts of climate change and the imposition of a disempowering discourse of drowning (through their campaign slogan 'not drowning but fighting'). The extent of their regional unity is fundamental as for Hau'ofa it is only when 'united we can be sufficiently strong to resist more effectively than we have' (1993: 128).

Using Hau'ofa's vision as a theoretical lens with which to examine the case of the Pacific Climate Warriors, I will make three contributions. Firstly, invoking Hulme's provocation to recognise not 'what we can do about climate change, but what climate change can do for us' (2009: 326), I argue that climate change activism creates an opportunity for the physical embodiment of Oceanic alliance, connection and expression of regional identity that Hau'ofa theoretically envisions. I identify the emergence of these forms of connection through familial modes of bonding by the participants and contend that these sibling-like solidarities reflect actual kin relations within the 350 Pacific local groups. I explore the extent of familial support for the campaign, marking kin relations as a substantive yet contentious feature of a Pacific model of protest, a tension that continues in the following chapter. Continuing to consider manifestations of Oceanic regionalism, I turn to questions of representation, and highlight the manner in which the participants, while situated as representatives of their respective nations, began to enact forms of composite, fluid and Pan-Pacific, as opposed to national, identities.

Secondly, I contend that climate change creates an opportunity to not just reinforce existing power relations between the Pacific Islands and the rest of the world (as the inevitable inundation narrative does), but to subvert and even invert them. To substantiate this, I invoke Hau'ofa's concept of 'world enlargement' as a foundation of this counter-discourse that emphasises the potential for the Pacific Islands to confront climate change. However, I contend that Hau'ofa's very notion of world enlargement needs enlarging, and refashion this concept in light of the Pacific Climate Warriors' actions. I consider the role of domesticity in the Warrior's experiences of climate change, and how the action can be understood as a means of 'bringing climate change home', an action that therefore enlarges Oceania beyond its boundaries, as the Pacific and its problems can no longer be contained within its islands. I argue that the emphasis upon the Pacific as acting for and on behalf of the world constitutes a form of world enlargement. I also identify the decolonising impulses at play, in terms of the need to re-educate Australia in its ignorance.

While recognising these to be key features of a Sea of Islands approach, I acknowledge the limitations of applying such a model to this case. For instance, I draw upon the oft-cited critique of Hau'ofa's work that its Pan-Pacific vision conceals intra-regional differences and inequities. I hazard this also to be the case with the Pacific Climate Warriors, noting the under-representation of Micronesia, the absence of many countries, and the power differentials enacted along gendered lines. However, as my third contribution I argue that the model of regionalism being produced and performed through the flotilla is one that acknowledges inequalities and difference. Crucially I identify discourses of relative altitudinal privilege, which engage empathetically with narratives of submersion and loss, but with a specificity that rejects the reduction of the Pacific to an anonymous inundated atoll. I also suggest that this acknowledgement of relative privilege adds to the complexities of climate change responsibility and blame explored throughout the empirical chapters. I conclude by situating Australia within this scale of privilege, opening up the possibility of a less conciliatory approach to the polluting nations by the Pacific Climate Warriors. Consequently, while I recognise shortcomings to Hau'ofa's vision and to the Pacific Climate Warriors' practices, in combination they lay the foundation for a Pacific-based counter-discourse that challenges the disempowering narrative of inevitable inundation.

1. Our Sea of Islands: unity, identity and regional interconnection

I open with an investigation into the ideas of unity and interconnection embedded within the Pacific Climate Warriors campaign. 350 Pacific's work is rooted in an explicit emphasis upon united Pacific action. As part of their *2013 Strategic Plan*, the organisation argues that 'as a region we stand in solidarity, calling for a new age of connectedness between us all' (350 Pacific 2013b: 2). The organisation identifies one of the Pacific's strengths as 'the unity of our region – connected by the ocean' (350 Pacific 2013b: 3). The latter statement resonates very directly with Hau'ofa's work, which argues for 'a regional identity anchored in our common heritage of the ocean' (2008a: 55). It also mirrors the call to forge connections with the more-than-human issued by contemporary theorists of the Anthropocene (Haraway 2016a). This regional connectivity is to some extent realised by the geographical breadth of communities involved. According to the 350 Pacific website (as of 2014[9]), its fifteen local groups are spread across Melanesia, Micronesia and Polynesia and include sovereign states and territories (see Figure 5).

[9] As of 2018, 350 Pacific's website no longer includes a map of the different local groups, hence the date of the included figure.

Yet these written and cartographic nods to regional cohesion do not tell us enough about the extent to which supra-national connections are being enacted and performed. For this I begin by identifying the enactment of Oceanic alliances and connections through familial modes of bonding by the Pacific Climate Warriors, and then explore the performance of both national and regional identities.



Figure 5- Locations of 350 Pacific local Climate Warrior groups

1A. Familial Solidarities

Kinship ties are undeniably pertinent in Hau'ofa's work, both through his recourse to appeals of Oceanic common heritage and through the practical pathways being traced across the ocean in order to maintain family relations that for him form the foundation of Oceania. Borer (1993: 84) has gently chided Hau'ofa for propounding a notion of 'mythical family consciousness': divorced from strict rules of consanguinity but still with the potential to inspire hope. Similarly, Stone (2011: 269) notes that in Hau'ofa's work 'Oceanic identity is an identity of resistance and activity...through recourse to a heritage of migration and unbounded kinship networks'.

I contend that the family relations the Warriors produced both embodied Hau'ofa's vision of Oceanic alliance through kinship, while creatively exceeding the manifestations of this that Hau'ofa himself presents. There is something far more 'unbounded', to borrow Stone's term, about the Warriors' new relations, than the routine examples of visiting diaspora Hau'ofa provides, as the family the Warriors are forging through their collective struggle transcends a sense of genetic literalism. Thus, this vision of a newly conceived family, united in purpose,

acting collectively with mutual care and affection, but made of figures that represent all corners of Oceania, can be seen as a manifestation *par excellence* of the vision of Pacific unity Hau'ofa articulates. However, as well relating as family, the Warriors' commitment to activism also produced some tensions with existing kin.

Recurrent throughout the campaign were motifs of family, particularly recognition of each other as brother and sister (and one matriarchal figure as the 'mother' of the group). For instance, one Warrior from Niue described the blockade itself as 'like a big huge family coming together, trying to portray a special message out to...out to Australia, out to Newcastle'. These familial connections were more than simile. Sibling-like attachments motivated the Warriors to take action. Another Niuean Warrior captures this explicitly:

> I am willing to fight. Because this is my family too. They are my family. Even though I came late I still feel so close to this and I call them my brothers and sisters. I really love them. (Samson, 350 Niue)

The recognition of each other as brother and sister was instrumental to the cohesion and solidarity enacted by the group. As Leah, from the Marshall Islands understands it:

> We were together like brothers and sisters and really connected. We really connected with each other. We did not leave anybody behind. We were checking on each other the whole time. Whenever someone fell, someone was there to help that person up. Whenever I failed to complete an interview, or had done an interview or turned down an interview my sister was there to help out. (Leah, 350 Marshall Islands)

For the Warriors, these familial-style relations are also crucially built upon a shared Christian faith. Religious foundations for unity are only given a passing reference by Hau'ofa, perhaps due to his avowed agnosticism and aversion to organised religion (2008b: 99). Yet shared Christian identity, as explored further in Chapter Six, was a linchpin of connection for the Warriors, which formed a link between their family's practices of devotion and these new forms of Oceanic regionalism. Many Warriors recognised that the regular acts of collective worship that peppered the campaign were essential to group cohesion. These performances of faith transcended denominational differences and cohered the group around the centrality of Christianity in their different island cultures[10]. As Joseph's account testifies:

[10] The significance of religious belief to the Pacific Climate Warriors' campaign, and to potential understandings of and responses to climate change, will be explored in far greater detail in Chapter Six.

> We all may have our differences but we all have faith. We all have religion. And we all believe in our faith. So, for us, the Pacific small islands, prayer is something that we all... it is part of our culture. It is part of our traditions. It is part of what defines who we are.
> (Joseph, 350 Federated States of Micronesia (FSM))

Yet these connections were not only optative (Heinrich 1963). These sibling-like solidarities also, to some extent, reflect actual kin relations within the 350 local groups. Warriors largely became involved in 350's work through existing friends and family. For instance, Maria's initial participation emerged not from previous engagements with social movements, but from strong encouragement by her affine:

> And then early April our coordinator Jonah whose wife is my auntie she was like...she wanted plenty people to attend this workshop, the 350 workshop and then I had no intention of attending it, I wasn't really into it and then on the day Jonah brother-in-law calls me up and tells me and 'get your butt here! It starts at eight'.
> (Maria, 350 Fiji)

The campaign also presented an opportunity to renew wider kinship ties, as after the main action in Newcastle, the majority of the Warriors (all those who were not media spokespeople) were then free to visit family members based in Australia. Early on during the campaign, one Tongan Warrior was asked by another Warrior if he would be staying with family in Sydney and he responded that he didn't have any. Both then burst into peals of laughter, imagining that absurd possibility given the strength of the Tongan diaspora in that city.

A substantive feature of this case of Pacific Island climate activism seems to be that it is socially embedded within kin relations. This was apparent through the centrality of forging and performing optative kin relations among the Warriors, as well as the extent to which the Warriors encountered activism through existing family ties and activism provided them with an opportunity to strengthen those ties. This reflects what Toren and Pauwels (2015) highlight as the wider importance of kinship networks in Pacific Island life.

However, this relationship between the Warriors' activism and family relations highlights a potential tension between their new Oceanic alliances and existing kin relations. Some Warriors received unconditional family support, in spite of awareness of the risks involved:

> Yeah, my family they supported me very well. And even all my friends and stuff because they support us very much and having the

> group coming here...they know how dangerous and high risk of coming here, that they would end up in jail or something like that, but they keep supporting us to go. Don't back down. (Tobiah, 350 Tonga)

Other Warriors were more oblique about the nature of their intended actions in Australia, for fear of family disapproval, admitting that 'I didn't mention anything about protest' when discussing their plans, or that 'my mum had no idea what I was going to get involved in'. Even Leah, daughter of a Pacific Island leader, who was publicly lauded by Radio Australia as coming 'with the blessing of her father, the President' (Radio Australia, 2014) admitted that in fact 'I told him...and he said 'ok' but I didn't really mention the blockade, but I'm sure he found out soon after I got here'. These fears were in some cases well-founded as one Warrior admitted:

> My grandparents from both sides...they weren't really supportive, I think they were scared for me because I told them that I was coming for a forum...and then when I told them about the protesting part they were scared because of the risk of me getting arrested, falling out the canoe into the sea, you know there's sharks there, blue bottomed jelly fish, you know, all that kind of stuff. (Maria, 350 Fiji)

For one Warrior, honesty about the true nature of the trip led to open defiance.

> They [her parents] were a bit afraid, a bit frightened about what will happen next week. They tried...tried to stop me from coming but I insist. I believe that, I said to them, yeah. I believe that God will go with us, yeah. So, there will not...nothing will happen to me. (Priscilla, 350 Solomon Islands)

In some cases, the extent of family approval the Warriors professed appears exaggerated. One Warrior claimed during our interview that his family 'had their doubts at first but eventually after explaining everything to them properly then yeah, they have been supporting me, everyone', yet in another conversation acknowledged he had an uncle working in mining in Australia who was opposed to the action, and had encouraged the Warrior's parents to dissuade him from coming. The disagreement had reached the point that the Warrior would not be staying with his uncle when visiting Brisbane, thus the Warrior's engagement in climate activism acted to rupture rather than maintain kinship ties. The Warriors also contended with this direct complicity of Pacific Islanders in the fossil fuel extraction industry during their visit to the Whitehaven Coal mine in Maules Creek (Chapter Five).

This suggest that notions and enactments of family were complicated and contested through engagement in the Pacific Climate Warriors campaign. On the one hand, we see the glimpses of Hau'ofa's idea of Oceanic connection performed through forging familial relations with Pacific strangers. Further, we witness allegiance to kin respected through participants engaging in protest via family connections and explicitly taking action on behalf of their families alongside current and future descendants. Yet this stands in tension with a present subterfuge or disobedience towards family necessary in order to perform this concern for kin.

1B. Performing national and Pan-Pacific identities

A vital quality of Hau'ofa's work is that it advocates forms of connection and regional identity that transcend and 'blurs the boundaries of nation-states' (Jolly 2007: 530). This is also one of the key controversies surrounding Hau'ofa's thesis. His vision of Oceania has been accused of being predicated on 'a homogenous Pacific Society' (Ratuva 1993: 95-96), and thereby belying the cultural and linguistic diversity of the region. If this were to be the case, this would be concerning given that the homogenisation or creation of a mythical and essentialised representation of the Pacific has been a crucial component of its belittlement (Fry 1997). Yet Hau'ofa's work has also been defended on this point, through claims that the interconnections he draws are premised upon diversity, the inhabiting of multiple identities, and reaching points of commonality while still holding onto distinct island heritages (Jolly 2007; Stone 2011; Madraiwiwi 2010). Hau'ofa himself unreservedly refutes this critique, arguing not only that homogeneity is 'neither possible nor desirable', but that 'our diversity is necessary for the struggle against the homogenising forces of the global juggernaut' (2008a: 42).

The Pacific Climate Warriors campaign engendered these forms of non-homogenised Oceanic regionalism, as the Warriors, while formally positioned as representatives of their respective nations, began to embrace forms of composite, fluid and Pan-Pacific, as opposed to national, identities. This was achieved through the use of customary dress, flags, and most significantly song and dance.

Firstly, many of the Warriors clearly understood themselves as national representatives, rather than merely individuals taking action, and took great pride in that role and identity. Indeed, many of the Warriors actually referred to each by their countries as monikers, rather than their Christian names.

Priscilla clearly grounded her presence in Australia in terms of her regional and local

affiliations:

> As a young lady, to be a Pacific Climate Change Warrior, in my own opinion I would say that I must stand as a warrior representing my own country, my own land, my own family. Stand and must fight against it, climate change effects, that are affecting our islands. I would say that to be a warrior it's a bit interesting because we are representing our own cultures here as well, our own unique customs here as well, and our own traditions here as well. So, it's a good thing to be a Pacific Climate Change Warrior. I am proud to represent my own country and my own island. (Priscilla, Solomon Islands)

Yet as she highlights, this patriotic act of representation is premised on an articulation of difference from the other island cultures. This emphasis upon uniqueness as opposed to a unity founded upon uniformity is mirrored by the organisational attitude of 350 Pacific. For example, one of the organisers presents this display of plurality as intrinsic to the strength of the campaign:

> Well I think.....seeing the beauty and strength of culture and diversity of cultures, because often the islands get lumped into one, so actually within the islands there's just fantastic diversity. So, showing that versus you know a few lumps of coal like, kind of a choice here. (Daniel, 350 Pacific)

Yet this emphasis upon the Warrior acting as metonym for the nation also caused some participants conflict between their personal interest and national duty. For instance, Abel's experience was a balance of pride and also a burdening sense of responsibility.

> And to be representing Tuvalu, as a climate Warrior from Tuvalu, it means a lot to me. I'm really proud of that. And it's a burden that I have to carry, representing my island given the fact that I like to mingle and socialise with people in a very... strange way, people might call it. Yep. Most of the times I have to hold my flag up high and be an ambassador for Tuvalu. (Abel, 350 Tuvalu)

His euphemistic allusions to 'strange' behaviour references his identity as *pinapenaaine* or occupying a specifically Tuvaluan non-heteronormative gender and sexual identity, (discussed further in Section 3B) and highlights the question of whether the Warriors are seen by themselves or others as valid or authentic in their representation of whole populations.

This became pertinent in relation to one of the most powerful of national insignia: the flag.

One participant questioned her own legitimacy as a representative of her country due to the incomplete truth with which she had presented the Australia trip to her family (like a number of others she had inventively described the flotilla as a 'conference'). Consequently, she didn't feel she had genuine governmental endorsement for her actions, and thus felt unable to fly her national flag during the protest. To both her relief and disappointment, her father gave her post-facto confirmation that the government was completely behind her and she should have held her flag high.

Many of the warriors recognised that they were representing not just their particular islands but the region as a whole. Leah, one of the key media spokespeople, recognised her role as speaking for Oceania and even further afield.

> The Pacific Climate Warrior is not just the face of the Marshall Islands, it's the face of the whole Pacific. It's the face of Fiji, Tokelau, Vanuatu, Tuvalu, and standing up for the Pacific and also standing in solidarity with those around the world that are facing climate change impacts. (Leah, 350 Marshall Islands)

Another participant recognised her responsibility towards pan-pacific representation, while emphasising similarly to Priscilla that this sense of over-arching identity was built upon a recognition of difference, not sameness.

> I think when I'm speaking during talks, of course I represent Kiribati and as a culture we...but again with the other Pacific Islands we all have our different unique cultures and at the end of the day I'm not just representing Kiribati but I'm representing the whole Pacific Islands because we share the same spirit, different cultures, unique cultures but somehow similar in many ways. So, we represent our own countries as well as the Pacific Islands. (Eve, 350 Kiribati)

Underlying this regional representation was an ideal of Pacific unity, as already witnessed through the use of family motifs. In his words Samson captures this while subverting notions of nationhood as based on separate, independent jurisdictions. In his defiant proclamation all Pacific Islands are united under one nation:

> We are fighting for our lives, fighting for our people and if we stand together as one nation from different countries anything is possible. They will hear our voice. (Samson, 350 Niue)

While the responsibilities of representation were treated with much gravity, there was also an

evident playfulness and fluidity in terms of the national and cultural identities performed. One participant from Tuvalu spent much of our trip to Maules Creek draped in and posing with a Tongan flag (Figure 6), and also during the blockade became the official captain of the Fiji canoe.

Figure 6 - A Tuvaluan Warrior, adorned with the Tongan flag, looks upon the mounds of overburden

Meanwhile Vanuatu *kastom* dress was gifted to one of the Tokelaun participants who then proudly wore it throughout the ANZ action in Melbourne. These material acts of exchange also disrupt the presentation of authenticity and islandness. The Warriors' campaign is couched in the language of traditionalism: the media consumption focuses upon the 'traditional dressed' Warriors (Queally 2014) and 'traditional canoes' (Garrett 2014; Kelly 2014; Singarayar 2014). Yet unbeknownst to the majority of the Western viewing public, through the borrowing and gifting of fabrics and flags, in many cases, the traditions displayed are that of another nation's rather than the Warrior's own. These gift-giving acts, undocumented in the media accounts, are performed not for audience consumption, but for the Warriors themselves in the production of Pacific connections and Oceanic identities. Thus, while these performances of Pan-Pacific identities act to homogenise to external audiences, internally there is still a recognition of the diversity and uniqueness of cultures.

These Oceanic identities were also performed through a powerful form of musical bricolage. At the conclusion of the blockade the Warriors sung a multi-lingual version of the charity hit single *We are the world* (Jackson & Ritchie 1985), with each respective country group contributing a line of the chorus translated into one of their nation's tongues. While originally developed as a celebrity fundraising response to famine in Ethiopia and later re-released in response to the 2010 earthquake in Haiti, the appropriation of the song for a moment of Pacific indigenous resistance to the fossil fuel industry is apt in both form and content. In the act of collectively singing in each other's languages, the dissolution of national and cultural boundaries between the Pacific Islanders is both imagined and enacted. The significance for Pacific liberation of speaking in indigenous rather than colonial tongues can also not be understated (Hao'ofa 2008c; Waddell 1993; Kabutaulaka 1993). Moreover, the song's key lyrics emphasise achievement through unity ('Let us realize that a change can only come/ When we stand together as one'), that to some extent mirrors Hau'ofa's claim that 'Only in unity can we realise our full potentials' (1993: 129). It announces the shared Christian identity of participants ('We are all a part of God's great big family') and the current realities of climate change impacts ('There are people dying'). Most crucially in its transposition from Eighties' American pop superstars to 21st century Islander climate activists it challenges notions of victimhood and agency in accordance with the campaign's mantra 'We are not drowing, we are fighting'. It calls out the ongoing apathy of Australia and other fossil-fuel intensive nations ('We can't go on pretending day by day/ That someone, somehow will soon make a change') and transforms the otherwise glib and incongruous line 'We're saving our own lives' into a cry of action and defiance grounded in the lived experience of suffering. Thus, this rewriting can be seen as part of a discourse that challenges the inevitable inundation discourse, and provides a further example of the role of songs in challenging existing climate narratives (Kempf 2017).

This Pan-Pacific cultural hybridisation also emerged through the *haka* (a ceremonial war dance, most commonly associated with Maori culture) which was devised and performed initially at Maules Creek (Figure 7) and then on the beach before the canoe launching (and later that evening in a local bar). With different participants leading different segments, all the men engaged in a dance that combined Tongan, Samoan, Fijian, Tokelaun, Solomon Islander, Ni-Vanuatu and Maori ceremonial dance, a composite *haka*. In this act, simple representations of national identity dissolved, and instead a fearsome vision of pan-pacific strength and unity was performed. The way in which flags, attire and dances circulated spoke to a group whose actions broke out of national silos and instead performed a sense of interconnected Oceanic islandness.

Figure 7 - The conclusion of the composite haka performed at Maules Creek

This expression of regional identity chimes with Hau'ofa's work in three ways. Firstly, the spirit with which the Warriors contributed to the song, the *haka* and other dances that were performed during the campaign upon meeting new allies, concords with 'the joy' he identifies in USP students in 'sharing aspects of their varied heritage with each other and with us' (1993: 131). Moreover, it centres exchange in the creation of collective identity, as 'our cultures have always been hybrid and hybridising, for we have always given to and taken from our neighbours and others we encounter' (Hau'ofa 2008d: 63).

Finally, the choice of music and dance as the medium for forging these Oceanic identities is highly apt. Hau'ofa's focus in his later years was on the creation and development of the Oceania Centre for Arts and Culture at USP. His directorship of the Centre and ongoing aspirations for region-building were explicitly interlinked, as he argued that 'the centre's emphasis on Oceanic forms and identity in artistic and cultural production should contribute significantly to regional cooperation and unity in our part of the world' (Hau'ofa 2008c: 87). In particular Hau'ofa saw the Centre as a site for cross-cultural fluidity and dialogue, for 'enmeshing, fusing, and hybridizing different aesthetic traditions' (Naidu 2010: 118). In this the composite *haka* can be seen as an exemplar. The circumstances of the songs and the *haka* also

resonate with Hau'ofa's vision for the Centre, as he saw it as imperative that Oceanians 'harness creativity to our practical struggle for survival' (2008c: 87), particularly in response to 'the most important global environmental agenda' (ibid). This approach has continued to this day, for example through the 2015 'Communicating Climate Change' exhibition held at the Oceania Centre, in which Pacific Island-based artists produced work which responded creatively to their changing environments (Figure 8).



Figure 8 - 'Under the Carpet' by Cristina Gonzales Martin. Displayed at the Oceania Centre in Suva, Fiji in March 2015.

Thus, overall, I contend that climate change activism, in the form of the Pacific Climate Warrior campaign, created an opportunity for the physical embodiment of Oceanic alliance, connection and expression of regional identity that Hau'ofa theoretically envisions. The campaign emerged through and strengthened existing kinship connections (through opportunities to engage with family members in the diaspora) and led to the forging of familial-style connections between the Warriors, despite the diversity of their islands of origin. This therefore highlights the importance of kinship in this expression of Pacific Island activism, as

well as the importance of kinship to Oceanic regionalism, yet a more unbounded form of kinship than that explicitly presented by Hau'ofa himself, in the sense that it extends notions of kinship beyond the consanguineous. However, due to the objections to the protest expressed by some of the Warriors' family members, obligations to family are also revealed to be a point of tension, that will be explored further in the following chapter. While the Warriors had strong national attachments, Pan-Pacific identity was also expressed through the exchange of custom dress and flags, and through the production of composite songs and a composite *haka*, highly pertinent art forms given Hau'ofa's emphasis upon song and dance as mediums for the manifestation of Oceanic identity.

Returning to Hau'ofa's overall argument, regional connection as a 'Sea of Islands' as opposed to small, isolated nations in a vast sea, is the foundation for the collective power of Oceania, and for an alternative understanding of the Pacific Islands that rejects the idea that they are weak and helpless. Yet in order to understand how this vision of Oceania could challenge the inevitable inundation discourse and realise its collective power, it is necessary to next consider Hau'ofa's concept of world enlargement.

2. We are the world: Pacific Climate Warriors and ever-expanding Oceania

> The 'O' in Oceania is the 'O' in Om: and that is the entire universe.
> (Mishra, 1993: 22)

I now turn to a second crucial facet of Hau'ofa's work, that of 'world enlargement', bringing this poetic and polemic vision of the ever-enlarging, ever-engulfing Oceania into dialogue with my empirical case study. Hau'ofa's concept of 'world enlargement' is somewhat hazy on the details, and seems to have received very limited critical reception compared to some of the other key ideas in his work. He first introduces the notion in his seminal essay *Our Sea of Islands,* when he refers to 'the contemporary process of what may be called world enlargement that is carried out by tens of thousands of ordinary Pacific Islanders right across the ocean...making nonsense of all national and economic boundaries...crisscrossing an ocean' (1994: 151). In his later work, he reiterates this notion of enlargement through increased mobility and the expansion of social networks and diasporas of Pacific peoples (2008a: 41).

This notion of world enlargement as it stands has two clear shortcomings. Firstly, Hau'ofa has fallen afoul of criticism for the overly optimistic view of migration presented in it. Chandra

(1993:77) takes Hau'ofa to task for failing to recognise the hardship emigration produces for those left behind, despite the flow of remittances, alongside the suffering many migrants experience, exploited by their new host nations. Secondly, and most crucially, I contend that Hau'ofa's very notion of world enlargement needs enlarging. Compared to the ambition and poetry of the rest of the Sea of Islands vision, there is something underwhelming and unfittingly prosaic about the notion that one of the only ways the might, strength and size of the ever-growing Oceania is realised is through Islanders joining the transnational pool of cheaply available labour. It also sits awkwardly with the Warriors' disavowal of the prospect of becoming climate refugees.

Looking instead to the poetry and near hyperbole of Sudesh Mishra's response to Hau'ofa's work, above, I'd like to consider other ways in which the Pacific Islands transcend their smallness, other ways in which Oceania's majesty and expanding magnitude can be realised in practice, and in turn counter the damaging inevitable inundation narrative. Thus, true to Hau'ofa's form I also use the notion of 'world enlargement' loosely, yet to differing effect. Through it I hope to convey a notion of Oceania as being as uncontained and uncontainable as the waters of its namesake, and as a specifically Pacific power from below.

I contend that three processes central to this formulation of world enlargement occurred through the Pacific Climate Warriors' campaign: firstly, that the problems and concerns of the Pacific Islands could not be contained within the islands, and through the action overflowed into Australia and further afield, an act that can be seen as 'bringing climate change home'. Secondly, the Warriors situated their work as acting for and on behalf of the world, globalising their actions and intentions, and forging solidarities with indigenous Australian activists as part of an expanding Oceania. Thirdly, through the blockade the Warriors sought to present the Pacific as an example to the world, as a form of decolonising re-education for Australia.

2A. King tides in our kitchens: bringing climate change home

Firstly, the very act of holding the blockade in Australia can be seen as a form of world enlargement. It articulates that Pacific Islander suffering, due to intensified cyclones and unprecedented king tides, can no longer be contained within those islands, and instead is brought home to its source. In this movement, the Australian coal industry is enveloped by the ever-enlarging Oceania, bringing the industry to account for its actions. This incorporation of Australia into Oceania is key to challenging the Pacific Islands' subordination, as much of Australia's belittlement of the Pacific emerges from a presumption that it is above and outside

the Pacific Island region, yet still has a special position as manager (Fry 2007).

This enlargement of Oceania beyond its boundaries can be understood as a means of 'bringing climate change home'. While obviously operating within a very distinct political tradition, in using this phrase I deliberately allude to the Weather Underground and the Red Army Faction's *modus operandi* of 'bringing the war home' (Varon 2004), a concept that violence can no longer be externalised, unseen and forgotten, but that those responsible for its production are confronted by its existence, experiencing it in microcosm. This can perhaps be seen most literally during the post-blockade action in Canberra where activists simulated waves in the offices of the Australian Minerals Council, and more recently during an action held in New Zealand by some members of 350 Pacific who created a 'Pacific Climate Refugee Camp' on the streets of Auckland.

This notion of 'bringing climate change home' has previously been utilised to somewhat different purposes by Slocum (2004). In her article the phrase indicates the necessity of making abstract global climate change meaningful and local, and inspiring others to action, ideas echoed by Hulme (2008). This draws out the final element of this tactic – the notion of home – as it highlights the role of domesticity in the Warriors' experiences and fears of climate change.

The place of home, both as a sense of place in the world and as a household dwelling, appeared frequently in the Warriors' accounts. For instance, Leah's account 'brings climate change home' (in Slocum's sense of making it local and tangible) through the evocation of the loss of home, the word itself appearing five times in quick succession.

> As you know, the Marshalls is barely three metres about sea level. It's flat land. There's no mountains, no hills, no rivers, no streams and it's very narrow land. And so, when sea level rises and high tides come in, it washes into people's *homes*, destroys their *homes* and they have to be...and they're left displaced and so have to look for a new *home*. A new place to stay...it's a very devastating situation because you live in a *home* where you...where you've been for your whole life and then all of a sudden, you know, the waves come crashing in and destroy everything...everything you've owned in that *home*. And you're left with nothing. (Leah, 350 Marshall Islands)

Meanwhile Samson invokes home through its near synonymy with land and collective belonging.

> Because it's your land as well and this is my land and you don't want your home to be swept away. Because your home, your land is yours. You lose your home you lose your land. I don't want to feel in another country, that is not mine.
> (Samson, 350 Niue)

In his use of the second person, Samson both directly addresses me as Western continental interviewer, and imagined islander, with home and land to lose. He explicitly uses this tactic of bringing home climate change through asking me to put myself in another's shoes and crucially my home in another locale.

> Imagine your family, like you swap sides, if you were at the Pacific and we were at your house, just sitting there. How would you feel? Put yourself in their position. And I will tell you that you will fight. You will do the same thing. You should understand that.
> (Samson, 350 Niue)

Finally, Maria's words present one of the most powerful articulations of the polysemic concept of home.

> The only thing that pushed us on was knowing we were there for a purpose. We were there to stop the coal mine, to stop the coal ships. And then going into the day when we saw the coal ship pass by we all cried, it was so emotional because like we know what those coal boats...what the coal does to us, the Islanders, and so watching it go by all that was in our head was like a family will lose their home today. A family will lose their livestock. A family will even lose their own livelihoods. Maybe their home. We just let one by. You know?
> (Maria, 350 Fiji)

In her account, she envisions the disrupted domesticity of a single family, with the loss of home reiterated as one of the most prevailing threats. In connecting the fossil fuel industry directly with this loss of home ('what the coal does to us') she makes the consequences of carbon combustion specific, localised and directly attributional: it is brought home, or made tangible to those who heed her words. And locating this direct impact not, for instance, in the erosion of a specific patch of coastline, but in the destruction of family life, she presents the act as morally reprehensible. This thereby evokes the emotive resonances of 'home' expressed in the above accounts by Leah and Samson. Thus in this passage we also witness this third form of 'bringing home', the need to stop these acts of violence at their source through direct intervention ('we were there for a purpose...we were there to stop the coal ships'), and thus a

further indication of world enlargement, as climate change as a problem is no longer contained within the Pacific Islands, but instead is brought back to Australia, engulfing Australia within this Oceanic concern.

2B. Pacific for the world

However, a further key element of the Warriors' messaging was that it wasn't just *their* homes that were threatened. A second dimension of Oceanic world enlargement revolves around bringing in global concerns as Pacific concerns, and linking up with other indigenous communities, as a further expansion of Oceanic regionalism. Hau'ofa foresaw a need for Oceania to 'link up with the rest of the world' in order to prevent environmental destruction, arguing both literally and figuratively that 'the sea unites the entire world' (1993: 139). The emphasis upon the need for the Pacific Islands to assist the rest of the world also fundamentally challenges the presumption that they are small and isolated 'islands in a far sea' that require rescue. Instead it is those island nations united that are reaching out in order to assist their neighbours: a manifestation of the powerful, ever-expanding and enlarging Oceania.

> I just wanted to remind everybody that this is not a fight that's...this is not a fight that's only for the Pacific. This is everybody's fight. This is a common fight. And we're just more...we're just really passionate about it because our islands are at the front line. And we just want to get our message out there, get our stories out there so that more people can hear about them and join us because there's not one country that's not affected by climate change...This is a common fight that we all share. (Leah, 350 Marshall Islands)

Leah's message was reiterated throughout the campaign: that the Warriors' actions weren't just motivated by their own self-interest and the interests of their national communities but were taken for the sake of the whole world, both now and for future generations to come.

And this taking of action is not just imagined as a petitioning to the larger states, but a direct intervention by the islands themselves. As Samson puts it:

> And there's not only us in the Pacific but it's affecting across the whole world, so we need to get that change now, we need to fight for it. No one says it's going to be easy, but we need to fight for it. Pick the world up. (Samson, 350 Niue)

This intent and ability to 'pick the world up' can be seen as part of a wider challenge to existing

discourses that present the Pacific Islands as small and powerless, a refutation of the Anthropocenic horror stories that the inevitable inundation discourse forms a part of. For some Warriors it was explicit that the Pacific Islands' lowly place in the hierarchy of nations had to change.

> Tell you the truth, I want to see the Pacific up top, and not on the bottom. I don't want to see people getting hit by this global warming, these tsunamis, floods, no. (Samson, 350 Niue)

Another key dimension to the process of world enlargement was the forging of indigenous solidarities, thereby bringing further communities into the enlarging Oceania. Hau'ofa's vision of Oceania is an inclusive one. He postulates that 'as far as I am concerned, anyone who has lived in our region and is committed to Oceania is an Oceanian' (2008a: 51). But he places special emphasis upon Islanders building connections with 'the *'tangata whenua* of Aotearoa and... with the Native Hawaiians' (1994: 156). Consequently, the extent to which the Warriors embraced other forms of indigeneity and built connections with Australian Aboriginal activists is highly relevant. Beginning from a position of uncertainty and tension, this relationship became a central feature of the unified action taken on the day of the blockade.

One of the first events scheduled within the Warriors' training was a visit to the Redfern Aboriginal Tent Embassy in Sydney, an ongoing occupation that opposed the gentrification of Aboriginal neighbourhoods, the racist policies of the Australian state and the dispossession of Aboriginal land. A number of the Warriors appeared uneasy in advance of this meeting. In preparation we were asked to collect gum leaves (eucalyptus) for use in the Welcome to Country smoking ceremony[11]. The Warriors I was around explicitly established their distance from this alternative form of indigeneity through emphasising their botanical ignorance of which leaves were appropriate and one Warrior threatened that we would become like 'Red Indians' and performed a parodic whooping dance. This nervousness and anticipation continued in the drive to Redfern, as we were warned by one organiser to be careful about what we said, claiming that Aboriginal people easily took offense. There were slapstick moments just before our arrival as the finally identified branches of gum trees accidentally spilled onto the minivan's floor, leading to fears that the Elders would be incensed by such irreverent treatment.

[11] A ritual by which an Aboriginal elder welcomes guests to their land and the guests are cleansed with smoke (Merlan 2014).

However, the smoking ceremony itself was a celebration of connection rather than difference, as the Elders expressed their shared experiences of Blackness with the Warriors, placing especial emphasis upon the common heritage of Melanesians and Aboriginal Australians. The Elders spoke movingly of their struggles to resist racism and gentrification in Redfern, inviting prayers and contributions from the Islanders. While one Warrior later confided in me that she was uncomfortable with the pagan nature of the ceremony, and feared that demons had been washed over her, the previous fears of difference appeared to melt away. The Warriors' campaign formally linked up with Seed (the indigenous branch of the Australian Youth Climate Coalition, now an organisation in its own right) bringing two Seed activists on the coach to Maules Creek, where the coal mine blockade already featured strong Aboriginal participation. The Warriors' time in Newcastle also began with a formal Welcome to Country led by Gomeroi elders, and the procession to the water's edge during the blockade itself was led by a contingent from Seed, wearing body paint and ceremonially clearing the path with branches of eucalyptus (Figure 9).

Figure 9 - Activists from Seed lead the procession at the start of the Pacific Climate Warrior blockade.

Australian understandings of Pacific Islanders were also refracted through Australian relations to indigeneity by one Warrior, in a way that centred indigenous experience. In a discussion regarding Australians' knowledge of Pacific Islanders she stated:

> I reckon that Australians do know about Pacific Islands because this is where most of the people derive from, Aboriginal from Australia, these are the people that are with us in this fight for our land, our identity, our people, so. (Delilah, 350 Samoa)

In this brief statement she not only highlights the comradeship between Aboriginal and Pacific allies, but marginalises White Australia, inverting hegemonic representations of the country's inhabitants by making Aboriginal Australians stand for all Australians. This solidarity with other indigenous struggles has continued as part of 350 Pacific's work, including sending recorded messages of solidarity to the Sioux activists at Standing Rock opposing the Dakota Access Pipeline in late 2016, and a visit by a few of the Warriors to the Canadian tar sands in May 2017 (Embree and 350.org 2017).

Thus, the expansion of Oceania is apparent through the forging of solidarities with Aboriginal Australian activists as Oceanic connections expand to include those beyond the Pacific Islands themselves, as well as through the Warriors' claims that their campaign was on the behalf of the whole world, not just Pacific Islanders. This acts as an example of world enlargement, as Pacific Islanders begin to act globally, and Oceania's concerns become a metonym for global concerns.

2C. Pacific as example

The final dimension to these practices of world enlargement is the extent to which the Warriors were not just attempting to act on behalf of the world but to set an example to the world through doing so. This notion of Oceania as exemplar involved both a showcasing of superior Pacific values and a decolonising attempt to re-educate Australia, highlighting the folly of its ways.

In the Warriors' approach, the Pacific acts as an example because of its superior moral values. Joseph captures this in his comparison with Australia:

> We are small islands but... we are the mighty Pacific Ocean...even though you know they have the bigger land, but as Pacific Islanders we have biggest hearts. So, Australia they might have bigger land but compared to us Pacific Islanders we have much, much more bigger hearts. (Joseph, 350 FSM)

His words, inspired by a speech by one of the organisers, both seemingly explicitly reference

Hau'ofa's work and emphasise the question of relative land size, as will be discussed in Section 3.

Other Warriors echoed this 'large-heartedness' through reference to a more compassionate and down-to-earth approach to life found within the islands. Abel contrasted the abstract and uncaring nature of Tony Abbot, then Prime Minister of Australia, with the attitude of his own nation's leader:

> That heartless person. And at home you see our Prime Minister walking. You say 'hi' to him, and say hi back, without bodyguards. He drives his own car. He feeds his own pigs. (Abel, 350 Tuvalu)

This emphasis upon the considerate nature of the Pacific Island governments was most pronounced in the context of proactive responses to climate change adaptation and mitigation. For Delilah it was unjustified that Australia and other industrialised nations would be so lax by comparison, as she asked, 'If our Pacific Island leaders are coming together to try and work on it, why not all the world's high leaders?'.

This sentiment was shared by Moses, who saw Tokelau's steps towards renewable energy generation as an example both for the rest of the Pacific and for the world.

> If our own country could all especially as taking the example from the Tokelau islands, I mean they're already been 100% renewable energy and if the other Pacific Islands could follow that same step and then take the lead of renewable energy and then show us through that this is what we want, this is what we, this is what Pacific Islanders say this is what would be. And then it would really teach a good example to Australia, so they could see us and it would be really a good, an effective motivation also for Australia. (Moses, 350 Vanuatu)

Crucially through this example-setting Moses also expresses a need to 'teach' and motivate Australia. Others echoed this explicit desire to educate:

> I hope they should learn from all the movements that we made...we're here to give them lessons and for them to learn about all the impacts that we are, about the purpose of why we are here to highlight the impacts of climate change, that we are currently living with in Tonga at all times. (Tobiah, 350 Tonga)

In a speech given after a solidarity action in Melbourne, one of the Warriors reiterated this need for Australia to be re-educated by the Pacific Islands, but through an explicitly

decolonising rejection of Australian modes of education, compared with Pacific Island models of knowledge.

> Colonialism is over. You don't just tell us what to do. Because we know what to do. We are clever people in the Pacific. We are educated people. We are educated by guiding our canoes by the sun and the stars. We just have a different education. We want you to come and learn that with us. Not just learning in universities: that's not as good as learning how to live a sustainable future. (Reuben, 350 Tokelau)

This productive tension between different forms of knowledge will be further explored in Chapter 6.

The imperative to alleviate Australia's ignorance was often tied to a call for polluters to bear witness to the impacts in the islands.

> These people or this industry they need to go to the islands to actually see the impacts that it's causing. So, then they actually know what we are on about, instead of just saying 'oh we don't know what we're doing. Why are you doing that?'. (Rachael, 350 Niue)

This pedagogical overture towards Australia both demonstrates a decolonising impulse and a potentially naive presumption of an information-deficit underlying existing actions. Beginning with the first aspect, Fry (1997) has identified the circulation of a 'doomdayism' discourse about the Pacific Islands, that is broadcast by Australia media commentators and policy officials. This discourse presumes that the Pacific Islands are headed towards an inevitable 'future nightmare of overcrowding, poverty, mass unemployment, serious environmental degradation, and a decline in health standards' (1997: 306) unless they heed Australia's salvationary message and change their ways, particularly through structural adjustment policies. Fry sees this discourse as a continuation of Australia's belittling approach to the Pacific Islands during the Cold War, and one that stems from a racist presumption that Australia has the right to manage its island neighbours. Writing a decade after Fry, Jolly (2007) contends that this damaging discourse is well and alive in the 21st century. This doomsday discourse also resonates with the apocalyptic horror stories of the Anthropocene, as explored by Tsing et al. (2017) and Buck (2015).

In their attempts to re-educate, the Warriors actively subvert the doomsdayism discourse. No longer is 'Australia...cast both as model and saviour of the Pacific' (Jolly 2007: 527). Instead it

is Australia who is held responsible for the impending apocalypse and Pacific Islanders that are presenting the message of salvation. Moreover, it an opportunity to turn the tables and actively re-educate those nations who had for so long imposed their systems of knowledge upon Oceania. One Warrior puts it explicitly:

> Developed and rich countries that are benefitting from this and I think it's time for them to...you know in the past we sort of always listened, you know, the islands always listened to the Europeans, this and that, and I think it's about time now for them to listen to us, to our call, to our need. (Eve, 350 Kiribati)

Through their call, the Warriors highlight the parochialism of 'outlander' thought (Borofsky 2000), as Australia and other larger nations have failed to truly look beyond their own borders and recognise the consequences of their actions. It stands as a further example of world enlargement, as rather than being small and marginal, the potency of the Pacific Islands is expanding to the point that they take the responsibility of educating their neighbours.

The power of an enlarged Oceania vis-a-vis Australia was invoked in other ways. During a training event held in Sydney, the organiser declared that while Pacific Islanders won't be at the big table, making decisions about the future of fossil fuel extraction, 'they can take action in their backyard: Australia'. The image of Australia as backyard conveys Pacific ownership: in an inversion of the attitude described by Fry in relation to doomsdayism, it inverts the relation of centrality and peripherality between Australia and the Pacific (as through this metaphor the Pacific is presumably figured as the home), and it invokes the spectre of NIMBYism, but in a manner that has been transnationally re-figured.

Yet the desire to inform and re-educate Australia also relies upon an information deficit model (the notion that the solution lies in a simple increase in dissemination of expert knowledge (Burgess et al. 1998)), in order to make Australian inaction (or perpetuation of destructive action) morally comprehensible. Many Warriors suspected that large numbers of Australians must not be truly conscious of the consequences of their nation's actions:

> These things are contributing to climate change, just to, just to reduce them like radically and just getting more local community and people in these big, big countries to be more aware that these, you know, these things that are being done in the big countries, that are contributing to climate change, are really affecting our islands back home. Because I don't think a lot of people... I mean a lot of people

> are aware that we're affected by climate change but I think there's also a large population that are not, and just to make them aware and just to get our stories out there more, in the media and whatever, whatever channel that we can go through to get our stories out there. I think people will come to understand and try to take more action. (Leah, 350 Marshall Islands)

Others cast the fossil fuel companies themselves, such as Whitehaven Coal, in a state of explicit ignorance.

> What they don't know is that they are not only harming us humans and other human beings but they are also hurting the environment. You know something that sustains us. (Maria, 350 Fiji)

These accusations of ignorance profess a faith in the underlying goodwill of the fossil fuel companies.

> I believe that the Australian people understand us...understand what we are going through. I believe that one day they will put a stop on what they are doing because they already seeing that too many disasters are happening in our islands in the Pacific. And I believe they will take action in the future in order for us to live happy...happily in our own islands. I believe that they gonna respect us in this. (Priscilla, 350 Solomon Islands)

This appears as a form of naive and overly generous rationalisation, as well as a homogenisation of Australia as a nation and its capacity to act. It could perhaps be linked to the ambivalent and aid-intensive relationship between Australia and many Pacific Island countries and a desire to not bite the hand that feeds. Yet, ultimately, this manifestation of a powerful expanding Oceania, that brings climate change home and acts as an example to and on behalf of the world, is potentially hamstrung by this presumption of Australia's innocence. This question is reckoned with in the following chapter, where the vision of Australian goodwill will be revisited and challenged, centring notions of antagonism, blame and affect.

Consequently, the actions of the Pacific Climate Warriors can be understood as a form of world enlargement, and one that extends Hau'ofa's original presentation of the concept as simply the dispersal of a Pacific workforce. Climate change activism provides an opportunity for the Warriors to display their region's significance and place Oceania at the centre of global concerns. I contend that these processes of world enlargement were apparent in three ways.

Firstly, through bringing activism to Australia from the Pacific, the problems and concerns of Oceania could no longer be contained within the islands. Climate change was 'brought home' by the Warriors in a number of ways, in a manner that engulfed Australia within Oceania's concern. Secondly, the Warriors situated their work as acting for and on behalf of the world, globalising their actions and intentions, and forging solidarities with indigenous Australian activists. This can be understood as an expansion of the world of Oceania, as rather than a marginal locale, it assumes the potency of a global force. Thirdly, this idea was extended through the Warriors' presentation of the Pacific as an example to the world, as a form of decolonising re-education for Australia, thereby further inverting power relations between Oceania and its larger neighbours. These acts of world enlargement express Pacific strength and contest the inevitable inundation discourse: it is through displaying their potency as part of an expanding, unified continent that the Warriors reinforce the claim that they are not drowning but fighting.

However, there has been some scepticism about the extent to which a reframing of Oceania's power is geopolitically viable. Mishra applauds Hau'ofa's vision for its 'celebratory resistance' (1993: 22) yet questions the extent to which the Pacific Islands have tangible control over their futures, compared with the power exerted by the Pacific Rim countries. Naidu (1993) has similarly warned that Hau'ofa, in his attempts to re-imagine the strength and significance of the Pacific, has underestimated the power of the global capitalist system that the islands are ensnared by. As a further slight upon Oceania's potency, Griffen, who declares Hau'ofa's Oceania 'romantic, appealing and perhaps fictional' (1993: 59), argues that he obscures the extent of urban poverty, exploitation and suffering in the Pacific through his focus on heroic self-sufficiency. She contends that the reality of current social and economic conditions in the islands need to be brought into account (a view point echoed more harshly by Veitayaki 1993) and that 'We need to be angrier over our present as well as pleased with the good things about our past and present' (1993: 62). This leads me to consider in the next and final section some of the shortcomings of Hau'ofa's analysis for this particular case.

3. Regional inequities and relative altitudinal privilege

These expressions of world enlargement and Oceanic interconnection through the generation of familial solidarities, the representation of regional identities and the fluid intermingling of different cultures can be seen as key features of a Sea of Islands approach, and indicate the

potential for this approach as a counter-discourse to the inevitable inundation discourse. However, there are still limitations to applying such a model to this empirical example. I begin by drawing upon the oft-cited critique of Hau'ofa's work: that his Pan-Pacific vision conceals intra-regional differences and inequities. I hazard this also to be the case with the Pacific Climate Warriors, noting the under-representation of Micronesia, the absence of many countries in the campaign, and also the Polynesian bias in terms of the inequitable number of participants, mirroring a further common critique of Hau'ofa's work. I also reflect upon power differentials enacted along gendered lines, and the extent to which the campaign reinforced traditional gender roles, acknowledging that these were to some degree subverted by the presence of non-heteronormatively gendered Warriors.

Rather than dismissing the Warriors' actions or Hau'ofa's approach because of these concerns, I argue that the model of regionalism being produced and performed through the flotilla is one that acknowledges inequalities and difference. Crucially I identify discourses of relative altitudinal privilege, which engage empathetically with narratives of inundation and loss, but with a specificity that rejects the reduction of the Pacific to an anonymous submerged atoll. This thereby indicates that there is still potential for understanding the Sea of Islands as a counter-discourse to the inevitable inundation narrative, and one whose many key tenets are being embodied and practiced by Pacific Islanders on the ground.

3A. Whose Sea of Islands?

Firstly, the true regionalism of the Pacific Climate Warriors campaign must be questioned in terms of how well it represented all parts of Oceania, and the extent to which it perpetuated a Polynesian bias. The thirty participants hailed from twelve different nations, out of a possible 22 Pacific Island countries and territories (Barnett and Campbell 2010). Organisers were aware that there were gaps in their coverage, but identified these gaps as emerging from pragmatic concerns and limited capacity, as opposed to a lack of enthusiasm for full continental representation. When asked about how well he believed the campaign included all the Pacific Islands and how representative of the Pacific it was, one of the organisers replied:

> Yeah, so we ended up with twelve islands. We could have got more. I guess at a push we could have got Nauru...easily got Nauru. Could have got Palau with a bit of a push. Cook Islands has been a bit of a gap lately. Guam's just jumped on board, in more like connected way. We're starting to build more momentum in New Caledonia. Haven't had a lot happening in French Polynesia. We could have had someone from American Samoa. I think that about covers the sort of

> gaps mainly. And but you know it just came down to sort of...the amount of budget we had to bring people over and also where there was...yeah, a lot of what we rely on is people in the islands just taking... taking up the call and doing stuff and so. Yeah, I think we did a pretty...pretty awesome job. 12 is well over...you know a majority of them. Yeah, I'm pretty stoked if I'm honest.
> (Daniel, 350 Pacific)

While I concur that bringing together Warriors from so many different countries was an impressive feat, I contend these lacuna are not simply arbitrary or a result of not pushing harder, but reflect inequities in terms of 350 Pacific's relationship with different parts of the region. None of the above countries that Daniel identified as missing were successfully brought on board for the following year's Vatican-based campaign, and none of them had one of their compatriots elected to the first Pacific Consultative Group in 2015. The absence of the three French territories (New Caledonia, Wallis and Futuna, and French Polynesia) suggests an absence that may emerge from language differences or a potential privileging of sovereign states over territories. Moreover, there are also limitations to how much this uniqueness or diversity is realised when relying upon the nation state as a container, as many Warriors identified more strongly with their specific home island, as opposed to the nation of which they were a citizen. For instance, joking questions were raised over authenticity and protocol regarding the Solomon Islands canoe: Priscilla was not suitable to be the captain given her gender, but the canoe was of her province, not Jeremiah's (her male companion from the Solomon Islands), thus the suitability of his claim to captaincy was also in doubt. This was eventually resolved in Jeremiah's favour, who excelled as captain of his small one-person canoe during the flotilla.

Moreover, within the composition of the existing Warriors, there were clear discrepancies between the sizes of different subregional contingents. Before delving deeper into this matter, I do acknowledge the contentions surrounding the labels Melanesia, Micronesia and Polynesia (Jolly 2007; Thomas et al. 1989), particularly in connection to Hau'ofa's work. O'Carroll decries them as the remnants of 'nineteenth century evolutionist lingo of biological racism' (1993: 25), and uncompromisingly declares 'Let's not apologise for them: let's get rid of them too!' (ibid). He critiques Hau'ofa's employment of them, arguing that those that still adhere to these colonial assignations are 'exactly the people Hau'ofa is fighting' (ibid). Instead to O'Carroll's mind part of the power of Hau'ofa's vision is that 'Oceania...can, in fact, ultimately supersede this European trio' (ibid). Hau'ofa justifies his perpetuation of the colonial trinity on the grounds that they 'are already part of the cultural consciousness of the peoples of Oceania

(1994: 161) but in fact later replaces this terminology with the divisions of West, North, Central and East Oceania (Hau'ofa 2008d: 77).

Despite their highly dubious heritage, given the place of these labels in 'cultural consciousness', and their role in positive Pacific self-identification (Kabutaulaka 2015), they are still meaningful in this context. Moreover, they were incorporated into the Warriors' working practices. Three Warrior co-ordinators were chosen each day to lead the group through facilitating group discussions, and there was a conscious decision to make sure they represented different subregions of the Pacific (as well as including at least one woman, discussed further in Section 3B).

While there were clearly attempts therefore to ensure balanced and equitable representation on the part of the campaign, the overall composition of the group indicated an overwhelming Polynesian bias. There were seven Melanesian participants compared with twenty Polynesians and only three Micronesians. This calculation places Fiji within the category of Melanesia due to its membership of the Melanesian Spearhead Group. If I follow Hau'ofa's argument that Fiji can also be included in Polynesia for 'geographic and cultural reasons' (Hau'ofa 1994: 161), then the disparity is further heightened.

These numbers are partly explained by the different islands' recruitment practices. While some national groups only allocated the two places funded by 350 Pacific, 350 Tonga encouraged community funding of additional participants, sending their Warrior count into the double digits.

However, this disparity also potentially reflects the systemic under-representation of Micronesia (Hanlon 2009), compounded by its weaker status with regards to Australia, as it largely falls under an American rather than Antipodean sphere of influence. This under-representation was felt keenly by one Micronesian Warrior.

> I was really you know amazed at that certain level. Until I met the other Warriors and you know of all the Warriors I only understand like share geographically location with one of them. The Marshallese Islander, but the others I have met some people just like them before, so I was expecting that it was going to be more than just the two of us[12], coming from Micronesia. But then again, I am really glad that it

[12] The discrepancy between Joseph's figure of two Micronesians and mine of three I presume is due to him overlooking the presence of one of the quieter Warriors, who was from Kiribati.

> wasn't just myself. I had somebody else from Micronesia who can both support the movement. (Joseph, 350 FSM)

This inequitable inclusion also highlights another key critique of Hau'ofa's regional vision. Namely that Hau'ofa wishfully overlooked existing tensions, hierarchies and rivalries in the Pacific, which have the potential to undermine continental unity (Naidu 1993; Borer 1993), in particular the belittlement of Melanesians by Polynesians (Kabutaulaka 1993, 2010: 113)[13]. Hau'ofa's work is seen by some as complicit with this, as the universality of his Pacific vision can be questioned, due to the lesser involvement of Melanesia and Micronesia in the region's international kin-based connections (Thaman 1993: 43), and the focus on a seafaring tradition that largely excludes Melanesia (Griffen 1993). Perhaps the Warriors' campaign is indeed very true to the Sea of Islands vision therefore in its shared Polynesian bias.

3B. Women at the end, halves in the middle

Continuing to critically interrogate the points of difference and division as opposed to unity within the Warriors as a collective, gender power dynamics are also crucial to consider. George (2014) has observed that in promotional materials released in advance of the blockade, the campaign consciously rejected images of women as weak in the face of climate change. This runs counter to many climate change narratives that present Islander women as the most vulnerable of the vulnerable (Mansfield 2013). On the other hand, the use of a 'warrior' and 'fighting' framing has the potential to rely strongly on predominately masculine tropes in order to achieve its message. The potential masculine bias of the warrior discourse was addressed by organisers.

> And yeah in most of the islands traditionally women are not considered warriors, so that was going against the grain a bit. But we felt we could do that because you know because it was Pan-Pacific, it was across the region. (Daniel, 350 Pacific)

Indeed McNamara and Farbotko interpret the Warrior's actions (based on an analysis of their media interviews and web materials) as an example of the 'blurring of gender identities' (2017: 17), as they imbue the masculine figure of the warrior with feminine characteristics such as caring and 'maternal nurturing' (2017: 21), and secondly because of the many non-gender-specific roles that the Warriors played during the campaign, such as being 'a non-violent direct

[13] Although I did not witness any such belittlement during the campaign.

activist, probably also a dancer, an orator and a youth leader' (2017: 22). However, the gendered demographics of the roles the Warriors played in the campaign does necessitate further examination.

It was apparent that the organisers were conscious about gender balance in terms of which Warriors acted as media spokespeople and who was selected to carry on to speaker events and actions in other Australian cities after the Newcastle blockade (as well as who acted as daily co-ordinators). Daniel explicitly acknowledged this dimension of the group's composition and media engagement:

> From the outset we made it a priority for...our goal was to get one female and one male from each island...And you know some of our strongest spokespeople were Leah and Mary, and yeah so, we were able to up the strength, uplift their voice...so then in that way women were a strong front of the campaign. (Daniel, 350 Pacific)

Yet in terms of absolute numbers, the campaign was male dominated, with nineteen men compared to only eleven women (although three of those men could also be considered outside of the conventional category of 'male', as discussed in detail on the following page). And while the term 'warrior' may be challenging some gender norms, in practice the action did seem to reinforce the traditional gender roles found in many Pacific Island societies. Women largely did not have a role in building the canoes (in some cases, such as in FSM, they were forbidden from participating in the process). Nor were any women captains of canoes and they largely stayed on shore during the protest (although admittedly a few went out in vessels and women did have a very strong presence on the beach). Moreover, because of the role of the captains on the day, it was largely men who were in charge. However, this gendered authority was strongly correlated with age. There were many more older male participants than older female ones, perhaps because many women of an equivalent age did not participate due to child-care responsibilities. Indeed, the intended female Warrior from Vanuatu was unable to attend because she became pregnant, whereas there were at least two male warriors who had very young children who came to Australia.

The performances of the composite *haka*, discussed in section 1B, became another site for the reinforcement of gender boundaries. While developing the *haka*, the male Warrior from the Solomon Islands had been unable to think of a suitable segment to contribute. As such, his compatriot Priscilla stepped up, teaching everyone a series of verses and dance moves. In earlier

rehearsals and performances (including as a goodbye to the Maules Creek blockade camp) Priscilla jumped up to lead this section, thereby participating in the officially male-only space. Despite her expertise in the dance, in more official performances (such as that on the beach before the launching of the vessels), she was not able to take part, and instead Jeremiah was called upon to lead the Solomon Islands section, as a Solomon Islander, despite being no more familiar with the dance than the other participants. Thus, the dance created an opportunity for a slight challenge to the boundaries of acceptably gendered behaviour, yet ultimately these boundaries were firmly reinstated. Moreover, during the time at Maules Creek both the male and female Warriors separately worked on dance performances, which were shared with the whole camp. However, only the men's dance was incorporated into the flotilla itself, perpetuating a masculine interpretation of the essence of what it was to be a Warrior.

In spite of earlier comments regarding the subversion of women's traditional non-warrior status, a white organiser was keen to defend these ongoing gender disparities with recourse to culture.

> In the facilitating the group and holding the group, it did become quite male-dominated. But that is quite bound up in a lot of cultural stuff which I guess I still haven't really quite understood […] And then at the same time, it was just like out on the water, it was...yeah paddling those canoes, I guess it did become clear that it was a place where the men had to lead. And I think people were ok with that[…] and at the same time the, you know, the sort of idea that women and men should be able to do exactly the same thing is not necessarily culturally appropriate. And that it's not necessarily a bad thing for women and men to have different roles. (Daniel, 350 Pacific)

The perpetuation of power inequities was further justified with regard to the time constraints of the campaign.

> I think if we were going to have more time together we would have just started getting into talking more about the gender roles and how the group communicates and appreciates different forms of leadership I think. (Daniel, 350 Pacific)

The crucial point here is not that of passing judgement on the merits of the campaign based on the relative power and prominence of men or on the permissibility of male dominance itself. Rather it leads to two important reflections. Firstly, a recognition that through this campaign familiar debates re-emerged, namely the heavily debated tension between cultural relativism

and gender equality (Rimonte 1991; Abu-Lughod 2002; Kabeer et al. 2011), and an emphasis upon the urgency of acting upon one facet of social injustice, while postponing further forms of liberation. And that these create a potential for a clash between some Western and Pacific activist cultures. While none of the Warriors expressed criticism to me of the gender dynamics of the campaign, the cultural sanctioning of gender inequalities did emerge as a concern during my fieldwork in Vanuatu. There some women climate advocates expressed frustration at the barriers they faced in installing solar energy, especially the lack of support they received from the community as it was not viewed as women's work, as well as anger regarding the potential complicity of the *kastom* marriage process in sexual violence. Secondly this suggests that all are not equal in our sea of islands: regionalism and pan-pacific solidarity in and of itself does not transform gender relations (although there are examples of powerfully women-led Oceanic struggles (De Ishtar 1998)).

Finally, such a binary account of gender is undeniably incomplete. As Besnier and Alexeyeff, alongside many others, have highlighted 'non-heteronormative persons are present in virtually all island societies of Polynesia and perhaps Micronesia, and increasingly visible in Melanesia' (2014: 11), and there has been extensive if perhaps not fruitful academic debate regarding the relationship between these indigenous practices and identities and those of Western categories of 'homosexual' and 'transgender'. Following Besnier and Alexeyeff, I will eschew the commonly used category of 'third gender' as I concur with their argument that it presents 'the illusion that transcending the strictures of binary gender is just a matter of adding one more category' (2014: 13). Instead I follow their lead in employing the umbrella term of 'non-heteronormative' as well as using the specific labels found within particular island nations.

Thus, the Warriors also included three *pinapenaaine* or *fakaleiti* participants (labels deriving from Tuvalu and Tonga respectively), two of whom were very prominent and were able to use their gender fluidity and multiplicity of gender presentations to great advantage. One participant showed himself[14] to be fully capable of traditional masculine tasks, such as lifting, assembling and steering canoes, but also could opt out of the demands of masculinity, at points participating in the *haka* and at times explicitly self-excluding, and choosing to join the women's dance rehearsals instead. He also had the ability to navigate between the men and women in the group with more ease and was welcome to enter the women's spaces, such as hostel rooms,

[14] While it is not uncommon for Pacific Islanders within these categories of indigenously defined non-heteronormativity (all of whom are assigned male at birth) to use the pronoun 'she' (see for example Kuwahara 2014), 'he' was the preferred pronoun of all those on the tour.

crucial for delivering the morning wake-up calls. One of the Warriors who had not previously travelled outside her nation talked of her parents' reticence at her participating, especially when she mentioned she would be accompanied by a man also from her country. When it was revealed that the man was *pinapenaaine* the parents were hugely relieved, declaring that she wasn't going with a boy after all and giving their full blessing. Consequently, the non-heteronormative performances of these Warriors were beneficial for the campaign.

These non-heteronormative Warriors also brought a playful and flirtatious aspect to the campaign. While there was a strong emphasis on the platonic and sibling-like relations between the warriors, Abel, in his liminally gendered position, had the licence to make outlandish and licentious jokes, such as claiming that 350 got its name from the number of people he had had sex with. These Warriors' intermediary status was acknowledged by the group. Forced to evacuate flooding tents during a rain storm, the entire group sheltered in a giant barn at the Maules Creek blockade. One Warrior authoritatively designated one side as the women's sleeping area, the other as the men's (in order to preclude any sexual impropriety). One liminally gendered Warrior jokingly demanded 'What about the halves?', receiving the reply 'Halves in the middle!'. Their contributions were acknowledged by one of the organisers who described how 'they almost play like an intermediary kind of role, which makes things really interesting and awesome and entertaining', although it was not formally incorporated into the binary gendered division of media spokespeople and Warrior co-ordinators.

Returning to Abel's previously expressed anxieties about his 'strange' behaviour and its impact upon his ability to represent Tuvalu, these performances of gender fluidity were clearly in fact an asset for the campaign. Thus, being situated as he was, at this liminal point or 'on the edge' between binary constructions of gender, can be seen as 'both a position of power and one of marginality' (Besnier and Alexeyeff 2014: 1). Moving through this Sea of Islands at a finer, interpersonal scale, these alternative expressions of gender and sexuality were also a crucible for cross-cultural and intra-group interconnection and unity.

Consequently, while the organisers did try to formally institute gender equality in terms of the representation of women as Warrior co-ordinators and media spokespeople, in many ways the campaign reinforced traditional gender norms and disparities between the sexes, particularly in terms of the use of canoes and performance of dances. This disparity highlighted a wider tension between gender equality and culturally sanctioned behaviours, although the case of the *pinapenaaine* and other non-heteronormatively gendered Warriors demonstrated a means of

challenging gender binaries within a culturally accepted form. Yet altogether this suggests that the relations of alliance and connection forged between the Warriors did not eliminate gendered power differences. However, in the final section I explore the ways in which inequality and difference, as opposed to homogeneity, were key features of the Warriors' expression of Oceanic regionalism, and of Hau'ofa's Sea of Islands vision, maintaining its potential as a basis for a counter-discourse.

3C. Fortunate highlands and pitied atolls

There were some clear inequities within the campaign in terms of gender relations and the representation of different island groupings. However, I contend that rather than a homogenising model of Pan-Pacific unity, the form of regionalism being produced and performed through the flotilla was one that acknowledged inequality and difference. Crucially this difference centred around perceptions of relative altitudinal privilege. A common motif running through the interviews was the relative good fortune of the volcanic island nations, compared with sorrow and sympathy for the low-lying atoll dwellers. For instance, Rachael contrasted the suffering she had personally experienced through extreme weather events with the greater suffering of the atolls.

> Niue was hit by the cyclone, Cyclone Heta in 2004 and the impacts of that, we...we're still living with it. And it's not a good feeling, and being there at that time, being afraid and everything and waking up...and waking up and you walk out of your house and all you can see is rubbish, rock, coconut trees, you know bricks brought up to the driveway and all of this, this stuff. And it's like how lucky I am to survive but then I was thinking about the other islands like Tuvalu who... since we're a highland we have cliffs and all that. We're lucky to have that, as for Tuvalu they're actually like slowly sinking. (Rachael, 350 Niue)

Thus, many Warriors, through engaging with these discourses of relative altitudinal privilege, mitigated their own sense of exposure to climate change impacts. In Priscilla's account this goes to the extreme of almost denying the Solomon Islands their status as a nation on the front line of climate change.

> Actually, our government, they didn't take strong action towards this because Solomon Islands are different from other Pacific countries. We have higher land. We have higher mountains. Our lands are just fine. We just have the sea level rise that are affecting our small villages in the provinces, but not seriously. We are definitely

> completely ok but some of the climate changes that affect us which is such as the tsunami and all that, flooding and all that.
> (Priscilla, 350 Solomon Islands)

Similarly, one Warrior spoke of his shame that Fiji was one of the bigger islands and therefore less affected. This discourse was not just present within the interviews I conducted, but also found a wider audience. In a piece for a Brisbane radio station, one of the Warriors reiterates these sentiments:

> In Papua New Guinea, because we have a big mainland, we are not as badly affected as the rest of the Pacific Islands. (Bowman 2014)

One Warrior went as far as to consciously visualise himself as an atoll dweller in order to engender a unity of feeling with his fellow Warriors and motivate himself to action.

> And I think I pretty much felt that spirit, that feeling that we all feel even though we might not, we might not be the same in relation to our island vulnerability and my island compared to their island they are much more rich than my island. My island we have mountains, we have high elevations but compared to the Marshallese and some of the Solomon Islands they all have flat, flat islands. So, I tried to put myself into their positions; if my island is their island or if their island is my island. I tried to put myself in their position, so we can both have the same mentality going through what we are here for. So, and I think up until yesterday, when we sailed out our canoes, I really felt how they felt about coming here: what they were pushing, what they are here for and their main purpose for coming here. I really felt what they feel. (Joseph, 350 FSM)

Joseph's words complicate the notion that all the Warriors are equally positioned as imminently and personally threatened by the impacts of climate change. Through this downplaying of lived experience in favour of imagining oneself in another's less fortunate position, it subverts the campaign's own claims to authenticity, grounded as they are in the presentation of the Warriors as *bona fide* climate victims. It contrasts with the claims for example of Jonah in the 'Canoes vs. Coal' video (Yacono 2014) that 'Climate change is real, and we are here to put the message across that we live the realities of climate change'. It also opens up questions of how processes of representation occur: whether the Warriors, as national representatives, were standing in for all those other Islanders affected by climate change, as symbols and delegates, or whether they as individuals embodied direct experiences of threat and suffering?

Joseph's statement also indicates that this hierarchy of peril and suffering is far from objective. He explicitly designates one country (the Solomon Islands) as being worthy of empathy, yet Priscilla from the Solomon Islands, as quoted above, explicitly disavows her nation's position of need. This also resonates with Nunn et al.'s (2016: 477) identification of 'spatial optimism bias' among USP students, as they observed that students tended to present unfamiliar locations as facing far greater environmental risks than their own familiar locations.

This acknowledgement of relative privilege also potentially plays a role in the complication and minimisation of discourses of blame, as explored in Chapter Six, as there is an implied spectrum of responsibility and adversity, whilst simple binaries between the category of climate victim and the category of carbon perpetrator are eschewed.

The narrative of imminently sinking islands was presented in relation to the fate of the atoll states, accompanied by a sense of great pity, as can be seen again in ABC Brisbane radio interview:

> Well some of the islands like Kiribati, Tuvalu and Tokelau have been given a couple of years. Before you know their islands are covered by water. And for these people they have nowhere else to go… This is urgent for us. We need to find a way to keep their island above water, we need to find a way to make sure they have a place to call home, and their children and their children's children also have a place to call home. (Bowman 2014)

In drawing on these images, the Warriors engaged empathetically with narratives of submersion and loss, but with a specificity that rejected the reduction of all of the Pacific Islands to an anonymous inundated atoll. This approach complicates both the narrative of inevitable inundation, and the 'we are not drowning but fighting' counter-narrative: it suggests '*we* are not drowning, *they* are'. In doing so, the authenticity of the actions of the majority of the Warriors are again complicated, as they position themselves as acting for others rather than their own nations or themselves.

These comparisons of size flowed both ways along the scale. Warriors not only positioned themselves in relation to the flatter and less fortunate, but in respect to Australia as a giant of the region.

> A lot of our islands are sinking. I mean Australia is very fortunate to be such a big, big island. A really big island. Most of us our islands

> are small enough that even a tsunami can come from one side and go to the other. It can cover the whole island. Australia need to understand that even though they think they are the mother of all Pacific Island countries they still have a responsibility to look after the small islands. So, I feel that. (Maria, 350 Fiji)

Thus, emphasising Australia's islandness gave it greater responsibility to its neighbours, and highlighted its complicity in rising emissions. Through this understanding Australia is brought into a Pacific Island context, engulfed within Oceania, reminiscent of the movements of world enlargement. And it challenges Australia's tendency to position itself 'ambiguously as both inside and outside the region' (Jolly 2007: 529). It also returns us to Joseph's claim that Australia's 'bigger land' is matched by Oceania's 'bigger hearts', again reiterating the world enlargement of Oceania. This understanding of Australia also potentially essentialises it as a nation, in terms of its values and capacity to act. While this can be seen as a rebuttal to Australian discursive essentialisations of the Pacific (Fry 1997), a more complex understanding of Australia will be explored in the following chapter.

Consequently, while there are inequities and disparities within this expression of Oceanic interconnection, both in terms of regional under-representation and gendered power dynamics, this manifestation of regional unity was itself predicated upon forms of disparity, in terms of perceived vulnerability to climate impacts. While outwardly presenting themselves as on the front lines of climate change, internally the Warriors, particularly from volcanic islands, were keen to emphasise their own relative altitudinal privilege with respect to those from atoll states. This act serves to further refute any labels of victimhood, reinforces their campaign mantra that they are 'not drowning', and akin to Hau'ofa's vision of Pacific unity, emphasises island distinction rather than homogeneity. Moreover, it suggests that despite some limitations to Hau'ofa's work and the Warriors' actions, in combination they still provide a basis for a counter-discourse that contests the inevitable inundation hypothesis and thereby provides an alternative telling of the Anthropocene.

4. Their Sea of Islands?

In this chapter, I have directly addressed both my overall research aim and one of my main research questions. Following the exhortations of Hulme (2009), Tsing et al. (2017), Haraway (2016a) and Buck (2015) for new narrative framings of climate change and the Anthropocene, and the call for the critiques of the disempowering representation of Pacific Islanders in the

inevitable inundation discourse (Farbotko 2005; Barnett and Campbell 2010; Bettini 2013a), my research aims to investigate counter-discourses and alternative framings of the Pacific Islands and climate change. Given the prominence and influence of Epeli Hau'ofa as a radical Oceanic scholar, educator and artist, through my research I have attempted to answer the question of whether the Pacific Climate Warriors' actions can be understood as a form of Oceanic regionalism as envisioned by Hau'ofa in his Sea of Islands. This regionalism is pertinent to the need for new narratives, as it can be understood as a foundation of a counter-discourse that contests the representation of the Pacific as weak, marginal and helpless, a belittlement of the Pacific that predates global concern regarding climate change but which is exacerbated through the inevitable inundation discourse.

To this end, I argue that climate change activism has created an opportunity for the physical embodiment of Oceanic alliance, connection and expression of regional identity that Hau'ofa theoretically envisions. This can be witnessed in the familial bonds and sibling-like attachments formed by the Warriors, and by their playful expressions of Pan-Pacific identities using song, dance, flags and custom dress. This vision of a newly conceived family, united in purpose, acting collectively with mutual care and affection, but made of figures that represent all corners of Oceania, can be seen as a manifestation *par excellence* of the vision of Pacific unity Hau'ofa articulates. However, as well as relating as family, in some cases the Warriors' commitment to activism also produced some issues with existing kin, and highlights the tensions surrounding familial obligations in this example of Pacific Island activism: tensions that will be explored further in the following chapter.

Secondly, I contend that climate change activism (and by extension climate change itself) creates an opportunity to not just reinforce existing power relations between the Pacific Islands and the rest of the world (as the inevitable inundation narrative does), but to subvert and even invert them. This is evident in the processes of world enlargement I have documented, borrowing the term from Hau'ofa's work, but enlarging it to encompass the many ways in which the Warriors extended the potency and significance of Oceania by making Oceanic concerns also Australian concerns and even global concerns. The processes of Oceanic alliance and world enlargement are deeply intertwined: the first forms a basis for regional unity and strength, which is demonstrated by the latter, and together they demonstrate the manner by which the Warriors contest the drowning islands discourse, and instead proffer an account of Pacific Islander power and agency.

I acknowledge limitations both to Hau'ofa's argument and the Warriors' practices, arguing that perhaps the Warriors' campaign is indeed very true to the Sea of Islands vision in its shared Polynesian bias, and worrying that despite efforts to ensure equality, to some extent the action did seem to reinforce rather than subvert traditional gender roles. However, I contend that rather than a homogenising model of Pan-Pacific unity, the form of regionalism being produced and performed through the flotilla was one that acknowledged inequality and difference. Crucially this difference centred around perceptions of relative altitudinal privilege. Expressions of this privilege complicate both the narrative of inevitable inundation, and the 'we are not drowning but fighting' counter-narrative: it suggests '*we* are not drowning, *they* are'. In doing so, the authenticity of the actions of the majority of the Warriors are again complicated, as they position themselves as acting for others rather than their own nations or themselves, thereby highlighting issues of representation that reoccur throughout my analysis. This indicates that the Warriors' actions can be illuminated through Hau'ofa's vision of Oceanic regionalism, and that there is still potential for understanding the Sea of Islands as a counter-discourse to the inevitable inundation narrative, and one whose many key tenets are being embodied and practiced by Pacific Islanders on the ground.

While I have examined some of the dynamics within the group – their points of interconnection as well as difference – and some of the displays of Pacific Island culture, such as dance, song and the use of custom dress, which formed a significant and distinctive component of the campaign, the direct action taken by the Warriors still remains to be discussed, and will consequently be the focus of the following chapter. In doing so, Hau'ofa's work will not be left behind. Indeed, the very format of the blockade itself also resonates with Hau'ofa's vision. The Warriors' fleet of vessels - kayaks, canoes, surfboards and dingies - were individually small and precarious, compared with the bulk and power of the coal barges. Yet the enormous coal barges, encircled and protected by the might of the Australian police force, were turned back by the collective presence of hundreds of tiny, flimsy kayaks acting together, united by the waters. In that moment (captured in Figure 10) it is no longer the besieged Islanders who Canute-like attempt to hold back the waves crashing into their homes, but Australia that is attempting to confront and restrain the forces of Oceania. Acting collectively, using the power of the ocean, the Warriors' blockade can itself be seen as a visceral manifestation of the Sea of Islands.



Figure 10 - The Warriors and their supporters form a sea of islands around the coal barge.

5. Becoming Warriors: affect and the production of activist subjectivity

Considering the actions of the Pacific Climate Warriors through the lens of Hau'ofa's Sea of Islands vision enabled me to re-evaluate the power of Oceania as a region vis-a-vis climate change, thereby demonstrating a potential counter-narrative that challenges the inevitable inundation discourse. In this chapter I continue with my focus upon the Pacific Climate Warriors, but concentrate less on a regional and more on an individual level, in order to rethink the capacity and attitudes of those within the region confronting climate change. I examine the actions of the Pacific Climate Warriors as political subjects, as opposed to helpless victims, in order to uncover further challenges to the drowning island discourse.

In this chapter I make three key contributions. Firstly, I explore the production of politics in action, and argue that affect plays a crucial role in the generation of political subjectivities, empirically demonstrating this through a focus on three main emotions (sorrow, fear and anger). Secondly, through my analysis of the process of becoming Warriors, I contend that the political subjectivities produced are specifically Pacific in terms of the relations to the state and to kin that emerge through activism, building upon the aspects of Pacific identity explored in the previous chapter. This contributes to a growing concern regarding the decolonisation of the climate justice movement (Virasami and Wanjiku Kelbert 2015) and the importance of indigenous-led struggles. Thirdly, I attempt to synthesise an understanding of the political derived from the post-politics literature with research into the place of affect in protest from the geography of social movements literature, as well as Jane Bennett's (2001) notion of enchantment: sensual and affectual encounters that lead to a transformation of self and consequent ethical action. I bring these three theoretical perspectives together to understand the production of political subjectivities – becoming Warriors – through transformative emotional encounters. I recognise these expressions of political agency as contestations of the horror stories of the Anthropocene, as identified by Buck (2015). Looking back to Hulme's (2009) argument regarding what climate change can do for us, I also demonstrate that climate change presents an opportunity for the production of political subjectivities.

1. Chapter outline

I begin by establishing my rationale for focusing on the production of political subjectivities, arguing that there is a need for further research that considers those facing the prospect of

climate-induced migration as political subjects (Section 2). I outline the potential for a post-political analysis of the Pacific Climate Warriors' actions, highlighting the importance of considering antagonistic feelings and practices. I place the post-politics literature in dialogue with Bennett's concept of enchantment, and with ideas emerging from the geographies of social movements, in order to better understand the production of political subjectivities through transformative emotional encounters (Section 3).

Turning to my empirical material, I explore the Warriors' lack of familiarity with protest prior to the campaign, to establish the basis upon which these activist selves were created (Section 4). I then consider in detail the training and self-discipline that was in entailed in the process of 'becoming Warriors' (Section 5). Next, I centre my analysis on the role of affect and collective emotional experience as transformational and critical to the formation of subjectivity. While narrating the Warriors' story chronologically, I also structure my account around three key emotions. The first - sorrow - in response to the witnessing of coal mining at Maules Creek (Section 6), is followed by the collective sensations of fear experienced in anticipation of the flotilla (Section 7). This is succeeded by an account of feelings of defiance and rage during the flotilla itself, in relation to the actions of the police (Section 8). I end by reflecting on how these transformational affective experiences have had an enduring impact upon the Warriors' ethical actions (Section 9).

Throughout my analysis, I raise the question of what the distinguishing features of Pacific Islander-led climate protest are, taking into account distinctive Pacific subjectivities. In particular, I raise the question of *who* the Pacific Climate Warriors are in antagonism with. I contend there is a shift from focusing on the fossil fuel companies to the Australian state itself, as manifested in the form of the Australian police. The Warriors express a sense of blame and anger towards Australia which stands in contrast to the re-educational and goodwill-based stance towards the country explored in the previous chapter. I recognise the power of the police as generative and productive - rather than merely repressive - in forging these political subjectivities. These antagonistic encounters lead to expressions of what I frame as transformational excess: Warriors transgressing the limits to disobedience set by the organisers, reflecting a potent tension over who defines the parameters of a distinctly Pacific mode of protest. This transformational excess again resonates with Bennett's idea of enchantment as through shocking affectual encounters with others – in this case the police – the Warriors' sense of capacity is transformed, galvanising them to further action in line with their ethical framework. Thus, the focus upon political subjectivities adds a new dimension to the

presentation of the Warriors' campaign presented hitherto, particularly in terms of problematising and complicating relations to the Australian state.

2. Focusing on the political

'We are not drowning, we are fighting'. Ransan-Cooper et al. (2015) pinpoint this key slogan of 350 Pacific's as illustrative of a new and emerging framing of climate migration discourse, one that counters the inevitable inundation discourse (what they designate as a 'victim' framing) through its focus upon (potential) climate migrants as 'political subjects' (2015: 111). In this chapter I wish to move from mere catchy illustration to substantive analysis, providing a detailed examination of the Warriors' actions as political subjects, and in doing so contributing to this currently underpopulated field of climate migration discourse.

Ransan-Cooper et al. outline four major discursive framings of potential climate migrants: as victims, security threats, adaptive agents and political subjects. They identify the as yet nascent and underdeveloped nature of the final framing (political subjects) and situate my work (Fair 2015b) within it as one of its few existing contributions. While they critique the first three framings for relying upon a Global North/ Global South "us versus them' dichotomy' (2015: 113) and producing policies of 'limited relevance' (ibid) to affected communities, through notable omission, the political subjects framing is favourably excluded from these critiques. These factors, plus the article's recognition of this frame's relevance to 350 Pacific's actions (similar to George's (2014) suggestion that 350 Pacific exhibit a politics of resistance) suggest both space and need for a greater exploration of political subjectivity.

Returning to Webber (2013), the pertinence of the political in relation to challenging the drowning islands discourse is clear. For Webber, a key consequence of the performance of vulnerability by the I-Kiribati government is the 'foreclosing [of] alternative and empowering political identities' (2013: 2720). Thus, an inversion of these disempowering discourses – a focus upon the 'fighting' rather than the 'drowning' - involves a deeper investigation into what these alternative political identities look like and how they are produced.

Finally, a focus upon the political speaks to a malady that is seemingly afflicting both this corner of academia and society at large. Andrew Baldwin contends that critical analysis of power and politics in relation to climate change and migration are being neglected in the face of demand for "urgent' policy solutions' (2015: 2019), a stance that Gemenne (2015) echoes in his fear that policies have overcome politics and that, in doing so, understandings of migration have been

damagingly depoliticised. This spectre of depoliticisation also resonates with theories of post-politics. Bettini (2013a), who echoes the concern about the denial of political subjectivities in the context of climate migration, recognises the drowning islands discourse as symptomatic of what Swyngedouw (2010) identifies as the 'post-political condition'.

Wilson and Swyngedouw (2014) argue that in an age that ideologically positions itself at 'the end of history' (Fukuyama 1992) with market-orientated liberal capitalist democracy as the seemingly unrivalled post-Cold War winner, and in an era that integrates the functions of governance with the institutions of capital, politics has been usurped by policy and problem-solving. Truly political debates, decisions and disagreements have been displaced by technocratic managerialism (Swyngedouw 2010). There is space only for a bureaucratic consensus, not for dissenting politics. This is enabled through the use of a narrative of apocalypse and emergency, which is mobilised in order to short-circuit debate and close off discussion of political options and alternatives. Thus, these theories of the post-political give further impetus for a focus upon political subjectivities, in distinction to the dominant depoliticised paradigm. In this context, 'drowning' can be understood not as a unique affliction of Oceania, but as part of the apocalyptic and depoliticising condition characterising environmental politics.

3. Post-politics, enchantment and the role of affect in social movements

To explore the production and expression of political subjectivities by the Pacific Climate Warriors, I am hinging my conception of 'the political' on that proffered by the post-politics literature, as articulated by Swyngedouw (2010) and influenced by Mouffe (2005), Zizek (1999) and Ranciere (2001). I am intrigued by the notion that retelling the Anthropocene can be a means for challenging and transcending post-political stasis. With the aim of translating Swyngedouw's ideas empirically I identify three key aspects of this challenge to post-politics: a refusal of the apocalyptic; a rejection of the populist conception of the human as a general, universal subject of climate change; and an emphasis upon antagonism, dissensus and confrontation (as opposed to bureaucratic consensus).

Beginning with the first two dimensions, the actions of the Pacific Climate Warriors suggest a resistance to the post-political. The anti-apocalyptic thrust of the campaign is evident in the group mantra. The 'drowning' they are refusing is the eschatological future they are being offered in many mainstream media and policy narratives. While reiterating the crucial importance of acting on climate change, they repudiate the familiar doomsday discourse,

offering a vision of strength and possibility - 'fighting' - in its stead. Meanwhile the Warriors' campaign straddles a connection to the universal and the particular: they situate themselves as being on the climate change front lines, especially affected, and able to respond in unique and particular ways through recourse to their island cultures, thereby articulating a Pacific specificity that shapes their resistance. At the same time, the universal impact of the Warriors' actions is highlighted, as discussed in relation to world enlargement in the preceding chapter, as they make explicit that they are acting not just for themselves or the Pacific, but for the world.

It is the third aspect that I will analyse more extensively: the extent to which a politics of antagonism, confrontation, difference and dissensus is being articulated by Pacific Islanders engaged in climate activism. In particular, I will explore the relations and tensions between antagonism and the articulation of a specifically Pacific mode of protest. Consequently, this research can be situated within the recent turn from critiquing depoliticisation to documenting the return of the political, as explored in the light of the Arab Spring and the Occupy movement (Wilson and Swyngedouw 2014). Yet in this turn, environmental politics, the core concern of 'Apocalypse Forever' (Swyngedouw 2010), appears to have been lost, and the sites for the return of the political appear to be fundamentally urban (Dikeç and Swyngedouw 2017). Thus, through the Pacific Climate Warriors, we can expand our notion of the post-post-political, demonstrating a re-injection of the political into climate politics, and recognising spaces of the rural as sites of resistance, suggesting a relevance beyond the literatures of climate migration and the Pacific Islands.

Further conceptual tools are also required to explore the Warriors' processes of activist self-creation. To investigate the place of emotion and affect in their transformational experiences, I draw upon Bennett's concept of enchantment, and place it in dialogue with the affect and geography of social movements literature, as well as the aforementioned post-politics literature.

Enchantment, as envisioned by Bennett, is premised upon 'a reawakened sense of wonder' (Buck 2015: 369), which is accessed through affective sensory experience – allowing one to be struck with wonder in everyday life – and a rejection of cynical alienation and fatalism. Bennett identifies moments of 'crossing' or sensuous (as opposed to purely rational) encounters with objects or other beings as generative of enchantment, and consequently transformation through wonder, enabling ethical life. The concept of enchantment is pertinent to my overall research enquiry into counter narratives of the Anthropocene, as a focus on enchantment provides an 'alter-tale' (Bennett 2001: 8), one that has been used to challenge the rationalist

horror stories of the Anthropocene (Buck 2015).

The relationship enchantment identifies between affective encounter, transformation of the self and ethical action dovetails with current research by geographers into the role of affect and emotion in social movements. I am drawing upon three key dimensions of this research: firstly, the recognition that the transformation of the self is a deliberate and necessary dimension of activism. Razsa recognises activism as a means by which individuals are 'producing themselves as political subjects' (2015: 101-102), as they are 'engaged in efforts, sometimes more consciously, sometimes less, to remake themselves through direct action' (2015: 138). Secondly, that activism involves numerous affectively charged encounters, that can be 'emotionally exhilarating' (Razsa 2015: 132). As Feigenbaum et al. (2013: 32) explain it, 'actions... are often spaces of intensity, where bodies enter vulnerable states that both produce and respond to affective sensations in the moment'.

Thirdly, that these affectively charged encounters are fundamental to the transformation of subjectivity that plays such a crucial role in activism. Feigenbaum et al. have identified the presence of 'transformational affect' (2013: 23) in protest encounters, and they argue that greater research is needed into these affective experiences, as 'affect plays a transformative role in shaping political identities' (2013: 34). According to Clough, emotion is not merely a by-product of direct action, but one of the major reasons for engaging in it, as he argues that 'we can understand anarchist direct action, at least in part, as a technique for activists to work on their own emotional states and connections with the hoped for effect of increasing their power to act as a radical collective' (2012: 1674). Clough also emphasises how the construction of 'new structures of feeling and emotional bonds' (1670) is crucial to movement growth, which resonates with the formation of familial bonds discussed in the previous chapter.

Jasper (1998) highlights the importance of 'moral shocks' that illuminate the discrepancy between one's values and events in the world, and can thereby viscerally move one to outrage and then action. He identifies the cultivation of moral shocks by activists and the importance of directing blame in order to bring others to their cause. However, Jasper does not see climate change as an issue that activists would be able to emotively mobilise in this way, suggesting instead that with 'diffuse environmental threats…fear and resignation are more likely than outrage' (1998: 411), a conclusion I will challenge empirically.

The terms 'affect' and 'emotion' are sometimes synonymous and sometimes strongly

differentiated within the literature. I follow Feigenbaum et al. (2013: 23), in exploring 'affect in encounters and interactions that move, stir or arouse something in us and produce a change', a gloss that resonates with Bennett's vision of enchantment. Meanwhile, following Clough (2012: 1669) I define emotion as 'consciously experienced feelings such as love, hate, fear, exhilaration'. In this chapter, I am exploring both: the sensual moments of encounter (affect), and their expression through three main emotions (sorrow, fear and anger).

This concern with affect and climate activism also speaks to the question Latour (2011) poses in terms of the fundamental disconnect that underlies the Anthropocene. He argues that part of our impotence in the face of climate change is the incongruity between the scale of the problem and the proportionality of our feelings in response to it. Consequently, perhaps one way to regain power is to allow ourselves to embrace this enormity of feeling, to open ourselves to the sorrow and fear of destruction as well as the joy and vitality of life.

In this chapter my major theoretical contribution is bringing together a concept of the political from the post-politics literature, with an understanding of transformation through emotion taken both from Jane Bennet's concept of enchantment, and existing geographical examinations of the relationships between affect and protest movements. Bringing these three distinct bodies of literature together through a detailed empirical case study, I elucidate further what the process of activist becoming looks like in a specifically Pacific context, and contribute to the under-researched area of climate migration literature that centres those threatened by climate-induced migration as political subjects. Thus, I will be exploring the production of transgressive, antagonistic and dissenting selves, as well as the enacting of confrontational practices.

4. Once were not warriors: the unfamiliarity of protest

Turning to the empirical material, I begin by exploring the Warriors' lack of familiarity with protest prior to the campaign, to establish the basis upon which these activist selves were created. While a few of the Warriors had significant backgrounds in advocacy or peace and conflict resolution, for many participants, the Stand Up for the Pacific tour (which climaxed in a flotilla of canoes and kayaks blockading Newcastle Harbour for a day) was their first experience of activism or direct action protest. Reuben's experience in that sense was typical:

> This is the first time we've ever been involved in non-violent direct action. Or indeed ever of any protest or demonstration before.
> (Reuben, 350 Tokelau)

Moreover, prior to the flotilla many of the Warriors seemed to lack a sense of activist genealogy: a knowledge of how to situate themselves within a history of struggles for social change, particularly within the Pacific. For instance, during one of the Warriors' training sessions, held in Newcastle prior to the flotilla, the Warriors were asked to think of examples of non-violent direct action in the Pacific. The answers varied widely from anti-government riots in Tonga, ethnic tensions in the Solomon Islands, to adaptation strategies being implemented in Kiribati, but no mentions were made of the Nuclear Free Independent Pacific movement as a comparable struggle. While the facilitators clarified that they were looking for stories of change and people taking back power, many of the Warriors seemed to struggle with 'direct action' as a category. Some of the stories instead emphasised respect for elders, having faith, and discussed recent political events in terms of government corruption or coups. Consequently, the answers given instead foregrounded significant features of a culturally-sanctioned Pacific handling of difficult events, highlighting, for instance, the place of religion and chiefly authority. Moreover, when I spoke at length with one Warrior, Moses, who did have more significant experience of activism, having been involved with 350's regional activities since 2012, he recognised the role researching previous activist struggles played in the development of his own understanding. Yet none of his examples had been Pacific-based.

This is significant, for as Razsa (2015) and Clough (2012) both argue, the story-telling of previous activist movements or the viewing of documentaries of previous protest successes or failures, play a critical role in the development of activist subjectivities, as seen in their case studies of anarchist groups in former Yugoslavia and the United States respectively. This suggests that the development of activist subjectivities was a nascent process for the Warriors, and that the Warriors would not necessarily be bringing the same expectations to the campaign compared with those already rooted in a protest culture, expectations for example concerning the actions of the police.

The Warriors did not engage at all in certain elements of lifestyle politics associated with Western activist culture, suggesting the distinctiveness of a Pacific mode of activism. For instance, in contrast to the predominance of vegan spaces in British environmental activism, there were repeated reflections upon the alienness and absurdity of vegetarianism, and I witnessed no critical engagement around the sustainability of flying, with one Warrior aspiring to becoming a pilot, and due to soon begin employment as an air traffic controller. I became uncomfortable at points in mentioning that some of the environmental activism I had

previously been involved in had also targeted airports, as flying appeared universally accepted as a necessity for maintaining connections to widely distributed family members. Very few of the Warriors had camped before, and some expressed distaste for this activity which seems to form the bedrock of many Western protest movements (Feigenbaum et al. 2013).

But perhaps the unfamiliarity of protest for the Warriors also speaks to the novelty of direct action protest itself in a Pacific context. For instance, in Rudiak-Gould's (2013) monograph of understandings of and responses to climate change in the Marshall Islands, he argues that protest or civil disobedience are highly unlikely responses within that context, although he recognises one group as a potential outlier, *Jo-Jikum*. And it was indeed a member of this group that represented the Marshall Islands and participated in the canoe action as a prominent media spokesperson.

Rather than relegating the actions of the Pacific Climate Warriors and *Jo-Jikum* to that of a mere aberration, instead the flotilla and following series of actions suggests that civil disobedience is a viable tactic in a Pacific Island context, despite the tendencies towards non-confrontation or in-group blame identified by Rudiak-Gould. Perhaps the more pertinent question is not whether certain tactics are employed, but when and under what conditions. The newness of the type of action undertaken was also acknowledged by the campaign organisers as well. In a Huffington Post article released shortly after the flotilla one of the core organisers claimed that 'never before has the Pacific engaged in such a bold and unified act of nonviolent direct action, but they showed they are leaders in it' (Packard 2014).

However, during the campaign there were tensions between the training and management of the protest by the organisers, and the Warriors' emphasis upon their existing expertise, especially in relation to the canoes. As one Warrior put it, 'we are adults, we have the knowledge'. During activities such as the creation of the Warrior Treaty (discussed in the following section), one Warrior pointed out that many of the values enshrined by it, such as respect, equality and bravery were already part of Pacific culture. This highlighted one of the points of connection between Pacific and Western activist cultures, but also the potential for frustration as the Warriors were presented with things they already knew, via the mechanism of Western activist discourse. Jonah articulated this most clearly:

> In terms of what we did yesterday [the flotilla] like we had to do trainings and all this but to be honest with you, you put an Islander in the face of combat, without any training, his instinct, that warrior

> spirit just comes out naturally. I mean you don't need to nurture a Pacific Climate Warrior. We, in the island, we know who we are, you know. And we get threatened if someone wants to take that away from us, and we stand. (Jonah, 350 Fiji)

These prior knowledges and pre-existing value systems are intrinsic to what makes a Pacific Islander model of protest, and as much a part of the process of becoming Warriors as the campaign experiences and trainings.

As well as very little previous experience of protest, many of the Warriors also had a very limited understanding of climate change science, which one of the organisers readily admitted to being the case. Staff from another NGO which supported the flotilla took time to introduce one of the Warriors to some of the basics of climate science, as the Warrior had no substantive prior understanding of it. As discussed during the methodology chapter, in interviews with the Warriors, discussions about the impacts of climate change in their home islands often fell flat, with the interviewees listing a rehearsed script of generic effects, or offering to simply show me the scripted list rather than voicing it themselves. This is in stark contrast to the UK environmental movement, which has been criticised for seeking its validity through recourse to climate science, perhaps the epitome of which can be seen during a 2007 protest against the proposed third runway at Heathrow Airport where activists marched with a banner that declared 'We are armed only with peer-reviewed science" (Schlembach et al. 2012).

However, this lack of knowledge was not seen as a limitation by the 350 organisers in terms of the Warriors fulfilling their roles as climate activists. In one Warrior training, (which I observed and participated in, held six months before the flotilla action with members of the Polynesian diaspora in Sydney), the explanations given of 350's name in relation to parts per million of CO_2 were tempered by an insistence that it wasn't about the science, but foremost about experience, identity and faith. Similarly, during an early go-round during the Sydney pre-flotilla trainings when all the Warriors were asked to introduce themselves and explain why they were there, one of the organisers explicitly chose not to speak about climate change at all but instead told the story of her grandparents and their decisions to move or stay within the communities they had grown up in. Climate change activism and climate science were thus legitimised through their connections to Pacific identity and culture, as opposed to science acting as the source of legitimation. This inversion can be seen as an enactment of what Hulme has called for in terms of a rejection of the 'de-culturating' of climate change (2008: 9), but one that is not just performed by academics, but by affected community members themselves. It also opens

a question regarding the relation between different epistemologies that will be explored in detail in Chapter Six. Turning next to the process of training and participants actively cultivating climate activist subjectivities, this suggests both the importance of knowledge building, but also of centring Pacific culture and values in order to enact a specifically Pacific mode of protest.

5. Becoming Warriors

From arrival right through to the days after the flotilla, the Warriors were subject to an exhaustive schedule of workshops, trainings, briefings, visits and photoshoots. On the very first evening of the training, the Warriors stood in a circle around the room and were asked to silently step forward if they felt ready to become a Warrior –most feet in the room moved. The training programme was explicitly orientated towards this goal: encouraging the participants to step up as Warriors.

As mentioned in the previous chapter, the training began with a visit to the Redfern Tent Embassy, giving participants the opportunity to learn about and connect with ongoing Aboriginal struggles, as well as share their own stories of where they came from and how they had got involved. The Warriors also received a presentation on the current situation regarding coal and fossil fuel expansion in Australia, as well as campaigns against it, such as that in the Leard Valley, and took part in a media training, focusing on the telling of their own personal stories rather than drilling in facts or soundbites. This emphasis again reflected the ethos that scientific knowledge was superseded by island connection.

As part of the induction process, the Warriors also attended a welcome event at the Campbelltown Art Centre, where the Warriors were addressed by a sympathetic local MP, and the two Warriors from Tuvalu spoke poignantly of the way in which droughts and kingtides prevented children from going to school, threatened their livestock and livelihoods, and ran the risk of separating families. The speeches were followed by performances by a local Maori cultural group and then a barbecue. The Warriors were subsequently encouraged to relax and enjoy free time, with some visiting a mall, and others hanging out at the pool near the home of one of the organisers.

Part of the training process involved an explicit inculcation into certain non-hierarchical activist practices, common to Western social movements (Trapese Collective 2007), even while the 350 Pacific organisers maintained greater authority within the group. For instance, the Warriors were introduced to the use of wiggling hands to signify agreement (a gesture that originates

from the British Sign Language gesture for clapping and was referred to by the 350 organisers as 'twinkling') and the production of collaboratively constructed group agreements, designed to act as a means of consenting to the self-governing of behaviour while avoiding the hierarchical imposition of rules. 'Prayer' was suggested as a feature of the group agreement, or Warrior Treaty, by one of the organisers, who then almost ostentatiously checked for any disagreement, perhaps a direct response to the backlash she had previously received at a 350.org event for emphasising the place of faith (Tiumalu 2014). However, some aspects of activist practice did not fully translate. For instance, we were tasked with explaining the function of the Warrior Treaty to the new arrivals. One of the organisers facilitating that discussion had been at pains to emphasise that it wasn't the same as rules, yet that was the explanation one of the Warriors supplied. This tension between consensual agreements and top-down rules was also due to emerge in relation to the risks of the flotilla itself.

Other conventions of non-hierarchical activist organising were also brought into the Warriors' campaign. For instance, 'affinity group' formations were used in travelling in convoy to Tarrawonga mine (described in greater detail in the next section), as the group divided itself into the different available vehicles and there were concerns about being stopped en route and having to manage encounters with police or mine security guards. Affinity groups are the 'basic organizational unit' (Graeber 2009: 288) of direct action politics: they are composed of roughly five to twenty people who have some basis of connection and are working together towards a collective goal, have shared tactics (Razsa 2015) and have the ability to autonomously make decisions about their group's form and level of involvement in any activities. Clough (2012) expands on the idea of affinity further, arguing that affinity is both 'a feeling of trust, closeness, respect' as well as a means of embodying a political ideal of non-hierarchy (Clough 2012: 1673). However, in practice, the units used to travel to Maules Creek were affinity groups in little more than name, given that the groups did not actually self-form on the basis of pre-existing trust and affinity, and were used just for the process of transport, as opposed to a form of action beyond that.

At points the self-disciplining functions of the training were readily apparent. Early in the training period one of the 350 Pacific organisers introduced the notion of 'Warrior Time' (an embodiment of efficient punctuality) in contrast to the easy-going and often tardy nature of Island Time. Demands were made for the Warriors to get on Warrior Time to enable them to achieve their goals on the day of the flotilla. Warrior Time was a rejection of familiar islander practices regarding time-keeping and a championing of Western clock time, yet packaged as

an authentically Islander practice through recourse to the Warrior discourse.

One morning the whole group was punished for its failure to enact Warrior Time. As had been typical on all previous days the Warriors filtered in in small groups for the opening morning meeting, well past the advertised start time, with various participants still busy waiting for showers or fetching breakfast. The organiser made everyone wait in silence until every single Warrior had arrived, making everyone uncomfortably conscious of the time being wasted, and then put the last Warriors to arrive on the spot, seeking an explanation for their lateness. One of the Warriors was later furious at the organiser for this behaviour, as it unkindly humiliated the Warriors who had arrived last, but largely the Warriors began to accept the principles of Warrior Time and became rigorously self-disciplining.

Different Warriors would volunteer to wake-up everyone else, and rise times that seemed at points excessively early began being enforced, with two to three hours allocated for the thirty Warriors to have washed and eaten breakfast. The very Warrior who had previously questioned the punitive approach to enforcing Warrior Time became one of its strongest advocates, telling Warriors that were still on Island Time, whether they called it 'Fiji Time, Tokelau Time or Vanuatu Time' that it was their time that they were wasting and that they were breaking the first rule of the Warrior Treaty, which was respect.

Having established some of the disciplinary practices involved in the cultivation of Warrior subjectivities, I now turn my focus to the role of affect in the transformation of campaign participants, beginning with sorrow.

6. Sorrow: we cry because that could have been our land and they are wasting it

Driving up through rural New South Wales in a chartered fifty-seater coach filled with dozing Warriors, one organiser performed as an ad-hoc tour guide, gesturing left and right out of the vehicle's windows at the mines, refineries and rail lines used to transport coal. We stopped as a juggernaut of a coal train passed across our tracks, crisscrossing the landscape as they did every twelve minutes (soon to be seven, if the plans for the new mine were to go ahead). The affective power of Maules Creek was evident from the outset, as our guide assured us that everyone had cried at some point while witnessing this landscape.

Perhaps one of the most formative experiences in the development of Warrior subjectivities, beyond all the carefully facilitated workshops and trainings, was the visit to the site of the

construction of the Whitehaven coal mine in Maules Creek in the Leard Valley, in Northern New South Wales, and the affective experiences that engendered. In this section I focus upon sorrow as a key affect, recognising its role in the production of the Warriors as political subjects, as through these painful and shocking encounters with people and places the Warriors were transformed and galvanised to action. I also contribute to literature that recognises protest camps as sites for significant affective encounters (Feigenbaum et al. 2013).

The Warriors visited Maules Creek because it was due to become one of the largest open-cast coal mines in Australia, and was also a site of fierce resistance. The mine's construction was being contested by a collective of local residents, (Aboriginal and white settler), and environmental activists from further afield, who had established an ongoing blockade camp, Camp Wando, on the land of a sympathetic farmer who himself played an integral part in the anti-mine struggle. Camp Wando boasted an impressive array of facilities on its dry and dusty site: rain-fed showers (with solar heated water), compost loos, a media office, a large kitchen and a meeting circle, as well as caravans and tents where the longer- and shorter-term residents slept. The camp had hosted a number of mass direct actions against the mine's construction, including 'walk-ons' onto the territory of the mine, with people travelling from across Australia to participate. These walk-ons had resulted in around forty-five arrests, given the criminal rather than civil nature of trespass as an offence in Australia. Thus, the Warriors came to Camp Wando to learn from other anti-coal activists, and to follow the coal from seam to sea, connecting the extraction process with the exportation via Newcastle Harbour and the eventual climate impacts in their homelands.

The Warriors were hosted by the camp, learned about their ongoing struggle, and had space to recognise their cultural differences and connections as a group. One evening, sat on logs and deck chairs in a small meeting circle, the Warriors took turns locating their home island on a map and sharing key facts about their nation, such as Tokelau's lack of airport and its endeavours in renewable energy, or meaningful personal experiences of extreme weather events, or even singing national anthems. The Leard Valley was thus also a venue for creativity, friendship and joy, as it was the site where the composite *haka* (discussed in the previous chapter), and the women's dance was created, and enabled stronger bonds to form between the Warriors and with their hosts. While this section focuses on the feelings of sorrow, these moments suggest the importance of joy in the campaign as well, the significance of which is further highlighted by Bennett's vision of enchantment, as she argues that 'joy can propel ethics' (2001: 2).

Yet the most catalysing moment during the Warriors' three-day trip was the visit to the site of a nearby active coal mine, where they held a small photo shoot with banners (Figure 11).

Figure 11 - The Warriors and protestors from Camp Wando hold a demonstration outside Tarrawonga mine, standing in front of the mountain of overburden.

Here at Tarrawonga, the Warriors bore witness to the towering mountains of overburden[15] that had been produced through the extraction process. The Warriors responded to this desecration of the landscape with disbelief, sorrow and rage. Jonah spoke evocatively about this sight:

> When we were going up to Maules Creek… and I was just chatting about in the car, la-la-la, talking but then I saw the mountain that, the coal and then the mine, I was like 'what'? Then it stirred a lot of emotions you know. I was heartbroken. (Jonah, 350 Fiji)

In many cases these powerful affective responses were shaped by a sense of Australia's abuse of its relative altitudinal privilege (as discussed in the previous chapter), as an enormous island with great towering highlands, compared with its less elevated neighbours. Abel, a resident of one of the smallest and most low-lying atoll nations, expressed this keenly:

[15] Overburden refers to the soil displaced in order to access desired mineral deposits, in this case coal.

> It was really...I had mixed feelings. I was angry, I was pissed off, I just couldn't describe how I felt. Like coming from a small island where we've been deprived of so many things, like land for instance. And this country's so blessed with these big pieces of land and what they're using with this land is really heart-breaking. They're just digging it up and leaving it there. What's supposed to be under there, they've dug it out. And it's polluting the environment, making people sick.
> (Abel, 350 Tuvalu)

Parallels were frequently drawn between the size of these artificial mountains and the smallest of the Pacific Islands, with one Warrior observing that 'that mound they had there: that could destroy about three islands'. These comparisons of scale enable the same sense of horror and violation to be imagined in relation to the Warriors' own homelands. As one Warrior remarked:

> Just visiting those mines was really emotional because most of those mines are the size of our islands and how could you do this to land and then not give a...not be assed about it? How can you just dig something and not put it back to where it belongs?
> (Delilah, 350 Samoa)

These evocations of altitudinal privilege centred around a misuse and misplacing of land, as the overburden had been left so visibly and disrespectfully where it should not be. As in Mary Douglas' (2003: 36) famous phrase, the overburden functioned as 'matter out of place': both literally dirt and a waste product in the eyes of the mining company, and for the Warriors as something that was perversely not where it should be. One Warrior went as far as imagining not a restoration of the landscape of the Leard Valley, but the land itself working to protect the Pacific, a magical-realist rendering of Australian climate intervention, or perhaps another instance of world enlargement as Australian land became Pacific.

> I think about other countries, other Pacific countries or other neighbours who are the low-lying islands that the ocean, yes sea level rise is increasing and causing them to sink. But these huge soil mounds are just wasted because they just destroy them and spoil the environment. I am imagining that if only I can perform some magic, I would take some of these wasted soils and deposit them on the islands in a way to prevent the impacts of climate change.
> (Jacob, 350 Vanuatu)

The misuse of land was also condemned in the light of Pacific Island values and practices surrounding the inalienable significance of land, and customary traditions regarding land

ownership.

> Still to this day the mining companies have just been really stubborn and not listening to the people of those lands. And I feel that's very disrespectful. Like in our culture, this...like when it comes to land use and like it's such a very sensitive topic and we...we have to respect the people of that land and honour their wishes and like for this...for me to see this thing happening it's just so very disappointing.
> (Leah, 350 Marshall Islands)

Leah's statement harks back to the previous examination of world enlargement, presenting the Pacific as a moral exemplar to its neighbour. It also expresses outrage at the lack of respect for the traditional owners of the land, as the proposed mine would be denying access to many sacred Aboriginal sites. Thus, these responses to the violence of extraction were twinned with an anger at the injustice of settler colonialism, and formed part of ongoing efforts at solidarity with Aboriginal struggles by the Warriors (as discussed in the previous chapter). This concern for the propriety of land, and the assault upon this that the coal mining represents, also highlights the importance of the rurality of the location. Through contrasting the desecration of the mine with the vitality of nature surrounding it, the Warriors emphasised the injustice being inflicted upon the non-human.

> On the way to Camp Wando we went through the Hunter Valley and I saw places there that I really thought were beautiful. I saw animals and creatures on the road that I was wondering what they were. And you know these are new places, and new things, new animals and stuff that I've never seen before. And you know it was also my first time seeing a kangaroo, and you know, it's something that's really beautiful for me to see, and then when you go further and then you see all these mines that have ripped apart the land. It's such a very disappointing and sad thing to see because Australia has this really lush and beautiful land and then these companies, these mining companies come and rip, rip it apart and it... it creates a big hole there that...that's going to be very, very hard to mend.
> (Leah, 350 Marshall Islands)

In preparation for encountering the Tarrawonga mine, a local ecologist delivered a presentation to the Warriors about the rich biodiversity of the area that was direly threatened by the proposed Whitehaven mine, and even brought along a selection of live, native reptiles and amphibians for the Warriors to hold (Figure 12). There was a lot of fear and excited trepidation at the prospect of handling these creatures, especially as concerns had been expressed about the danger of snakes while setting up camp only the day before.

Figure 12 - A Warrior encounters a reptilian native of the Leard Valley.

The force of these encounters resonates with the Bennett's notion of shock and wonder, which she frames as enchantment, as arising through a sensuous encounter or crossing with a non-human other. These playful and vital encounters with animal residents of the Leard Valley stood in stark relief against the desecration embodied in the mounds of overburden, making visible the violence enacted both upon the human and the non-human through the mining process. Abel's words reiterate this juxtaposition of luscious natural growth and its defilement:

> But to see these vast trees growing together here, trees growing beyond what I can see with my own naked eyes, it's truly a blessing and what they're doing with it, they're just pulling the trees out which have grown there for ages. They're just pulling it out and throwing it away as if it's garbage. (Abel, 350 Tuvalu)

Abel's words echo the matter-out-of-placeness of the overburden, with arboreal blessings being treated like dirt.

As well as the reptilian residents there were also powerful, if less joyous encounters, with some of those who worked at Tarrawonga mine. The protest camp had had trouble from a number of the security guards, and the Warriors' presence was mooted as a possible positive intervention, as a number of the security workers were Samoan or Tongan. However, attempts

to enter into dialogue with the guards were fruitless. Those that the Warriors approached turned out not to be Samoan and just told the Warriors that they were trespassing. Rather than building bridges, encountering the Tarrawonga mine and its staff heightened feelings of antagonism amongst the Warriors. One participant spoke of how she wanted to 'smack' a security guard, especially as he had no right to tell Aboriginal people they were trespassing, as it was Aboriginal land. Another Warrior joked of putting aside 'non-violence' for two minutes as the trucks full of coal drove past. While the Warriors did remain strictly non-violent throughout, these tense moments spoke to the anger and frustrations engendered in them by so clearly witnessing ecological destruction, and through their encounters with the mine's security force.

> The way they stopped us from entering stirred up anger in me and I was really angry, or I had a hateful heart because all they are thinking of is money, but they are not considering the future and they are not also thinking about other people. So, I just felt really angry, but I also felt sorry for my brothers and sisters who are living in the low-lying islands because seeing such huge areas makes them to think about their tiny landmasses and they are finding it difficult to do gardening, play or enjoy themselves in their own place. So, it is to do with emotion, anger, devastation and all those things, yes.
> (Jacob, 350 Vanuatu)

Jacob's anger at this blinkered focus upon money at all costs was shared by many Warriors, who expressed similar condemnations of capitalist economy compared with island values. It also highlights the interplay of both anger and sadness in the Warriors' responses to Maules Creek, mirroring the process Gould (2002) observes in the ACT UP movement, as activists deliberately channelled their grief at death from AIDS into anger at government inaction; feelings that could therefore sustain their movement. Through witnessing and affectively engaging with this destruction, many Warriors began to expand the focus of their antagonism to include the complicity of the Australian state apparatus for supporting and enabling fossil fuel expansion.

> Like I wish the government would listen more to their people, to its people, rather than to people who are filling up the pockets. And I feel like the government has more connection to the mining companies than it does to its people. (Leah, 350 Marshall Islands)

Some critiques went as far as a general condemnation of Australia's actions, one that stands in tension with the ignorance and goodwill framing of Australia, as explored in Chapter Four. Rather than acting unaware of the consequences of its actions, Australia was construed as

being 'cruel and heartless', a clear target for blame and responsibility.

> I'm really, really affected, it touched me very much to my heart, to the bottom of my heart, to see a lot of that. Actually, honest I see that Australia they ruin everything, not just for the Pacific, but for Australia, for the Australian, they harm the people's lives, they are playing off Australian citizens' lives. (Tobiah, 350 Tonga)

Bearing witness to this destruction was not simply distressing for the Warriors: it was a catalyst for action. It both stoked the fires of their anger and galvanised them to put that anger into antagonistic practice through the flotilla. Abel's words neatly summarise this, while also reiterating the concern for the misplacing of land:

> Maules Creek really stirred up my feeling of wanting to fight more in this campaign. It really give me an insight…of how cruel and how heartless these people are. (Abel, 350 Tuvalu)

In response to the enormous mounds of overburden the Warriors felt sorrow, anger and disgust. Their sense of antagonism was strongly affectively charged and catalysed by an engagement with the geographically situated materialities (as opposed to abstract calculations) of fossil fuel extraction. It also began to shift in terms of its target, encompassing both the fossil fuel industry and the Australian state, and thereby complicating framings of the latter. This critical discourse – encapsulated in Tobiah's claim that 'Australia, they ruin everything' – does not lead to a gross simplification of Australia. Instead it co-exists with the naive discourse of Australian well-intentioned ignorance (explored in the previous chapter), as well as one that celebrates Australians for standing in solidarity with Pacific Islanders. Holding these three divergent discourses together at once starts to give an insight into the multiple, complex and contradictory relations between the Warriors and the Australian state.

The Warriors' feelings of sorrow were defined on specifically Pacific terms, as a violation of the respect for land, and within the moral schema of relative altitudinal privilege, suggesting an integrally Oceanic dimension to their activist identities. The episode at Maules Creek also highlights the significance of a rural location and the witnessing of injustice and suffering in a more-than-human context in generating feelings of sadness, frustration and antagonism, in contrast to the post-politics literature's current emphasis upon urban insurrections. The encounter at Maules Creek propelled the Warriors to transgressive action and the formation of dissenting selves, suggesting the power and potential centrality of collective emotional experiences in the production of activist subjectivities. It concurs with Jasper's (1998) emphasis upon moral shocks in movement building, as well as Bennett's vision of enchantment: in their

encounters with the Tarrawonga mine the Warriors are 'struck and shaken by the extraordinary that lives amid the familiar and everyday' (Bennett 2001: 4). Yet rather than being consumed with marvellous wonder, this encounter fills them with a sadness that spurs them to acts of ethical generosity, acting (as described in the previous chapter) on behalf of the whole world. The next section of the chapter follows the Warriors' trajectory and manifestations of dissent, exploring how these new subjectivities were expressed through the canoe blockade, in particular through confrontations with the Australian police force, along with concomitant affects of fear and anger.

7. Fear: embracing risk, uncertainty and sacrifice

I contend that the next key affective milestone in the process of becoming Warriors was the collective experience of fear and uncertainty, and the Warriors' dedication to continuing with the action despite the potential risks and sacrifice it entailed; a self-disciplining practice akin to the embodiment of 'Warrior Time'. I explore how theses fears were experienced and overcome by the Warriors, looking first at the fears expressed prior to the start of the campaign: concerns emerging from the novelty of the flotilla and expressed by the Warriors' families, uncertainty surrounding visas as well as some of the limitations of the Warriors' appreciations of the risks. I then consider how the Warriors, once confronted by the extent of the risks, internalised these fears, accepting the gravity of the situation and the sacrifice it would entail. But I also suggest that at points these acts of risk and sacrifice were in tension with Pacific family-centred values, indicating a challenge in the process of becoming Warriors: cultivating a specifically Pacific mode of activist selfhood. This tension is typified in the controversy surrounding which age groups of Warriors could participate in the flotilla.

A factor that exacerbated the Warriors' uncertainties regarding the extent of risk they were undertaking was the novelty of the flotilla itself. The Warriors' flotilla was the sixth such event to take place, yet what set it aside from its predecessors was its leadership by Pacific Islanders; the incorporation of specifically Pacific cultural and religious practices into the action, such as an opening *haka* and a prayer led by a Samoan minister; and the use of hand-crafted canoes from five different countries, that had been built for the action. This opened up the question of how a Pacific politics of protest including the involvement of those with precarious visa situations would shape the dynamics of the day. While there had been very few arrests during previous harbour blockades organised by Rising Tide Australia, a series of legislative and political changes since the last flotilla left no legal guarantees for the safety of the Warriors.

In the run-up to the action at Newcastle Harbour many of the Warriors expressed fears their families' had voiced regarding their physical safety and negative legal consequences. As Jonah from Fiji explained 'my family were worried about me coming in case I got arrested or get chopped up by the propellers. Yeah, but it had to be done.' Jonah's acknowledgement of the dangers and his determination to continue despite these risks was a crucial part of the activist self-building process.

And the risks were not merely present in the minds of concerned parents and spouses. Even prior to the flotilla itself, one 350 Pacific organiser acknowledged that there was a danger that some of the Warriors wouldn't get visas to enter Australia if they were too transparent about their reasons for travel, and one of the venues that was due to host the Warriors as part of a Pacific Island community welcoming event refused to have the canoes present, out of concerns of associating the venue with the criminality of the blockade action.

Furthermore, it emerged that, prior to the pre-action briefings, a number of the Warriors had not been aware of the extent of the risks involved. One Warrior from Tokelau acknowledged that, had he been fully cognizant of what the organisers were plotting, he wouldn't have personally agreed to participate, whilst one of his compatriots admitted:

> Oh yes. I wasn't really aware of what the risks really…I was only just building this thing [the canoe] and saying that look I might get arrested. But when I got all here and got all the information I was like 'oh really'? I am really going to get arrested! (Reuben, 350 Tokelau)

While organisers provided a legal briefing, explaining that entering the shipping lane or obstructing the passage of a ship did constitute an arrestable offence, the workshop was an onslaught of information that many Warriors did not seem that engaged with. Speaking with some of them afterwards there seemed to be some confusion about the possible consequences and the powers and reach of the Australia state. For instance, one participant pondered whether her prestigious university scholarship from Australia would be jeopardized by her participation, yet she was still ready to take that risk, despite the level of sacrifice that possibly entailed.

In the run-up to the flotilla, the Warriors clearly internalised these emotions surrounding risk and fear. As documented in Fox (2016), the shortlist of concerns included 'drowning, arrest, run over by boat, all kinds of sharks, jellyfish, getting punched, sea creatures, drifting away in currents into the Pacific Ocean, cultural disrespect, big waves', as well as anxieties regarding

the need for elaborate thermal clothing to contend with Australia's Spring weather, and the potential for deportation.

In recognising their fears, the Warriors also embraced the gravitas of the situation, in terms of the rationale for the blockade and its potential negative repercussions. For Joseph, it was vital that his family understood that it was not merely a fun day out on the water.

> [his sister] was like 'How did you go? I bet that it was really fun'. I was like 'What? Are you kidding?'...And then I said well it could be if fun if only you have the courage to take the risk. And she started like being serious about it. (Joseph, 350 FSM)

Concomitant with the Warriors' sense of risk and fear was the sacrifice deemed necessary for the campaign, apparent through the emphasis upon ascetic discipline and hard work. As well as the potential sacrifices demanded by the flotilla, participating in the campaign as a representative of one's country was a sacrifice in and of itself, and required rigorous self-disciplinary practices. This included a lack of sleep, due to the need to devote all waking hours to the project and keep to Warrior Time. Many participants emphasised the sacrifices they were making:

> I must go to represent my own country. I must go to fight against this climate change effects. Because I have the heart of my own island, back in my own village. So, I have to came over, to leave my family and my land, my belongings, everything, to come and stand and be present and fight for our country. (Priscilla, 350 Solomon Islands)

Priscilla's words capture two key dimensions to the Warriors' experiences of fear and risk: that of sacrifice with regards to family, and of an undeniable moral imperative to act, beyond immediate familial commitments. The former was clearly present throughout the campaign, as a few of the Warriors had new babies or very recent marriages that they were forced to take time apart from, and one admitted that he had been putting his own wages into canoe construction, rather than sharing them with his family. This level of dedication despite family demands was most apparent in the case of an organiser who received a phone call on the way to Newcastle informing her that her soon-to-be adopted son was going to be born earlier than expected, forcing her to choose between participating in the flotilla and being the first person to hold her child. Faced with such a choice, she called her mother, who offered to hold him first instead, and resolved to carry on with the flotilla, as she was doing it for him and future generations. However, these expressions of dedication existed in tension with claims that a

Pacific mode of protest was one that placed family first.

The greatest conflict between these self-disciplining processes of sacrifice and dedication on one hand and Pacific family values on the other occurred early on during the training process. Within the organising group there were strong concerns about the potential for Warriors to be arrested or deported, and the potential consequences for their future mobility, employment and family connections. A compromise was reached by the organisers that Warriors under the age of twenty-five (and who lacked powerful New Zealand or Australian passports) should not be in canoes that entered the restricted zone – the shipping channel – but could participate on the beach or in the waters closer to shore. The organisers supported those aged over twenty-five to make their own decisions. The justification for this decision was framed in terms of Pacific kinship structures. One organiser (herself a Pacific Islander) argued that while all the Warriors may legally be adults, many were still socially children and under the domain of their parents within a Pacific Islander context as they were not yet married with children of their own.

While the majority of the Warriors were content with the agreed age division, for some it seemed an affront to the virtues of youth empowerment that formed an explicit core of 350's work. It undermined the egalitarian and united efforts of the team, and denied the magnitude of the threat of climate change, in contrast with the 350 Pacific's media narrative of taking action out of absolute necessity and for survival. As one dissenting Warrior put it, 'climate change doesn't leave you alone if you're twenty-four'. Another Warrior, who had expressed willingness to go as far as possible, even doubted his involvement in the project as a whole at this point as, for him, this prohibition on some taking arrestable actions suggested a wider lack of support for the risks he himself was willing to take.

The organisers responded to these critiques firstly by dismissing notions of activist bravado: the suggestion that being willing or able to be arrested made you more of a Warrior, a conscious reaction against an ethos of machismo risk-taking cultivated within some Western activist circles (such as documented by Clough in terms of 'riot-braggadocio' (2012: 1674)). Instead, facing the fears of being arrested, being separated from one's family and home island, or entering potentially jellyfish-infested waters were all presented by organisers as equally legitimate experiences in the process of becoming Warriors. These rejections of bravado also dovetailed with the group's emphasis upon humility as a virtue. For instance, the Warriors would not volunteer themselves for the daily rotating co-ordinator roles, but instead volunteered each other, and none who were volunteered refused the role. This process, in contrast to that

which I was familiar with from UK organising meetings, embodied the principles of humility and reciprocity: no one offered to put themselves above the others, but humbly accepted the role of working for the group when it was offered to them. These expression of humility could be seen as at odds with expressions of antagonism: willingness to express your will over and above that of another. Perhaps therefore it is unsurprising, as will be seen in the following section, that the organisers faced challenges in either incorporating antagonism into or fully disavowing it from a Pacific mode of protest.

The complaints about the under twenty-five rule were also negotiated through further references to familial obligation. Organisers invoked the threat of the shame that would be draped over the whole family, not just the individual Warrior, in the case of arrest, with one organiser sharing such an experience following his previous involvement with Greenpeace. Having participated in an action against a coal port with a small group of predominately white activists, there had been insufficient transparency about potential consequences, and no space for discussions that engaged with the familial dimensions of those consequences, perhaps due to a cultural obliviousness on the part of the white activists about the Pacific significance of shame. Creating the space to have this discussion about the relationship between activism and Pacific values of family was explicitly presented as a feature of what made this action Pacific, and thereby unprecedented, as opposed to 'traditional white activism'.

However the particular training session where the under twenty-five rule was introduced did not fully open a space for discussion, but announced a pre-agreed conclusion, and advanced an instruction that others were expected to adhere to. It therefore doubly violated the principle of individual autonomy, a fundamental cornerstone of Western anarchist and anti-authoritarian environmental activism (Graeber 2009), both through its process and through the privileging of family responsibility above individual freedom and agency. Consequently, it was both incongruous with my own Western conceptions and experiences of activism, and was a key site for articulating Pacific difference.

Thus, the actions of the Warriors in the immediate run-up to the flotilla also testify to the role of affect in the generation of political subjectivities. These Warrior subjectivities were constituted through collective experiences of apprehension and fear, when faced with an uncertain array of physical and legal risks, as well as ascetic demands of dedication and sacrifice, yet only sacrifice conceived of as compatible with Pacific norms of familial obligation. Indeed, as an explicitly Pacific model of activism, space was created to discuss risk in relation

to values of family, including the potential for shame. In emphasising these relations with kin as opposed to the autonomy of the individual, the Warriors' practices diverge from those examples of activism documented by Graeber (2009), Clough (2012) or Williams (2008). As can be seen in the following section detailing the events of the flotilla itself, the parameters governing the boundaries of acceptable activist practice continued to be a point of tension and contestation. In exploring feelings of anger, questions of antagonism (central to post-political analysis) and moments of shock and encounter (integral to ideas of enchantment) become most prevalent.

8. Anger: generative encounters with police aggression

As established in relation to the experience of Maules Creek, by the time the Warriors reached Newcastle, the Australian state had also become a target of their antagonism, in addition to the fossil fuel industry. As corporeal embodiments of state power, perhaps it is unsurprising that, on the day of action itself, the Australian police became a focus for the Warriors' dissent. In examining the Warriors' interactions with the police, particularly their outrage at officers' behaviour during two key altercations, the most central emotional state is revealed to be anger. I recount the major actions taken by the police that fuelled this anger: threats, capsizing, the detaining of two Tongan Warriors, and the sinking of the Vanuatu canoe. The role of the police in generating significant affectual encounters that transform activists' viewpoints has been noted (Feigenbaum et al. 2013; Razsa 2015; Graeber 2009). Yet this anger is not just destructive. The actions of the police in invoking this affect are shown to be generative and productive, in inspiring the Warriors to perform transformational acts of dissent. These encounters with the forces of law also highlight major tensions in the process of producing Warriors. A number of these transformational acts of dissent exceeded the boundaries established by the protest organisers, highlighting the ambivalent relationship of the group to acts of confrontation and antagonism.

There was considerable outrage at the conduct of the police during the flotilla, due to what many activists perceived as deceitful behaviour and direct heavy-handed interventions (as was also noted in some news coverage). According to the accounts of organisers on the day, officers wrongly informed the Warriors that the port was closed, while continuing to let a further ship through, and falsely claimed that the first ship passing through the harbour, a coal ship, was actually a grain ship, a move presumably taken in order to disperse the blockade. The Warriors considered the police to have lied and to have made very aggressive threats, in suggesting that

the Tokelau canoe would get crushed; that all those on board the Vanuatu canoe would be arrested; and the canoe itself would be confiscated if it re-entered the water.

Activists were also pulled from their vessels, kayaks were capsized and confiscated, and those on tourist visas were threatened with deportation. One participant vented her frustration, describing how:

> At one stage one police came and pulled off our kayak to the shore. Yeah, so, it was very scary and also at one point that day I just screamed, I was screaming. (Eve, 350 Kiribati)

During one of the most dramatic incidents of the day, the police temporarily detained two of the Tongan Warriors. As one of the two previously-detained Warriors described during the debrief, they had set sail in order to check the buoyancy of their canoe on behalf of their heavier compatriots, with a clear resolution to not take the risk of entering the shipping channel. Yet they accidentally found themselves dragged right into the path of the coal ship, and nearly underneath it, because the national flag they were flying had inadvertently acted as a sail (Figure 13).



Figure 13 - Two Tongan Warriors are rescued from the capsized canoe.

After the canoe had begun to sink dangerously close to the coal ship, both Warriors were pulled

from the water by police who were initially kind and hospitable, yet put on their 'mean faces' as soon as they reached the police boat. There both Warriors were left cold, wet and fearful, as the police threatened them with arrest and deportation, and detained them without blankets for three hours. Recounting this story the following day, Tobiah, one of the two Warriors, insisted that the greatest hardship was the loss of the support and solidarity of the other Warriors (as the police prevented the other Warriors from accessing the detainees), leaving them with the severe, unsmiling police. Not only despite but because of the fear and discomfort of this experience, the police's harsh disciplinary actions had a productive impact upon Tobiah and his companion. They enabled him to recognise a capacity for courage he had not previously anticipated, and challenged him to enact his activism in unprecedented ways. Rather than feeling ashamed or remorseful for his behaviour, speaking only three days later he was proud and exhilarated:

> Oh my God. That's an unforgettable day, and it was unforgettable moment, the best moment I ever experienced. I feel I am so proud of what happened on Friday, of all the movements and stuff and all the actions. Yeah, you can imagine. I feel like I am so excited and more than excited of what I feel and all the actions, very amazing. I'm proud of everyone. Especially myself, I got arrested!
> (Tobiah, 350 Tonga)

Yet perhaps the most significant altercation with police officers on the day centred around the capsizing of the Vanuatu canoe. Differing accounts circulated regarding the cause of the capsizing and the relative culpability of the police. Samson, part of the canoe's crew, construes the incident as a malicious, violent act, that endangered the vessel's passengers, including a nonagenarian war veteran:

> They [the police] got angrier at us cause they pushed us three times, and the whole time they didn't even notice, actually they knew, they knew the old man was in front of us. But they rammed us and they broke the side of the canoe. And I said to them "Don't move! Don't move!" and they just looked they just looked at us and when the canoe flipped over the old man was drowning. Don't be selfish. That is being selfish. It was there in their face, they saw it was going to happen and they just rammed us in the side and then looked straight.
> (Samson, 350 Niue)

However documentary film maker Josh Fox, also aboard the Vanuatu canoe, recounts events differently in his cinematic portrayal, denying any deliberate wrongdoing on the part of the police. His narration presents the severing of the outrigger as the consequence of a semi-

comedic accident, while his footage doesn't actually capture the 'big wave', or the contact between the police boat and the outrigger:

> All of a sudden, a few kayakers broke off and tried to make a run for it. They got out pretty far, causing the Australian coast guard to loop around and cause a monster wake, a big wave. When the wave hit us, we tipped side to side, not a problem. But it caused the police boat to tip as well, coming down on the pontoon side of the Vanuatu canoe. (Fox, 2016)

Josh Fox's account does not relay the feelings of anger and antagonism expressed by many of the Warriors, and indeed his account of this particular incident foregrounds the experiences of the Australian passengers, rendering the Warriors themselves almost incidental. Yet appreciating these sentiments of anger is crucial for understanding the transformational consequences of this encounter.

For instance, Samson also described his horror at the police officers' amoral actions, particularly in regard to the elderly passenger whom he had tried to pull from the water, but had been prevented from doing so by police officers:

> If that old man had passed away it's their fault. They were being selfish and not thinking about their actions and just trying to do their jobs. You know, sometimes you just have to push aside your job and come and help us along. Because how can you live with yourself if other people are dying?...I don't know how he's going to live with himself but that's what happened[16]. (Samson, 350 Niue)

These intensive emotional experiences were not limited to those aboard the vessel. Jacob, watching from the beach, captures the affective complexity of the encounter:

> So, I had all these feelings and when the police came, I was afraid, yes when the police came I was afraid because it was my first time and this was not in Vanuatu, they were police officers whom I have never met so it was my first experience. So, I was afraid of all these things. When they came, they threatened us, so I was angry and when I watched the canoe turn over, I felt it was very emotional. Yes, so it was every feeling that a man should have, I had it all in that particular moment. (Jacob, 350 Vanuatu)

With the Vanuatu canoe and its crew in disarray, the coal ship steamrollered on past the other

[16] The elderly passenger was ultimately fine, and even well enough to participate in one of the solidarity actions only a few days later, occupying the Sydney offices of Whitehaven Coal.

vessels, successfully exiting the port with its cargo. The failure to halt the ship and the destruction and distress endured by the canoe and its passengers brought many on the beach, including myself, to tears:

> When the canoes were wrecked, when the Vanuatu canoe was broken in half and capsized, I cried. I cried. And most of the Warriors on the beach cried…the building of the canoe is a spiritual thing for a Pacific islander and for someone just to go and break it. (Jonah, 350 Fiji)

Reflecting on this moment during his documentary, Fox observes that 'this was not our finest hour, weeping over a broken ship, a coal barge with thousands of tonnes of coal leaving port'. However, I contend that in many ways it was. Reflecting again upon Latour (2011)'s call to embrace the magnitude of feeling demanded by ecological catastrophe, the Warriors demonstrated this feeling for the consequences of climate change, irrespective of its geographic and temporal displacement. Returning to Maria's words in the previous chapters that work to bring climate change home, the tragedy of this particular coal ship's movements is made painfully evident:

> When we saw the coal ship pass by we all cried, it was so emotional because like we know what those coal boats...what the coal does to us, the Islanders, and so watching it go by, all that was in our head was like a family will lose their home today. A family will lose their livestock. A family will even lose their own livelihoods. Maybe their home. We just let one by. (Maria, 350 Fiji)

The collective nature of this emotional reaction –'we all cried' –was also crucial to forging an activist community of affect, or what Gould frames as an 'emotional common sense' (2002: 178). This community of affect was not limited to those on the beach that day. Carrying back the stories of their actions to their family and friends, the Warriors not only gave an account of what they did but built up an emotional common sense with others, highlighting the importance of activist story-telling (Clough 2012). Jacob's account following his return is testament to this:

> I told them the story of the main purpose of our tour. They only wanted to hear about the protest…So I related the story to them, starting in the morning, they wanted to know every detail of information…when the canoe turned over, and I told them at the moment we all cried and this made my family also cry, yes they cried…the result show that we managed to stop ten coal ships that should have entered. Yes, it was only two that came, and we went out

> to block them. So, this was the story I told them, and they were happy and excited about it. (Jacob, 350 Vanuatu)

Unlike the examples of activist bravado highlighted by Clough, Jacob's words acknowledge his distress, and through doing so the audience are brought empathetically into the memory of the action, crying as he cried, sharing the Warriors' joy at their achievements. As Razsa and Clough argue, story-telling can also be seen as a major component of the development of activist subjectivity. In light of this, perhaps the most significant legacy of the campaign was the production of activist selves.

Finally, the breaking of the Vanuatu canoe created a sublime opportunity for transformational disobedience, as the Warriors were catalysed by the police's actions to further forms of dissent. In contrast to imagery of helpless, vulnerable islanders – 'drowning' –I witnessed 'fighting', as the Warriors were enacting a politics of visceral defiance. One of the Warriors framed his acts of courage in terms of a direct confrontation with those that sought to stop him, the police:

> I wasn't afraid to get arrested. I was fighting for something I want. I was going to go down for what I want. That is why I kept on going in. No worry. First boat, I went in. They said, "paddle back" and I just kept on paddling, kept on paddling. No way, no way. And then when we hit the boat, we just kept on going. No way they were going to stop us. And then they pushed us away and we kept on going. No way. (Samson, 350 Niue)

Similarly, another crew member from the Vanuatu canoe understood his newly found sense of bravery in relation to this head-on confrontation with the police as antagonists, while also suggesting previous negative experiences with the police:

> It is really a new thing for me. A new, new thing for me. I still cannot forget how my, how did I have that courage to do it, to do what I did yesterday…But it's the first, it's my first experience I actually ran towards cops, not ran away from cops. (Joseph, 350 FSM)

Faced with these new obstacles and opponents, the previous slurry of concerns regarding cold water and sea creatures seemed to melt away, and a spirit of wilful and mischievous disobedience emerged in response to the police. While the day before there had been a group agreement to respect the police and not be cheeky (for example through pretending not to speak English) during the flotilla many pursued exactly that tactic. In order to resist leaving the waters, one Warrior from the Solomon Islands disguised his language skills, thereby refusing to hear police instructions, and successfully re-entered the sea after being seized three times until finally

officers snapped his paddle. One participant's experience encapsulates this spirit of defiance and dissent that emerged:

> One of the police who came to take us to the beach [so out of the water], he was like 'Do you swim? Can you swim?' But you know, coming from the Pacific, you know how to swim but you have to lie because otherwise if you say 'I can swim' they knock [you] in the water. So, it's sort of very scary. I was very honest, 'Yes of course I can swim'. I didn't realise you know. And my other friend from Kiribati she realised what he would do if we said it, so she was like 'No, no, no I can't swim, I can't swim' so he was like 'Ok I'll take you to the beach. Don't come back again!' But we went back.
> (Eve, 350 Kiribati)

Most crucially, the Warriors refused to acquiesce to the destruction of the Vanuatu canoe. It was tugged ashore and those returning from the waters were greeted on the beaches with tears and song. Without even a word, a Tokelaun elder stepped forth and with prayers and power tools the Vanuatu canoe was repaired, in direct defiance of the orders of the police on the beach. In fixing and returning the canoe to the waters, the Warriors refuted the treatment of the boat as no more than pieces of wood, instead honouring the blessings bestowed upon it by priests, politicians and ancestors.

The productive affects of anger generated through antagonism with the police translated into activism that exceeded the expectations of the organisers, opening up spaces for disagreement about the limits of action for the protest group and how these reflected upon the group's Pacific values. On the day of the flotilla, many of the younger Warriors chose to flout the under twenty-five rule and sail out into the shipping lanes. This transformational sense of disobedience continued through the following week, as solidarity actions were organised around the country by 350 Australia and other local activists, which were intended to amplify the message of the Warriors and act in solidarity with them, but not actually put the Warriors themselves at risk of arrest. Yet in the case of the Melbourne action (which involved an occupation of the main headquarters of ANZ bank due to its financing of Whitehaven Coal's construction in Maules Creek) and the Canberra action (of which more below), some Warriors became directly involved in the civil disobedience, and through doing so defied rules imposed by some 350 organisers, highlighting a wider tension over the limits of acceptable antagonism.

In the case of the Canberra action at the office of the National Minerals Council, the three Warriors attending were explicitly told by one of the organisers that they should stay outside,

otherwise they risked arrest. However, one Warrior refuted the logic of the organisers, insisting upon the necessity of law-breaking risk-taking by the Warriors themselves:

> They say this is a solidarity movement to support the Pacific Climate Warriors and if the Pacific Climate Warriors is not going [to get] arrested with them it's not really meaningful. And if I get arrested with them it would be some really powerful thing we should do. (Moses, 350 Vanuatu)

Consequently, Moses lied to his Warrior companions, falsely reassuring them that he would stay outside with them, and then also entered the office to stage a sit-in with the Australian activists. He eventually exited the building, narrowly avoiding the police, only after a 350 Pacific organiser commanded him via phone to cease his involvement in the protest.

This scenario reflects a range of tensions in the Warriors' relations to direct action activism, including a further imposition of leaders' decisions over and above individual autonomy and a clash between the spirit of civil disobedience and the more risk-averse approach of the paid organisers. At the centre of this is a question surrounding where the acceptable limits to confrontation lie. The flotilla was framed as a 'nonviolent but intensely contested battlefield' in one organiser's journalistic account of the campaign, followed by an insistence that the approach must be 'confronting' in order to engage in the next 'peaceful battle' (Packard 2014). The near contradiction of the notion of the 'peaceful battle', the invoking and simultaneous disavowal of the language of violence reflects the group's complicated relationship to the politics of antagonism.

At the Sydney Warrior training held some months in advance of the flotilla itself, an organiser reassured the workshop participants that there would be a legal team working 'to make sure no one will be doing anything to break the law'. In a similar vein, another organiser repeatedly referred to the action as a 'legal protest', in reference to the legality of being on the beach and in the water (excluding the shipping lanes). Both cases indicate a denial of the fundamentally illegal intent of the action, and suggest a desire to distance the campaign from associations of criminality or legal transgression. The Sydney workshop organiser also insisted that 'we're not anti-government, not against the system' but 'we're pro-Pacific, pro-awareness', suggesting a disconnect between politics and practice, as the actions of confrontation with forces of the state integral to the flotilla were not underpinned by a systemic critique of state power. These understandings on the part of the organisers put the campaign at odds with more anti-

authoritarian and anarchist cultures of protest, and from a post-political lens inhibit an analysis of the event as a 'return of the political', given this explicit denial of systemic critique.

However, this aversion to confrontation and illegality was not shared by all in the campaign. One Warrior much later expressed frustration and confusion that there wasn't a more confrontational or at least directly meaningful dimension to their time at Maules Creek. While they were in a space that had been created to facilitate direct action, and hearing many stories of it, the Warriors themselves were just used for photo shoots.

Perhaps at the core of this tension over antagonism was a desire by the organisers to articulate a specifically Pacific mode of activism, in distinction to Western confrontation-orientated forms of protest. One organiser, with nearly nine months of hindsight, reflected that 'it was quite spectacle-focused, quite putting up a fight, which is not, you know, that Pacific'. Linked to this conception of a Pacific mode of protest as non-antagonistic was the valorisation of affects of calmness and peace, rooted in faith, as opposed to anger. However, this opens a question regarding the space to legitimately feel anger, given its potent transformative effects.

In recognising the crucial role that affect plays in the generation of political subjectivities, feelings of anger, especially those produced in contestations with the police, were central. These encounters with police, including threats of arrest or the capsizing of canoes, while largely perceived negatively by the Warriors, were generative, helping to produce the Warriors as activists, a process previously noted by Razsa (2015) and Graeber (2009). The transformational impact of these encounters is evident in the way they galvanised the Warriors to take steps they didn't previously see themselves as willing or capable of doing, such as repeatedly returning to the water despite threats of deportation, facing up to police jet skis, and sailing right towards the coal barges in the middle of the shipping lane. These transformative encounters also motivated some Warriors to take action that exceeded the action parameters agreed by the campaign organisers, such as under-twenty-fives entering the shipping lanes or Warriors directly participating in the solidarity actions. This further highlights a tension, already raised in the previous section, about the relationship between individual autonomy and group authority and leadership. This tension works to differentiate the politics of the Pacific Climate Warriors from other climate activist groups with more avowedly non-hierarchical or anarchist politics, suggesting another potential dimension of a specifically Pacific mode of protest.

These feelings of anger were also mixed with moments of sorrow, such as witnessed in the

destruction of the Vanuatu canoe. Again, these intense affective moments – the tears shed upon Horseshoe beach – suggest what Latour identifies as an engagement with the magnitude of feeling demanded by the Anthropocene. The Warriors cried and felt rage both due to the proximate sacrilege performed upon the ancestrally-blessed canoe as well as due to the passage of the coal ship and the consequent damage climate change would wreck upon their homes and the homes of distant others, again straddling concerns of the local and the global. In this moment of intense emotional intimacy, the abstraction and geographic and temporal displacement of climate change is overcome.

9. Being Warriors

While these intense affective experiences – feelings of sorrow, fear and anger – in shocking encounters with ravaged landscapes; threats of injury and arrest; and heavy-handed behaviour by the police were contained within a period of less than a month, the transformational impacts of the campaign continued well beyond that point. The shaping effect of these emotions upon the Warriors' subjectivities has continued to propel them towards ethical action.

As noted in their action debrief and in follow-up interviews, all of the organisers recognised the campaign as a transformative process for them and the others who were involved:

> I think I can say it changed every single Pacific Climate Warrior that was part of it. And like I think they'll always look back on it like a life...an incredibly memorable and life changing experience. (Daniel, 350 Pacific)

In terms of how these changes manifested, for some it was the forging of this enduring activist identity that continued with them.

> So being a Climate Warrior I feel like this is now my…this is my whole life. I am going to take these fights for my whole life… I'm just fucking doing this thing until I die. It's really...I mean I cannot quit this job. It's just makes me really happy that I'm doing, that I'm doing important things for people and also for me and also my children, for my future children, so this is like this is it. (Moses, 350 Vanuatu)

At the end of the campaign many of the Warriors spoke of how inspired they felt to do more, back in their home countries, channelling those intense affectual experiences. A clear succession of actions has flowed from the flotilla, from attempts to enter ANZ Bank in Port Vila, Vanuatu,

in order to demand divestment action (with protesters' slogan-scrawled bare chests mimicking that of the Melbourne Solidarity action), or a protest against the threat of becoming climate refugees, organised by the COP21 Pacific Civil Society Observers at a training in New Zealand, to a kayak flotilla down the Seine during the COP in Paris itself. The Pacific Climate Warriors have continued to spread their message in Paris and Rome (as described in the opening chapter), and in Canada, linking up with First Nations activists resisting the Kinder Morgan pipeline.

Thus, while the campaign has many legacies, including being labelled the 'David versus Goliath campaign of the year' (Buckingham 2014), or stopping those ten coal ships, perhaps the most enduring legacy is the production of activist selves.

10. Conclusion

In this chapter, I have brought together three different literatures: post-politics, enchantment and the geography of social movements. Post-politics has helped me to recognise the value of focusing upon the Warriors as political subjects, the centrality of this political agency to contestations of the drowning islands discourse, and to recognise the shifting points of antagonism within the campaign, from the fossil fuel companies to the Australian state, including their embodiment in the form of the police. However, a post-political analysis alone is insufficient for three reasons. Firstly, in its focus upon the urban it neglects spaces such as Maules Creek as sites for the re-injection of the political. Secondly, the emphasis upon antagonism is in tension with the ambivalence expressed towards antagonism by the 350 Pacific campaign organisers, in terms of the limits they imposed upon the protest, and the suggestion that a conflict-driven approach was at odds with a Pacific ethos. This is reinforced by McNamara and Farbotko's analysis of the campaign, as they describe how in the use of the term 'Warrior' they are 'shedding its combative conceptual lineage' (2017: 21), and they are engaging in 'symbolic, discursive battles' (2017: 24), as opposed to targeting particular enemies. This is not to suggest that the Warriors' actions aren't political, but that they do not fall with a post-politics confrontation-focused definition of the political. Finally, a post-political approach does not sufficiently centre affect in its analysis of protest movements.

Consequently, I have turned to both Bennett's concept of enchantment and the geographies of social movements literature to explore the significance of affect. I have demonstrated the importance of affect in the production of activist subjectivities, highlighting the role of sorrow, fear and anger. In describing these processes, I have borrowed Bennett's language of crossings, shocks and sensuous encounters in order to understand the different affectively-charged

moments the Warriors experienced. Yet while powerful and shocking, encounters with the mounds of overburden at Maules Creek are not exactly wondrous: it is still a far cry from Buck's 'charming Anthropocene'. Thus, I have taken Bennett's underlying principle (that shocking encounters have a transformative impact that engender future ethical action) but brought it to bear on less joyous moments, calling upon the difficult and distressing emotions the Warriors experienced. In this reflection upon challenging emotions, I have drawn upon the geography and anthropology of social movements literature, as authors such Clough, Razsa and Graeber have documented how fear and anger, particularly in encounters with police, can have galvanising impacts upon activists' subjectivities and their future actions. Yet one of the limitations of these literatures is their disproportionate emphasis upon secular, Western, anarchic models of protests. In this chapter I have also sought to outline some of the qualities of a distinctively Pacific form of protest.

I propose that some of the features of a distinctively Pacific manifestation of protest are land, family and faith. The significance of land can be seen in the responses to Maules Creek: the invocations of relative altitudinal privilege, distress at matter out of place, and comparison between the mounds of overburden and the Warriors' own home islands (comparisons that also emerged with respect to the tar sands in the Warriors' 2017 visit to Alberta), as the devastation of the former becomes a metonym for the threat to the latter. Reflecting again upon Latour's call to embrace the emotional enormity of the Anthropocene, the Warriors' response to Maules Creek can be situated in this light. They were literally empowered by their tears: spurred on to take action and in doing so develop new activist subjectivities in response to sadness and anger that they felt. These feelings can also be linked to Albrecht et al.'s (2007) notion of solastalgia, the nostalgia for a place that one is still in but is irrevocably altered by environmental change. Fittingly, one of the earliest applications of this concept is in response to the ravages of mining upon the New South Wales landscape. Here the Warriors take solastalgia to a new level, expressing not just distress at the loss of a place through change, but misery at the transformation of a place that they themselves have never previously known, but which they project onto their own homelands and the future that may await them. Thus, the Warriors can be freed from any accusations of nimbyism or limited self-interest, showing deep empathy with the suffering of others and solidarity with a foreign landscape. Again, the forces of world enlargement are at play, with Oceania acting and feeling for the world.

Secondly, the value of family to the Warriors' expression of activism was apparent in the previous chapter in terms of the sibling-like bonds and optative kinship that formed between

the Warriors. It continues to be of consequence in this chapter in terms of the threat of shame that arrest through direct action presents to the Warriors' families, the familial responsibilities the 350 Pacific organisers adopt towards the younger Warriors via the under twenty-five rule, and the sacrifices the Warriors make with regards to their own families, having to be away from young children and spouses or giving money directly to the campaign rather than financially supporting their relatives. And in these invocations of family some of the greatest tensions emerge between how 350 Pacific organised their action protocols compared with more non-hierarchical models of organising that privilege individual autonomy. Family can be seen as the fundamental motivation and underlying principle of why the Warriors took action: acting on behalf of the world, but also to safeguard their own homes and kin, again bridging the universal and the particular.

And finally, unlike the movements described by Clough, Razsa or Graeber, faith is another defining feature of this Pacific form of protest, from the inclusion of prayer in the Warrior treaty to the opening of the flotilla with a prayer and the unity that collective worship brought the Warriors. And it is this question – the place of religious responses to climate change – that I will pursue further in the following section, looking beyond the Pacific Climate Warriors to a plethora of actors in Vanuatu and how faith informed their understandings, actions and the stories they tell about climate change.

6. Three stories of Noah: exploring hybrid knowledges and political imaginaries through religious narratives of climate change in the Pacific Islands

Having focused in the previous two chapters on the actions of one particular climate activist network, in this final empirical chapter I extend my field of analysis, drawing upon fieldwork I conducted in Vanuatu, and placing it in dialogue with secondary sources from across the Pacific Island region. I use this broader empirical scope to address three main concerns. Firstly, that of the academic marginalisation of religious perspectives on climate change in the Pacific (as observed by Rubow 2009 and Kempf 2017), the demand for ethical and spiritual re-framings of climate change (Hulme 2009; Nunn 2017) and the dearth of social scientific literature exploring religious understandings and responses to climate change (Haluza-DeLay 2014). Consequently, I am placing religious responses to climate change at the centre of my analysis, and thereby hope to contribute to this under-explored area of research.

Secondly, as highlighted by Rubow (2009) and Kempf (2017), much of the existing negative appraisal of religious perspectives on climate change – the treatment of religion as a barrier by scholars such as Kuruppu and Liverman (2011), Paton and Fairbairn-Dunlop (2010), and McAdam and Loughry (2009) – seems to emerge from an attempt to expunge religious belief in favour of scientific expertise. Conversely, I propose to hold these various knowledges (Christian, *kastom*[17], and scientific) in balance, exploring their convergences, connections and tensions, using an approach I term *tufala save*, a phrase borrowed from one of my participants. This recognition of spiritual and not just secular knowledges also dovetails with a concern for ethical action motivated by a sense of enchantment, as opposed to disenchanted rationalism (Bennett 2001).

Thirdly, through this focus upon religious responses and hybrid knowledges, I continue my concern with the need for new narratives of climate change and the Anthropocene. I achieve this through focusing on one main religious narrative – the biblical story of Noah and the flood – and explore how different articulations of this tale have a shaping effect on political imaginaries, investigating the nuanced relationship between the beliefs articulated and the actions deemed appropriate and possible. This both connects with the previous chapter's

[17] Kastom can be defined as 'loosely, indigenous knowledge and practice' (Taylor 2013: 139), while Mitchell (2011: 37) alternatively glosses it as 'the hybrid set of discourses and practices that encompass the cultural knowledge, sociality, and social processes that are unique to ni-Vanuatu'.

concern with the political, and responds to Hulme's (2009) call for further research into the heterogeneity of religious responses, as through using Noah as a narrative frame I explore the multiplicity of faith-based understandings. Returning to my research's overarching aim, I evaluate the potential for these religious discourses to form part of a more empowering, alternate framing of climate change and the Pacific Islands that contests the inevitable inundation discourse.

1. Chapter outline

In order to affirm the importance of religious perspectives on climate change, I begin by establishing the significance of Christianity across the Pacific Islands, and then outline the complex relationship between Christianity and *kastom* beliefs in Vanuatu (Section 2). Following this, I recognise the extent and importance of Church involvement in proactive responses to climate change, globally, regionally across the Pacific Islands (Section 3), and nationally, with respect to Vanuatu (Section 4). I acknowledge the place of the Church in terms of awareness raising, engaging in adaptation projects, and facilitating resettlement occasioned by worsening climatic conditions. I then contend that existing examinations of faith-based responses to climate change have not gone far enough. There is a need to look beyond churches merely as convenient institutional frameworks for information dissemination and community mobilisation, and to also consider the power and potency of religious ideas themselves. In doing so, I argue for the necessary desecularisation of climate discourse and a rejection of the supremacy of scientific thought in favour of embracing *tufala save*: an enmeshing and balancing of both scientific and religious knowledges (Section 5). In order to substantiate this assertion, I tackle one of the most contentious biblical narratives with respect to climate change in the Pacific Islands: the story of the flood, Genesis 6-9, a tale that has been at the heart of the scholarly rejection of religious understandings of climate change in the Pacific.

While Kempf has explored the Noah Story in great depth in the context of Kiribati, he primarily focuses upon only one of many discursive manifestations of the story, while acknowledging the potential for other interpretations, 'translations and reticulations' of the tale (2017: 43). In this way I hope to build upon his work, expanding knowledge of the multiple ways in which the Noah story is currently invoked in the Pacific, and through doing so recuperating some of the potential for religious thought to act as a resource (Hulme 2017: 15), rather than barrier, for action on climate change. I contend that different articulations of this narrative have symbolic and material power, and become entangled with and enable particular

understandings of and responses to climate change. I trace three discursive manifestations of the Noah story within the Pacific Islands (Section 6). I then consider the implications arising from these narratives in terms of the political imaginaries they generate, focusing on questions of sin, trust and agency (Section 7). Loosely focused on each narrative in turn, I consider the relationship between trust in the divine, prayer and action (Section 7A), divine warnings and the sin of carbon emissions (Section 7B) and divine accompaniment and the rejection of retributive suffering (Section 7C). I conclude by recognising that these diverse religious framings all have the potential to act as the basis for counter-narratives that contest the drowning island discourse (Section 8), as in contrasting ways they all foreground Islander agency. This thereby affirms the value of exploring religious perspectives on climate change.

2. The significance of Christianity in the Pacific Islands

In considering the place of religious thought and action in relation to climate change, I here concentrate exclusively upon Christian faith practices, due to the overwhelming dominance of Christianity across the Pacific Island region. As Tomlinson and McDougall (2013: 2) highlight, utilising data from the 2004 World Christian database, across all Pacific Island states (with the exception of Nauru and Fiji) more than 80% of inhabitants identify as Christian, and in most cases the proportion of Christians is higher than 90%. Meanwhile Operation World (2018) puts six Pacific Island countries in its list of the 15 most Christian countries by percentage of population.

The significance of Christianity in the Pacific does not just lie in its statistical prevalence. Tomlinson and McDougall contend that Oceania is 'solidly Christian' because 'Christianity is the dominant cultural force throughout the region' (2013: 4) and it fundamentally shapes politics. Indeed, Douglas (2007) argues, that given the way that Christianity is built upon local beliefs in Melanesia, it is not experienced 'as foreign or imposed…but as a lived spiritual reality' (2007: 162).

The importance of Christianity is as true for Vanuatu as for the wider Pacific Island region. According to the latest national census at least 80% of the population identified with one of the major Christian denominations (VNSO 2009)[18]. Christianity has also been identified as 'the key national symbol' (Douglas 2007: 161) in Vanuatu, as it brings greater unification to the

[18] The survey includes nearly 30,000 respondents listed under 'other', some of whom may also be members of a less populous Christian denomination, such as the Mormons, who are not accounted for under the main survey divisions.

country than the very many different localised manifestations of *kastom*. Part of the power of Christianity may derive from the role of the church in the colonisation of the New Hebrides (as Vanuatu was formerly known). Indeed, Eriksen (2013) argues that the colonial Christian missions enabled governance on the village level, disciplining and regulating communities, and thus contests the idea that Vanuatu has a weak state, instead suggesting that the state project was to some extent successfully enacted through the churches. Post-independence, Eriksen argues that the nature of the churches' power has changed: it is dispersed rather than disciplinary, as through their partnership with NGOs, churches produce state effects, through providing services normally granted by government. This provision of state effects and wielding of state-like powers is highly pertinent to the question of the role the Church plays today in climate change communication and adaptation.

While my predominate focus is therefore upon Christianity as an organised religion in the Pacific, in Vanuatu the significance of *kastom* cannot be overlooked. Few Ni-Vanuatu exclusively religiously identify with *kastom* practices – only around three and a half percent of the population according to the most recent census – (VNSO 2009), yet it still culturally informs many people's spiritual outlooks. As Douglas (2007) highlights, Christianity and *kastom* are both formally enshrined in Melanesian constitutions, as leaders of the newly independent nations embraced a form of 'Christianised kastom' (2007: 160), such as Vanuatu's first Prime Minister Walter Lini, who in his inaugural prime ministerial address claimed that 'God and custom must be the sail and the steering-paddle of our canoe' (Douglas 2007: 161). Thus, the two belief systems are by no means necessarily antithetical, but are instead in dialogue with each other (Tomlinson and McDougall 2013). The mass conversion to Christianity did not lead to a total loss of indigenous beliefs and practices, partly due to points of compatibility between Christianity and *kastom* (Taylor 2016a).

During my fieldwork I also noted a common acceptance of select dimensions of *kastom*. Those who strongly advocated traditional methods of developing food security and the preservation of customary knowledges also appreciated the damaging impacts of some *kastom* practices upon gender relations, particularly observing how certain kin relations and the rights of *kastom* marriages could legitimise sexual violence and undermine sexual consent. The negative uses of *kastom* were also more generally decried, such as the expression of jealousy through the destruction of roads, machinery or the sending of rain to ruin festivities. Yet the use of *kastom* power for positive purposes was not portrayed as inherently incompatible with Christian faith, at least by some priests from Presbyterian and other non-charismatic denominations.

Indeed, relationships with *kastom* vary by denomination, with the Anglican, Catholic and Protestant churches more willing to assimilate various aspects (Douglas 2007: 160), in contrast with more vehement rejection of *kastom* by the Seventh Day Adventists (SDA) and newer evangelical churches (Taylor 2016a), who often emphasise the potentially murderous dimensions of sorcery. In terms of my research focus, I am predominately concerned with churches that are inclusive of some *kastom* practices, (which are also those that have the greater number of members (Eriksen 2013)) with the exception of the SDA. While recognising the dialogue between Christianity and *kastom* in Vanuatu, the significance of Christianity in the Pacific Island region and its potential to shape perspectives on climate change is apparent. Next I turn to the actualisation of that potential.

3. Global to regional religious climate initiatives

Firstly, the active engagement of religious institutions in climate change advocacy on a global scale must be acknowledged. From the participation of the Church of England and the Methodist Church in the global fossil fuel divestment movement (Brown 2015), to the People's Pilgrimage led by former Philippines UNFCCC COP delegate Yeb Sano, a 'spiritual journey' on foot from Rome to Paris in advance of the 2015 climate negotiations (Scammell 2015), the increasing prominence of faith-led responses to climate change is clear. Perhaps mostly notably the release of Pope Francis' encyclical *Laudato Si: On Care for Our Common Home* has also brought the potential positive interrelation between religious institutions and climate advocacy efforts to global attention. The encyclical directly addresses the calamities of climate change, as well as poverty and inequality, and the need for a worldwide ecological response, and has been lauded as a 'profound analysis of humanity's earthly predicament' (Hulme 2015: 16), modelling the moral leadership on climate change that has been called for (Dasgupta and Ramanathan 2014).

On a regional level, the proactive response to climate change by faith institutions is most evident with respect to the work of the Pacific Conference of Churches (PCC), an ecumenical organisation, and the regional division of the World Council of Churches. The PCC has been active around climate change for decades, first releasing a statement concerning the issue through its General Assembly in 1997 (Edwards 2014). This was followed in 2004 by its Otin Taai declaration (World Council of Churches 2004) which called upon churches in the industrialised world to act in solidarity with the Pacific and for companies to facilitate the transition to low-carbon economies. The Otin Taai declaration also explicitly recommended

that Pacific churches allocate money in their budgets for climate change education, develop sermons regarding creation, and work through existing church structures to disseminate awareness, avenues that have to some extent been pursued in Vanuatu, as will be seen in the following section. The concerted environmental concern demonstrated by the PCC builds upon its history of political and ecological engagement, particularly with regards to opposing nuclear testing (Edwards 2014).

The PCC has also been strongly advocating a relocation agenda for those most threatened by sea level rise (Edwards 2014). The PCC General Assembly first tackled the issue of relocation in response to climate change in 2007, culminating policy-wise in its Moana Declaration in 2009, which emphasised the right of communities affected by climate change to resettle in other Pacific Islands. The PCC has conducted research and worked directly with Pacific Island governments over the issue of climate-induced relocation, as well as with communities in Fiji to help them develop relocation plans. In doing so, the PCC also embraces the spiritual dimension to its work through ideas of the 'accompaniment' (Edwards 2014: 210) of both displaced and receiving communities, tending to their ethical and emotional needs, through visiting and witnessing the stories of those affected. The practical role churches can play in cases of displacement is also demonstrated in the case of the Carteret Islanders in Papua New Guinea, as the Catholic Church donated four parcels of land for them to relocate to in mainland Bougainville. However, such a strong focus upon relocation could also be questioned, given the extent to which it might bolster rather than rebuff the drowning islands discourse.

According to Edwards, the success of the PCC and their members' efforts emerges from the unique status of the church in terms of its ability to build networks. She claims that 'no other organisation is as close to the people affected nor as influential and independent in its advocacy role' (2014: 210). Within this context she argues that the role of church leaders is crucial, due to the respect they hold within society, and their capacity to communicate with and mobilise communities is unrivalled. Thus, the long-standing engagement of the PCC in ecological concerns, the extant work they have achieved in terms of policy and practice regarding climate-induced relocation, and the influence they identify faith leaders as holding all testify to the significance and potential of faith-based organisations in responding to climate change in the Pacific Island region.

4. Faith-based climate initiatives in Vanuatu

The inclusion of faith organisations in climate initiatives is also evident on a national scale in

Vanuatu. The Vanuatu Government works in partnership with faith bodies with regards to its climate change operations, although indirectly. The National Advisory Board and Project Management Unit, the coordinating bodies of the government's climate change and DRR activities, co-operate with the Vanuatu Christian Council (VCC)[19] via a consortium of local NGOs. Many international NGOs, when establishing village-based committees to oversee new climate adaptation projects also make a practice of ensuring there are representatives from local religious institutions included, and utilise time in church services as a means of advertising the new initiatives.

> Usually we use the Church as it's already a structure in place that mobilise a lot of the communities...the easiest way is to go through the Church because they do disaggregate the groups of the community already and make the service at different times. So, they just come and make like five minute or ten minute awareness.
> (David, ex-patriate NGO worker)

Church-funded climate awareness projects are already in operation, taking a diverse range of approaches from training to preaching, tackling food security to construction. I heard reports of the Anglican Church at work in the Torres Islands, in the far north of the country, and of Presbyterian ministers preaching on climate change. The VCC was engaged in a project with the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation establishing nurseries and home gardening projects (encouraging families to grow food in the area immediately next to their houses, as opposed to solely in the traditionally established gardens which are located at a distance from residences) and has also trained community members as part of climate change adaptation and DRR programmes. Meanwhile the Presbyterian Church has been engaged in a project regarding seawall construction in Nguna (one of the islands closest to the capital island) and is also working with a community on an island off Malekula who may need to resettle on the mainland.

Moreover, while many Churches are already active on this issue, there appeared to be a consensus across my participants working in climate-based projects (as opposed to my participants formally positioned within the Church) that the Church offered huge unrealised potential in terms of expanding climate change communications and they generally advocated

[19] The VCC is an ecumenical body representing all Christian denominations within the country, and a national subdivision of the PCC.

the Church's greater involvement.

> They are in places where the government does not go. They have networks that the government doesn't have, and they have systems that are in place that we could explore and use to advantage. (Elijah, former government official)

Among the perceived advantages of greater engagement via the church was the existing formal structures for information dissemination and governance present in all villages across the country. This is a system of enormous reach compared to the capillaries of the Vanuatu state, or the capacity of NGOs, and similarly to Reale's (2014) analysis of the Church's power in the Solomon Islands, could fill a governance gap. With respect to the institutional presence of the Church, other interviewees highlighted the significance of the Churches' existing youth groups and recreational and social programs, which could easily incorporate topics of climate concern, and which could amass far greater audiences than an externally derived meeting regarding climate change ever could. As one interviewee emphasised, working through the Church would also give community members greater ownership over the programs, if they occurred within 'that space that's something that belongs to them'.

Consequently, the underutilisation of Church connections and resources was a common theme among responses by those professionally engaged in Vanuatu-based climate advocacy. As Elijah, the former government official further observed: 'They are doing some things now, but it's on a very, very minute scale'. This enthusiasm for an expanded place for the Church in climate advocacy was also shared by some pastors. Some ordained participants saw spreading awareness of climate change and the threat it presented to their communities as well as the actions that parishioners could take in response as a crucial part of their role. Other pastors also recognised that they held a greater degree of authority and sway over the community than external initiators and thereby had the potential to encourage a greater participation in initiatives. As one representative of the PCC quipped 'academics have graduates but church leaders have flocks', emphasising the far-reaching influence church leaders have within communities.

On the other hand, some ex-patriate NGO workers expressed considerable resistance to the idea of working more closely with the Church or explicitly incorporating scriptural passages. This scepticism was often justified with reference to the impartiality of the organisation and the risks of discriminating or dividing communities through denominational difference:

> No, I try to be like, not using any church...because you don't know who you're having...here there are so many churches... so you never know to who you are talking to. So, I don't want after they feel like, 'Oh we're different' you know. So, I'm not taking any political…as an NGO we don't have any church and politics point of view, so we are completely blank on that. (Naomi, ex-patriate NGO worker)

This suggests some scepticism towards the Church's role, mirroring analyses that present religion as a barrier or that prioritise scientific knowledge, as will be discussed in the following section.

5. Embracing *tufala save*

Thus, it can be surmised that while some faith-based organisations are included within responses to climate change in Vanuatu, and regionally across the Pacific, this inclusion currently falls far short of what is largely envisioned to be possible both by those at helm of climate initiatives and those within the Church. I contend that in order for churches to be maximally engaged in climate communication, adaptation and advocacy, there is a need to look beyond churches merely as convenient institutional frameworks for information dissemination and community mobilisation, but also to consider the power and potency of religious ideas themselves. As a basis for this, I argue for an endorsement of what a number of my participants have referred as *tufala save,* a balancing of both scientific and religious knowledges. For instance, as one participant reflected in relation to the appearance of a rainbow in the story of Noah:

> Oh well that's like kind of climate change, coz you know the rainbow came out, that's a promise, but and then scientist say it's like, coz of the water or something, spectrum, creating a spectrum. It's good to have two beliefs. Both of them are right. (Ruth, 350 Vanuatu)

This simultaneous acceptance of both beliefs (that a rainbow can at once be both no more and no less than a divine covenant and the refraction of light through water droplets) challenges the hierarchy of climate knowledges, contesting the pre-eminence of scientific forms of thought and also thereby motions to desecularise climate discourse. This is at odds with the existing negative appraisal of religious perspectives on climate – the treatment of religion as a barrier by scholars such as Kuruppu and Liverman (2011), Paton and Fairbairn-Dunlop (2010), and McAdam and Loughry (2009) – which seems to emerge from an attempt to expunge religious belief in favour of scientific expertise. Moreover, while a number of participants advocated the need for science and religion to work together, in balance, this notion of balance does not equate

to an equal degree of authority or validity for the two respective knowledges. Many proponents of the *tufala save* approach firmly held the notion that in this relationship Christian forms of knowledge reigned supreme. As a Presbyterian pastor expressed it:

> Yeah, we can by scientific research say something will happen but if God says there will be rain, there'll be rain. So, people believe that yes, we can say something, but God is sovereign.
> (Peter, Presbyterian Church)

This supremacy of religious knowledge sometimes manifested as a humouring of scientific understanding.

> There's scientific evidence and then there's God's view. So, I am a Christian person… but I like weighing things. Like scientists, like they are from this world and you know they're smart, they know what they are talking about but then the Bible already talked about it…so if I am a Christian and I approach a scientist, I wouldn't want to point the finger and say, "oh you're wrong". That wouldn't be nice but just nodding and agreeing with him and say, "oh yeah, that was bound to happen", like that. (Ruth, 350 Vanuatu)

Or similarly some participants saw the provision of scientific knowledge as a beneficent act of God. As one pastor explained 'God gave us scientists to work with them on this issue', a sentiment echoed in Paton and Fairbairn-Dunlop's (2010) research in Tuvalu, where some interlocutors concluded that the scientists were a conduit for God's warnings. These approaches act as an inversion of the manner in which cultural and religious understandings are often brought to the table as a lesser complement to the overall authority of scientific thought. This also highlights the necessity of embracing multiple, divergent knowledges, akin to what Kempf (2017) advocates as a relational approach, and to Hulme's (2017) recognition of the limitations of purely scientific framings of climate change, and the need for religious perspectives that provide a 'thick' account of moral reasoning.

Part of the impetus for this bringing together of these two forms of thinking is not just because of the Church's organisational capacity, as previously discussed, but also because of the cultural resonance of biblical narratives as a means of understanding climate change. As one SDA member explained it:

> We have stories about things in the Bible that we can relate to people, we can relate it to churches, so that it's more applicable to the what

> we are facing now because history seems to be repeating itself…Those kinds of stories, when you talk to Christians they will understand it. (Isaac, NGO worker)

Working through the lens of religious thought can thus be understood as an avenue for situating climate change as locally meaningful and morally resonant (Hulme 2008; Nunn 2017).

Others have issued this call for not just a focus on religious structures, but theological wisdom. For instance, the PCC's Otin Taai declaration recommends that 'Members of the governing bodies of [fossil fuel] companies should consider the theological views of churches that address climate change and recognise what their companies are doing to God's creation' (World Council of Churches 2004). This suggests not only an existing theological deficit, which some of those who are active around climate change wish to rectify, but also a relationship between theological thought and the broader ethics of climate justice in relation to fossil fuel consumption, which will be explored further in this chapter.

This principle of *tufala save* is already being enacted through partnerships between some NGOs and churches within Vanuatu. Many Ni-Vanuatu interviewees were open and positive about the prospect of engaging with biblical scripture as part of climate change communication, including those working on climate change from within the government. Some participants advocated the use of the pulpit specifically as a site for climate advocacy, recommending the preaching of sermons that explicitly addressed these issues.

The German development organisation, GIZ, has put together a sermon on climate change that pastors can use, and which has been presented in some Presbyterian churches and been circulated further afield. The presentation draws upon scripture in order to demonstrate the foreshadowing of current climate change impacts, as well as giving practical advice about steps that can be taken as part of community-level climate adaptation, bolstered by the weight of biblical authority. For instance, in the presentation the current blight afflicting the leaves of the laplap plant (which have a central role in many traditional meals) is explained with reference to Luke 21:11 'There will be famines and pestilences in various places, and fearful events and great signs from heaven'[20]. However, this text has been notably amended with the removal of references of 'earthquakes', presumably in order to forestall the association of all natural disasters with climate change. This is far from the only example of liberal editing of scripture.

[20] All biblical quotations are taken from the New International Version, in line with that used by GIZ.

While parallels between existing climate change impacts and biblical precedents are clearly drawn, the latter are often dramatically decontextualised and stripped of symbolic meaning. For instance, James 3:12 'A salty spring cannot produce fresh water' is treated as a literal gloss of the problem of salt water incursion into a fresh water lens, yet when considered in the wider context of James 3 is used metaphorically to refer to the character of the human tongue with respect to the challenges of taming it, and the problem of a mouth that puts forth curses being able to praise God. Similarly, Ezekiel 17:8 ('It had been planted in good soil by abundant water so that it would produce branches, bear fruit and become a splendid vine') is treated as spiritual endorsement for the construction of compost toilets as a means of creating 'good soil'. Yet descriptions of the vine in question are commonly theologically interpreted as an allegory for the status of Judea in relation to Egypt following the Babylonian invasion (Fishbane 1984) as opposed to a genuine horticulture recommendation. Thus, this presentation highlights some of the tensions between scientific and religious knowledges, and the fluidity with which biblical material can be used to tell a multiplicity of stories, as will become further apparent in the discussions of Noah. While the presentation is undeniably instructive with regards to climate change adaptation, it does not take advantage of what the Bible does present with regards to climate change: a means for people to meaningfully relate to climate change as a moral and ethical issue.

Pastors I spoke with from the Presbyterian, SDA, and Catholic Church all reported having delivered sermons regarding climate change, and a number of my Presbyterian interviewees had attended services which explicitly addressed questions around climate change and extreme weather events. However other pastors and parishioners from a range of denominations revealed that they had not delivered or witnessed any services concerning these matters, suggesting that while the pulpit is increasingly a site for climate communication, this is far from universal. This further confirms my participants' assertions that the Church's potential for climate advocacy is currently far from being fully realised.

This also highlights a question regarding the scope of my research with respect to denominational difference (a concern previously highlighted in Section 2 regarding relations between Christian thought and *kastom* knowledge). According to the most recent census, 28% of Vanuatu's population is Presbyterian, 15% are Anglican, another 12% are Roman Catholic and 12% are SDA (VNSO 2009). The remaining 13% of the Christian population is spread across a number of different smaller denominations, including the Church of Christ, the Assemblies of God, the Neil Thomas Ministry and the Mormon Church. The pastors I spoke

with all hailed from the four largest churches, as did the vast majority of my research participants. Thus, although this research cannot claim to speak to all Christian denominations currently present in Vanuatu, it does consider the practice of the four most popular, who collectively make up almost 84% of the country's Christian population.

Thus, I have established the significance of the Church in the Pacific Island region, and highlighted the vital and influential role it can play in climate change communication and adaptation. This is due not just to its institutional form but the alternative forms of knowledge it disseminates, which have the potential to complement scientific knowledges and resonate more profoundly with Pacific Islander communities. Therefore, I now turn to the question of how these knowledges are being applied. In order to do so, I will focus upon one particular biblical narrative: the story of the flood, Genesis 6-9.

6. The biblical story of the flood

The story of the flood has been identified as the 'archetypal account of climatic disaster and existential threat' (Hulme 2017: 83) across multiple faiths, and as an apocalyptic myth present in contemporary artistic depictions of climate change that could serve to undermine pro-environmental action (Salvador and Norton 2011). My reason for selecting this story over and above other examples from scripture are threefold. Firstly, it was a reoccurring feature of discussions with pastors and parishioners, and thus held meaning and relevance for many of my participants. Secondly, it has been at the centre of a controversy regarding the relation between religious thought and climate discourse, and has been used as an excuse by some to dismiss the potential of biblical knowledges in relation to climate advocacy. While the Noah story has legitimised an attempted purification of scientific and religious knowledges (Kempf 2017), I wish to use it as a means to explore the balance, enmeshment and tensions between different epistemologies.

And thirdly, due to the contrast between the meanings my participants had garnered from it and those present in its more controversial form, it highlights the polysemic potential of scripture. As Salvador and Norton note, 'subtle changes in mythic form can fundamentally alter the construal of contemporary social and political issues' (2011: 47). I contend that different articulations of this narrative have symbolic and material power, and become entangled with particular and distinct understandings of and responses to climate change. I trace three discursive manifestations of the Noah story within the Pacific Islands. I consider the implications arising from these narratives in terms of the political imaginaries they generate,

focusing on questions of sin, trust and agency. Loosely focused on each narrative in turn, I consider the relationship between trust in the divine, prayer and action; divine warnings and the sin of carbon emissions; and divine accompaniment and the rejection of retributive suffering. Thus, the multiplicity of interpretations possible highlights the importance, in Donna Haraway's words, of 'which stories tell stories' (2016b: 39), of which readings are shared, for what reason and to what consequence. And I am indeed looking not just at the story of Noah, but at what stories that story tells. This also again reiterates the wider power of climate change narrative (Hulme 2009, Tsing et al. 2017), and its potential to either reinforce the inevitable inundation discourse or echo the counter-claim that islanders are 'not drowning but fighting'.

But first, I begin with a reminder of the biblical passage itself. Genesis 6-9 recounts how in response to the sin and violence that filled the Earth, God unleashed waters from windows of the heavens and the fountains of the deep, subsuming all land and wiping all living creatures from the Earth. All bar, Noah, his family, and diverse members of the animal kingdom, who safely weathered the storms in an ark, hand-built by Noah to divine specifications. After more than a year at sea, this homeless menagerie disembarked, to be welcomed by a promise from God that such a fate should never befall them or their descendants again. Most pertinent to the first articulation of the Noah tale is its conclusion during which God declares:

> I have set my rainbow in the clouds, and it will be the sign of the covenant between me and the earth.
> Whenever I bring clouds over the earth and the rainbow appears in the clouds,
> I will remember my covenant between me and you and all living creatures of every kind.
> Never again will the waters become a flood to destroy all life.
> (Genesis 9:13-15)

6A. The first reading: the rainbow covenant and climate denial

The ramifications of this covenant extend far beyond the Old Testament itself. As has been documented by research into the Marshall Islands (Rudiak-Gould 2009), Kiribati (Loughry and McAdam 2008) and Tuvalu (Mortreux and Barnett 2009; World Council of Churches 2011) this promise has been mobilised as a vehicle for climate change denial across the atoll states of Oceania, those countries often depicted as being on the front lines of climate change. For instance, more than half of Mortreux and Barnett's participants in Tuvalu reported that they were not concerned by climate change, and rejected climatological predictions of sea level rise. These repudiations were based upon the premise that the rainbow covenant was a holy promise

that God would not flood the earth again and would safeguard Tuvalu. Such sentiments have been echoed by Harry Tong, Kiribati opposition leader and brother to the recent President, who publicly stated 'Climate change is an all-natural phenomenon. You can't really do much about that, unless you can talk to God and negotiate with God…He made a promise to Noah that he will never again destroy this earth with flood' (Reed 2010). Teburoro Tito, a former President of Kiribati, has also used religious grounds to espouse climate denial, contending that 'God is not so silly to allow people to perish just like that' (Reed 2011).

Interviewees I spoke with who were from or had worked in Tuvalu or Kiribati reiterated the presence of this narrative, although none condoned it themselves:

> In the past when we tried to educate our own people…So they believe that the Bible said you know when God promised Noah he would never send floods and that's what our older people used to think and they believe. In 2009 when I went back to Kiribati a lot of them are saying 'are you saying that God will break his promise? God will never break his promise' you know. (Eve, 350 Kiribati)

This first reading of Noah has three primary consequences. Firstly, it impedes local attempts to raise awareness, and stimulate proactive adaptation activities. One of my I-Kiribati interviewees spoke despondently of the resistance she faced from elderly members of her congregation, rejecting her role as a climate advocate, and utilising the story of the rainbow in order to do so.

> The elderly people, they always say when I talk about climate change...they always say 'Oh no, this is not your task. Because you are pastors, ministers, church ministers, you have been telling us from the past until now, we are in this age now, we believe that there is a God, we've been saved... the sign of the rainbow which is the no more flood to be on the Earth to destroy the Earth. But now you are coming to tell us that this, all things like climate change, which means we are being destructed by another flood'. So they don't want to hear about it. (Esther, I-Kiribati preacher)

Secondly, this particular narrative manifestation has been condemned as detrimental to Islander agency in the face of climate change. As Loughry and McAdam note, whether climate change is denied based on the rainbow promise, or is seen as a form of divine punishment, these understandings 'restrict the people of Kiribati's sense that they can be active in addressing the climate changes they are experiencing' (2008: 51). Finally, this particular interpretation of

Genesis can be used to tarnish the potential for religious understanding and religious action on climate change more broadly. As Mortreux and Barnett have noted 'faith that God will protect Tuvalu is such a strong belief within the community that some officials identified religion as a *barrier* to awareness of and adaptation to climate change (2009: 110 my italics). As Kempf (2017) highlights, this has resulted in an attempted purification of scientific and religious knowledges by some social science scholars, and a derogation of faith-based responses, thereby neglecting the potential of religiously-informed messaging (Nunn 2017).

While this reading raises issues that are pertinent to Vanuatu (such as the relationship between trust in God and agency), which will be discussed in Section 8, I did not encounter this narrative itself during my Vanuatu-based fieldwork. It was not apparent in sermons, church publications, climate change workshops or village discussions, and when I directly asked a few NGO workers and pastors about this reading of the tale they explicitly rejected it. However, other manifestations of the Noah story did emerge.

6B. The second reading: preparation and sin

In a post-Cyclone Pam Port Vila, awash with discourses of national resilience and sacks of donated rice, the story of Noah was repeatedly invoked as a parable for the need for greater preparedness. One SDA member explained to me that:

> People in the past they have faced famine, they have faced flood, you know, I mean, we as Christians, we believe in the story of the flood, there was a flood, you know. So, Noah prepared, he prepared. He built a boat so that he can save all the animals. (Isaac, NGO worker)

Figure 14 - Winning entry by Biliso Osake in the Pacific category of the 2012 UNDP Asia-Pacific Cartoon Contest on Climate Change and Human Development.

I encountered this interpretation of the tale in discussions with pastors from the Presbyterian Church, the Anglican Church and the Seventh Day Adventists, as well as Ni-Vanuatu NGO workers and youth climate activists. In contrast to the first reading - where the story of Noah was used to enable climate change denial - the second reading uses Noah as an instructive against the dangers of denial itself. As one climate adaptation project worker presented it:

> Noah's story is a good one that I think I've used... when it came to hard questions which were asked and I can feel that these questions are doubts, doubt questions from community then I use this to push it if I know it is a religious community. So, I will say the example of Noah. He warned people on the vision he saw but they were ignorant, and then what happened? (Sarah, NGO worker)

Thus, here the story of Noah is not a vehicle for doubt, but explicitly mobilised as a weapon against it, encouraging shameful identification not with the successfully prepared Noah, but with the doubting masses who foolishly did not heed the signs.

Explicitly drawing parallels between Noah's predicament and Vanuatu's current challenges with respect to climate change adaptation and enduring extreme weather events, some pastors encased the biblical teaching in the language of disaster risk reduction. For instance, one official

from the Presbyterian Church described how:

> God talks to Noah and he starts to prepare. Many people laugh, but he does it. When disaster strikes, he is prepared and puts all the animals inside. The same as with climate change, the same as with tsunami. They reach land, the dove goes out, they are at the rebuilding stage, building it back up again. The disaster strikes because there was a covenant with God before, and it is broken. But a new covenant is made and they can rebuild.
> (Cornelius, Presbyterian Church)

Far from the world-changing and apocalyptic, the eventual receding of the waters is envisioned as a familiar, manageable and predictable point in a cyclical disaster response process: 'the rebuilding stage'. This reframing of scripture within NGO discourse is also apparent in the *Pastors and Disasters* handbook, a guide which has been circulated to some Anglican ministers in Vanuatu, where Noah's acts of preparation are framed as 'a strong risk mitigation plan' (Episcopal Relief and Development 2014: 1.1).

As well as Noah, the figure of Joseph was invoked by a handful of participants as an icon of sage preparation. Thus, additional biblical stories were used to bolster the narrative of Noah. One SDA interviewee drew explicit parallels between the seven years of famine the Egyptian people faced and the ongoing threat to Ni-Vanuatu food security presented by climate change:

> Joseph, during the time of famine, famine in Egypt, there was seven years of harvest and seven years of drought, you know? For that seven years it is the seven years of preparation, you know. You must have plenty food and everything. And after seven years, that's climate change, you know. I mean, they foresee that there's going to be a drought and Joseph was the person who tell everybody 'plant as much as you can because we'll be having drought for another seven years'. (Isaac, NGO Worker)

As a slight variant, another SDA member also emphasised the pertinence of Joseph's actions, but interpreted the plentiful and lean years in Egypt as corresponding to the annual cycle of extreme weather events in Vanuatu.

> Some of these preachers they preach about Joseph's time, the drought, the seven years plentiful and the seven years of drought. And that we translate it into Vanuatu per year on a yearly basis six months safe climate conditions, and six months disaster climate. So, what we are trying to learn here is to make people prepare within the six months, food security and prepare for shelter and food

> preservations and then we wait for the next six month seasonal which is not really safe season for climate. And then we see how, if any cyclone happen to come, at least people they are ready and using those concept, those principles from the Bible.
> (Adam, ecumenical organisation)

Thus, rather than potentially having to prepare for an open-ended and ongoing state of suffering (when the famine acts as a substitute for climate change), the years of famine are normalised and brought within the framework of a manageable and predictable regular cycle, akin to the reference to the post-flood period as the 'rebuilding phase'. This manageability, achieved partly through a linguistic fusing - an NGOisation of scripture - is also apparent in the same participant's contextualisation of the story:

> We have lessons learned from the drought in the Bible where Joseph was the key coordinator in Egypt. (Adam, ecumenical organisation)

As well as bestowing Joseph with an incongruous title, more redolent of international development discourse than Genesis, he incorporates the ever-present post-Pam evaluative mantra of 'lessons learned'. Again, this tone is echoed by *Pastors and Disasters*, in reference to Genesis 41. The Archbishop for the Anglican Church of Burundi describes how the Pharaoh acts by 'choosing Joseph to become the steward of that huge DRR project for the Egyptian people' (Episcopal Relief and Development 2014:1.4). However, this does suggest the potential for an affinity between spiritual belief and adaptive practice as Archbishop Ntahoturi further affirms that 'disaster preparedness is an ideal for everyone who loves the Lord and His creation' (2014: 1.4).

Thus, this second narrative of Noah – emphasising preparation and climate belief as opposed to denial – was also reinforced with other biblical stories, and through a merging of NGO and theological discourse, indicating the multiple knowledges that participants were engaging with. Through its contrast with the first story of Noah the heterogeneity of religious perspectives becomes apparent. However, in other renderings of the tale, Noah's role was less celebrated.

6C. The third reading: those outside of the ark

The third and final reading of this tale emerged during an interview with Ezekiel, a church-based Tuvaluan climate advocate who was actively working to contest the rainbow covenant as denial discourse in his home country and to generate new scriptural understandings. This reading stands in contrast to the first, as it reaffirms the Rainbow Covenant while denying its

relevance to climate change due to the latter's anthropogenic rather than divine origins, and thereby like the second framing emphasises the need for human action.

> I am not saying that we are losing hope in the covenant. We are still part of the covenant. And God is still part of the covenant. And he remains faithful to his words. I think the problem is with us human beings. And that is the good news. The issue of climate change is nothing to do with God. But it's something to do with us. Therefore, there should be a solution somewhere. Because if it is to do with God, therefore it's beyond our capabilities, beyond us. But since this is a human made catastrophe, therefore there should be a human solution from below, not above. (Ezekiel, Church of Tuvalu)

But it also refutes the basic premise of the second framing, by rejecting the presentation of Noah as an aspirational figure. In his radical re-reading Ezekiel argues that:

> Sometimes we tend to ignore the cries of those who were outside the ark. And many animals were died outside the ark. And we also tend to ignore those kinds of readings. We always go to the conclusion that Noah was the hero in the story and he should be praised for what he has done. But disregarding the cries of those who were outside of the ark. Those outside the ark need to be liberated and I think God is with those who are outside the ark. God is struggling with them, trying to alleviate them while Noah he is enjoying the luxury life, you know. And those who are outside the ark: I think we can identify ourselves with those who are outside the ark. Those who don't have the resources to be on Noah's ark. So, I think we are more related to those who were floating outside the ark. (Ezekiel, Church of Tuvalu)

Another Tuvaluan scholar, Reverend Lusama, General Secretary of the *Ekalesia Kelisiano Tuvalu* (the Tuvalu Christian Church), mirrors Ezekiel's scorn for Noah who is 'enjoying the luxury life' while many around him drown, as he argues that:

> We have seen that the ark has taken a sharp change in shape and form, it has ceased of being a lifeboat, it has ceased to be a divine instrument of life affirmation, but it has become a human made ark, which favors not the innocent but the value of money. It ignores the cries of the poor, the powerless and the marginalized while it tends to the voices of the rich and the powerful…Therefore, the boarding ticket onto our present ark is no longer innocence, but profit. (Lusama 2004: 92).

Thus, those whose actions perpetuate ecological destruction are rewarded, while the innocent are punished. In Lusama's words, 'literally, they are overboard while the guilty are on-board

the ark of salvation' (2004: 97).

While this reading is theologically unorthodox, it is highly pertinent to the question of which narratives constitute the Anthropocene. It forefronts the suffering of those during the flood and extends this concern beyond solely the human. Indeed, with the mention of the 'many animals' who died outside the ark, Ezekiel invokes the sentiments of multi-species compassion highlighted by Kate Rigby (2008) in her account of the ark, and advocated by Tsing et al. (2017). With popular media discourses ever regurgitating representations of Tuvalu as a sinking paradise, the canary in the global coal mine, it is not such a conceptual leap to consider those so imminently threatened as those outside of the ark. And reconsidering the story of the ark in this light is part of an explicit plan by Ezekiel to 'try to find a Tuvalu position on reading those texts', and thus an attempt by Pacific Islanders to reassert control over the discourses concerning them. Having described the three tellings of the Noah story that I encountered during my research, I next turn to the different political imaginaries they generated or foreclosed.

7. Meanings of the ark: political implications and hybrid knowledges

As Tsing et al. (2017: M8) observe, 'some kinds of stories help us notice; others get in our way'. Similarly, I contend that these three different evocations of the story of Noah (rainbow covenant as denial, Noah as icon of preparation, and Islanders as unjustly outside of the ark) offer up different political imaginaries in response to climate change. They open up some possible avenues of thought and action, while foreclosing others, suggesting the heterogeneity of religious responses to climate change. The constraints of these political imaginaries centre around intertwining themes of sin and responsibility as well as questions of trust in divine providence versus individual agency (which may be bolstered or inhibited by the aforementioned trust). Bearing these key themes in mind, I will discuss the political imaginaries generated by the three stories in turn.

7A. Trust in the divine, prayer and agency

In response to the first narrative, I explore the extent to which faith can lead to apathy in the face of climate change. I highlight the potential for trust in the divine to produce a lack of agency, probing the relations between action and prayer and thereby questioning the limited political imaginaries generated by this discourse. However, cynicism regarding faith-based responses to climate change in Vanuatu can be tempered by recognising the multiplicity of roles prayer can play in relation to action. Rather than entirely dismissing the first manifestation of

the Noah story, I acknowledge the arguments of Kempf (2017) and Rubow and Bird (2016) who contend that this use of the Noahic covenant as a rejection of climate science is also in itself a counter-discourse which refuses to sublimate all other sources of knowledge to the Western scientific.

The rainbow covenant as denial narrative presents examples of religious beliefs leading to inaction in response to climate change, in Tuvalu, Kiribati and the Marshall Islands. I begin therefore by exploring the extent to which religiously-based apathy or fatalism was also present in Vanuatu. Firstly, while not invoking the rainbow covenant as example, some participants in Vanuatu did still legitimise climate inaction through their religious understandings. As one member of the Anglican Church explained to me:

> The foundation of Vanuatu is built on the Christian faith and the word of God says that it is not for you to worry about the weather…God is the boss of the clouds and all of the other things up there, he sends rain to come, he sends wind to come…nature is controlled by God. Then for us to try to solve climate change, we can't. Because only God will say what happens tomorrow…When people come and talk about climate change with us, we understand it as a natural disaster so there's no need to worry about it. Because if you worry about it, it's not your business. It's not my business. It's God's business. (Deborah, Anglican Church)

This echoes Donner's (2007) argument that within a Pacific Islander context especially the weather and the climate are seen as part of the domain of the gods, in contrast to the land, which is under the dominion of humans. While this expression of unconcern was anomalous among my participants, the suggestion that climate change was in God's hands, and therefore beyond the purview of human action, did chime with the sentiment voiced by another participant that the only avenue open to those in Vanuatu was prayer. This was most notably in relation to the actions of neighbouring Australia, who was acknowledged to have caused the pollution that was affecting Vanuatu.

> If after that, Australia doesn't want to do that [to change], then the people of Vanuatu will pray 'Father God, you keep climate change as it has been for all time and you keep us safe'. Because of all of the big countries we can't go to them and say you must stop. Only people of that country can go and say to their countries they must stop. It's like that. (Gabrielle, Anglican Church)

This approach stands in stark contrast to that of the Pacific Climate Warriors as explored in

Chapters Four and Five (whose demonstration can be understood as exactly that which Gabrielle cautions against) and taps into a wider question of the tension between prayer and action. One participant mapped this opposition onto the distinction between Christian religion and *kastom*, as a critique of the approach of the former:

> When we talk about the Bible, the Church talks about how we should pray, we should pray. But with *kastom*, we make it with our hands, we do it through action… like we pray to God to hear us, but with *kastom*, we make something with our hands, with our thinking, yes. (Abraham, chiefly authority)

Thus, the tension between trust and agency, or fatalism as opposed to choice is again echoed, but with these differing positions occupied by different bodies of knowledge (*kastom* versus Christian) as opposed to different theological stances. On the other hand, *kastom* and scientific knowledges were not without their own tensions, in relation to disaster preparation. One employee at the Meteorological Office recounted a row he had had with a chief in the immediate build-up to Cyclone Pam. He urged the chief to tell all the people of his village to take precautions against the impending hurricane, but the chief assured him that him and those with the strongest *kastom* were working their hardest to deflect the cyclone and did not need to alarm the others. Without disrespecting *kastom* nor chiefly authority the Meteorological employee desperately tried to convince the chief that *kastom* alone was insufficient preparation, and was unfortunately proved correct. With some schadenfreude the employee remarked that as soon as telecommunications were restored the chief was one of those who most urgently demanded food rations, tents and tarpaulins as his village had been savagely hit. In spite of incidences such as these, the shape of the cyclone's path, as it almost entirely avoided the northern Vanuatu islands of Malekula and Santo was commonly attributed to the fact that those communities were known to keep strong *kastom*. Overall, this suggests that even if both scientific and *kastom* knowledges provoke proactive responses to climate change and disasters, the nature of the actions encouraged may be at odds with each other.

There are other way in which faith-based apathy towards climate change could emerge. Understanding climate change as a divine rather than human matter, with prayer as the only recourse, could also result in a fatalistic apocalypticism. As one 350 Vanuatu member who was very active in climate advocacy explained:

> Most of the people are Christians and people believe in climate change, that climate change is happening and most of them believe

> that you know, it's just Jesus coming back again and it's the last days…They have all this thinking and so they do believe, they really had this concern like 'we have to pray hard, we have to' you know? And they keep on praying, praying, without doing something which is really actioning, like go plant something to stop coastal erosion and they just keep on praying. And so, they have like confusion. It's all confused them that they just keep praying but Jesus isn't coming back again but sea is coming up and they lost all...so that why we try to we try to like keep on praying but just do something, you know, to keep all your resources in place so that you can have the accessibility to it. (Moses, 350 Vanuatu)

Others also spoke of the threat apocalyptic interpretations presented to effective climate communication. Indeed, a number of participants who referenced the Bible as a warning or foretelling of climate change adopted an apocalyptic tenor. Interviewees mentioned the book of Revelations, the prophecy of the end times presented in Matthew 24, and the shocking time of Daniel 2 in relation to current and future impacts of climate change. One pastor postulated that climate change was the consequence of sin, springing from the disconnection of humanity and God, and thereby destined to end in Armageddon.

> Climate change is a sign of catastrophe that has hit the world. Slowly it will increase in the sense that if we see it as a sign of the problem of sin which affects man and disconnects him from God so man becomes selfish…When man does not connect with God, man disconnects himself and becomes wicked due to selfishness, then man creates a sign to show that God will be angry and destroy this world. This world will be destroyed. (Amos, SDA preacher)

This argument was reinforced again with reference to Noah, through emphasis upon the fallen world surrounding him that God is forced to wash away.

> If we take it as a sign we will say that man has become selfish. We look back at the story of Genesis in Chapter 6, we look at Noah's story, the Bible tells us that this world becomes so wicked. People forget God. That is why God decided to put an end to this problem. (Amos, SDA preacher)

Consequently, even while this first telling of the ark is not knowingly in circulation in Vanuatu, the potential links between religious understandings and failure to take action due to a faith in divine intervention (or a sense of inevitable damnation) are present. Moreover, the scepticism regarding faith-based responses to climate change, highlighted by Kempf (2017) in his analysis

of existing accounts of the rainbow covenant discourse in Kiribati and Tuvalu, was also not unknown in Vanuatu. In a conversation about the role the Church can play, a participant described how when discussing this on the island of Epi:

> They all started laughing and they said 'Church is always just pointing up here. Just keeps pointing to God'. So, they don't deal with down here, they point up there. (Andrew, ex-patriate NGO worker)

Others also indicated that they suspected the Church was more preoccupied with otherworldly spiritual preparations rather than contemporary corporeal concerns, particularly in the case of certain denominations such as the Neil Thomas Ministry. So far, such an analysis could align with those scholars who seem to suggest religious perspectives inhibit rather than enable proactive responses to climate change. The first manifestation of the Noah story, and the concurrent emphasis upon prayer rather than action, and upon spiritual futures rather than worldly presents suggests a limited political imaginary, with little room for Pacific Islanders to play an active role in the face of climate change. It seems to resonate with rather than challenge the inevitable inundation discourse.

Yet I contend that the relations between trust in the divine, prayer and agency, and the implications of the first reading of the Noah story are far less straightforward than this. Firstly, Hereniko (2014) defends Islanders who in the face of climate change choose to place their faith in God rather than scientific research. He postulates that it is the most prudent and sensible option, given the greater dependability of God compared with the large industrialised nations who had created the problem in the first place, a contrast to the emphasis by the Pacific Climate Warriors upon the naivety yet goodwill of Australia in Chapter Four.

Secondly, denouncing prayer as a simple opposition to action does not reflect the experiences and understanding of many participants. For instance, one official from the Presbyterian Church insisted upon the importance of prayer, but also of taking responsibility for action in addition to it. He explained that for example when faced with a cyclone one should pray to God for protection, but one must also take actions such as cutting down the trees nearest the house. One cannot simply pray, as one can depend on God excessively, and thereby fail to take responsibility for oneself. Meanwhile, in the *Pastors and Disasters* handbook, Archbishop Ntahoturi interprets prayer not as in opposition to or a complement to action, but as a precursor, as he recommends 'praying for and receiving God's inspiration so that people in the

position of taking actions can understand what God wants them to do' (Episcopal Relief & Development 2014: 1.5). These two articulations of the combined role of prayer and action also highlight the theme of warnings and foretelling, which will be explored in Section 7B.

Finally, the circulation of the rainbow covenant discourse, and the denial of the severity of climate change can itself be seen as an example of agency, and reclaiming of control over Pacific Island futures. As Kempf (2017) argues, the rainbow covenant denial narrative is in itself a rejection of the inevitable inundation discourse, and to some extent has been produced as a backlash against scientific and political pronouncements that hasten the demise of Kiribati. Consequently, Kempf interprets this first reading of Noah as a 'religious-political counternarrative' (2017: 24). He observes the way it is mobilised in Kiribati by the parliamentary opposition, to delegitimise the current government and to resist the scientific narrative of climate change currently imposed upon Kiribati. Similarly, Rubow and Bird (2016) argue that in referencing the rainbow covenant, Tuvaluans are denying the inevitable inundation discourse by instead professing a faith in the ongoing continuity of the world, in a way that reflects the interconnectedness of land-sea-air that is central to much Oceanian eco-theology. This is rejection of impending disaster in favour of continuity is confirmed by Kempf who argues that this Christian counter-discourse gives Islanders recourse to a higher authority than that of the scientists, and allows them to project a different vision of Kiribati's future, one of 'continuity and stability' (2017: 34) as opposed to total loss. This agency, expressed through disrupting the hegemony of scientific knowledge is captured by former President of Kiribati Teburoro Tito who claims 'I laugh because I don't give in totally to science' (Reed 2011).

Consequently, even the much-maligned rainbow covenant discourse does present instances of agency, and contests the supremacy of scientific knowledge, presenting instead a political imaginary rooted in faith and continuity. However, the other two narratives of Noah appear to present a more fruitful convergence of scientific and religious knowledge, as well as more explicit emphases upon Islander agency. To this end, I now consider the theme of warning and foretelling, as emerged in the second Noah reading and the story of Joseph and the Pharaoh.

7B. Divine warnings and the sin of carbon emissions

In response to the second narrative, I begin by examining the place of warning and foretelling, moving onto a consideration of the failure to heed messages and act. Recognising the frequent understanding of climate change and Cyclone Pam as messages that encourage changes in behaviour, I consider the relationship between sin and carbon emissions. I explore the extent

to which some Ni-Vanuatu take on the burden of climate change causation, and how this sense of climate sin can be situated in the wider context of perceived moral decline. I therefore highlight the generation of a political imaginary dominated by localised individual action.

Firstly, central to the interpretation of Noah as parable of preparedness was the emphasis upon heeding or failing to heed warnings, acting either as Noah or the others of his time did. One facet of this was a reiterated observation by many participants of the extent to which the Bible warns of or foretells climatic changes.

> I mean if you read about the Bible and there's verses in which they, they speak about something's going to happen and if you take the things happening I mean compare with all this climate change stuff, it's really, it's really happening like. What it says in the Bible it's happening now. (Moses, 350 Vanuatu)

Climate change was often recognised as being part of the domain of the gods (Donner 2007), just as the flood of Noah's time and the famines that Joseph and Pharaoh faced were. Yet while during the first narrative this led to the conclusion that human action was inconsequential, in this second retelling, participants followed in the footsteps of Noah and Joseph, advocating the importance of preparation.

> Then for us to try to solve climate change, we can't. Because only God will say what happens tomorrow. But we have to prepare. We must prepare because we don't know what will happen tomorrow. (Gabrielle, Presbyterian Church)

Thus, in this reading human agency – the capacity and willingness to prepare – is still crucial, not just in spite of but because of the unknowability of God.

Discussion of warnings and foretellings often moved from the generality of climate change to the specificity of Cyclone Pam. Many I spoke with affirmed knowledge of the cyclone through means other than the broadcasts of the Meteorological Office. One preacher spoke of a vision a few days prior of a saucepan over-boiling that she saw as a portent of a coming disaster, and another described many of the auguries witnessed in nature, from the way to the clouds were flying, the appearance of unusual birds, to the rippling of the ocean, all of which he understood as God's revelation through nature.

While the cyclone's death toll was very low, some were still critical of the failure to heed

warnings and prepare, again couched in the relation to Noah as an example.

> Noah was approaching a disaster, but Noah prepared for that disaster. And an awareness had gone to everyone already and something was coming but they didn't worry like that. It's just like Vanuatu. Vanuatu, when they recognise the red light is coming, they don't worry, they just walk all around, a lot of them, like I'm saying, drink kava and then they are surprised, and they run all around and then where will they go? Where will they go now, for the wind is strong? Everything is blown down, like that. But if everyone had prepared, you would come to Vanuatu and look, and you wouldn't even know a hurricane had passed. (Deborah, Anglican Church)

Again, this answer reflects the NGOisation of scripture: while translated from the Bislama, the phrase 'awareness' as a singular noun appears in English in the original, bringing divine pronouncements and contemporary development communications under the same umbrella. Linked to these ideas of preparation and warning was an emphasis on the importance of interpreting the divine significance of Pam's coming. For instance, the same preacher also emphasised the cyclone as a holy lesson:

> So, when the cyclone came and gave us a disaster, you can see that the people of Vanuatu are all over the place, because everyone understood that God had come to teach, or that God had given us a warning, that we must look at how we are living. So, we understand it that way. (Deborah, Anglican Church)

Others followed suit, interpreting the cyclone as an instruction for those in Vanuatu to change their lifestyles to be more in accordance with God's plan.

> And creation being God's revelation, God is speaking to us through nature, so when Cyclone Pam strike people say, 'What is God saying to us?'. Maybe God is speaking to us through nature maybe because of the way we live so we need to change the way we live. So, the hurricane was not only described as a hurricane but the issue of what is God speaking to us through the hurricane.
> (Peter, Presbyterian Church)

The idea of climate change and Cyclone Pam as divine imperatives for behaviour change highlights the importance of sin, particularly the sin of carbon emissions. This is demonstrated in a recent sermon by Fiji-based preacher Richard A. Davis. He rejects the denialist reassurances of the first reading of the flood, but uses the promise of the rainbow as evidence

of climate change's anthropogenic nature, as is also found in the third reading. He postulates that 'instead of coming from God's hand, the rising waters of climate change are the waters of human sin' and argues that 'in some ways we deserve the punishment of a worldwide flood as people implicated in the causes of climate change. Some have more emissions than others, *but we all have emissions* and many of us use beyond what is acceptable for a stable climate' (Davis 2015). Thus, the language of 'carbon indulgences' (Nerlich and Koteyko 2009) with its religious connotations moves from the metaphorical to the literal.

Both this interpretation and the narrative emerging in Vanuatu, appear to align with what Peter Rudiak-Gould (2013) has identified as a framing of 'universal' climate blame. All are held equally responsible for causing and responding to climate change, while recognising that their contributions to the problem may be at different degrees of magnitude. This interpretation clearly aligned with the ethical stance of some participants:

> If we say that 'No, we don't make emissions', but think about when you're burning a tire how much poison is in the tire which will affect the environment…We all contribute to cause the climate change problem. Ah, even the human body produces heat, yes it produces heat and it is good heat that's coming out of the body. But otherwise we all contribute one way or another, maybe in the islands small scale and in bigger countries bigger scale. (Amos, SDA preacher)

Linked to this was a refusal to direct accusations of blame at the larger industrialised countries, and thus a rejection of a model of 'industrial blame' as Rudiak-Gould (2013) categorises it.

> I think it's everyone's business. I mean obviously pointing fingers hasn't worked so far and so I'm not going to say industrialised countries are responsible for this. I mean there's probably a degree of accountability yes, but I don't think responsibility should lie in their hands because we've seen that it doesn't work. (Martha, 350 Vanuatu)

There is a clear pragmatism to this argument—that apportioning blame solely to the global north has been ineffective—yet it also stands in stark contrast to the antagonistic politics of blame enacted by the Pacific Climate Warriors with respect to Australia. Others sympathised with this position, with for instance one pastor explaining 'Ah we can pass this [the buck], we can point fingers at people, you can do that but four fingers will always come back to you'. These sentiments suggest that Vanuatu could be legitimately pointed at in terms of climate change responsibility, a notion that may be at odds with historic emissions records but not with

the attitude of many participants.

Linked to this emphasis upon the need to prepare and take collective responsibility for climate change, many respondents also talked about the need for those in Vanuatu to mitigate their own carbon emissions: burning less rubbish, taking less truck rides, using less wood to make cooking fires. Some preachers explicitly incorporated these guidelines for more sustainable living into their preaching. For instance, one pastor outlined some of his key advice to parishioners:

> Don't cut down trees. Be careful with your plastics. So, we go along with the government in promoting non-plastic society where we carry a basket to go shopping rather than get plastics and bring pollution... So, we talk about protecting trees and careful of burning the trees, cutting down trees but protecting them because they give us air. And also, the way we bring pollution. Like people are getting a lot of tin stuff, they eat and then they throw them all over the place and they bring pollution and let tin into the sea and bring poison to the fish or into the river. So simple steps where a community can look after themselves, not so complicated. (Peter, Presbyterian Church)

This attitude is mirrored by Tuvaluan theologian Fusi, who, while condemning the 'Big Homes' of those who have sought wealth and power and thereby caused anthropogenic climate change, also pinpoints Islander moral responsibility. He argues 'the blame must not always be upon the big countries of the world because the people of Tuvalu have also failed to look after their only home' (2005: 17). He consequently invokes the current ecological predicament as an opportunity for Tuvaluans to act as stewards towards their homeland, a theme that also reoccurred across my interviews.

These messages of environmental conservation as well as emissions reduction were also being disseminated in secular contexts. For instance, at a food security workshop in Malekula, a large island in the North of Vanuatu, participants asked whether they shouldn't burn wood because of climate change and were told by the presenter that indeed they shouldn't burn too much. The same question emerged in a similar workshop regarding disaster relief gardening vis-a-vis mulching cleared vegetation or using the more traditional swidden approach: while the former was encouraged as being more sustainable, this was in tension with the cultural respect for slash and burn. Villagers were also encouraged to replant in order to replace any logged trees. Similarly, in a workshop focused on planning the goals and targets of 350 Vanuatu, some of the participants discussed the need for all villages that were using benzene for light to move to

solar, and suggested that people should walk short journeys, rather than take the bus. These emphases upon the potential and necessity for Islanders in both urban and rural contexts to reduce their own carbon emissions suggests an extreme localisation of responsibility for a global issue.

While NGO workers advocating these messages did not place blame on Islanders acting without awareness of the climate consequences, they did insist on the need for better climate communication and education, in order for Islanders to be able to rectify their behaviour.

> It is not our grandfather's fault if he doesn't know, if he doesn't plant or he digs out sand, it can cause sea level rise. It is not Auntie's fault if she doesn't stop to burn plastic, it continues to heat up the atmosphere. So I think that we should do more…maybe media or organize some more things to give out information… It is important for us to inform… for what they should do, what they should not do, what they should reduce. (Sarah, NGO worker)

And many of those spreading these messages clearly practiced what they preached. For instance, one NGO worker spoke proudly of the changes she had made to her own lifestyle:

> Using my own basket like when I go down to the shop or to the market, thinking 'I have to take my own bag', put in all the foods that I want, not taking too much plastic to go home...and also one another thing is sometimes I decide to walk, going back home, just for a short distance, don't need bus, I have to walk and one other action that I have like growing my own food. (Abigail, NGO worker)

Meanwhile a public official spoke of how she had embraced green technologies at home in the form of solar, and reframed many of the domestic features of her life that are common across Ni-Vanuatu households (such as not using a fridge or electric heater) as forms of sustainable living.

> Like myself at home I use solar. I don't use electricity…Now we use solar for water as well. We don't have water supply, but we have rain water tanks and a ground tank but when we...like small things like when we do gardening we don't burn the bush anymore like before… Avoid burning big bush, it's small but we avoid smoking, burning of plastics and wheels and all that. We just burn that around our area and we also plant a lot of trees, but like coconuts and sandalwood. We plant a lot of them, a lot of flowers as well, green areas eh? So, this, I have a small place, so this is what we try to do. We don't allow burning of plastics and leaves and all that. We just compost them. But nothing major but we decided not to use electricity power, we just use

> solar. So, we don't have fridge, we don't have heater, we had them, but we decided not to use them because we don't want to consume electricity. (Oprah, Government employee)

However, some strongly disagreed with the emphasis upon Islander mitigation as a practical or ethical response to the climate crisis. One of the NGO workers criticised the hypocrisies present in climate change communication:

> We have taken almost two times a plane to say that and then we will blame somebody that normally walk by foot, but he takes three times a year a truck. It's kind of stupid now. No, it's much more good to avoid to take the blame to do that and then you will reduce the impact, you know. So, yeah, I'm not really comfortable to blame the people who have really small impact and this kind of stuff. I would not recommend to do that. We are here to help the people. We are not here to say, 'No, you do not need to use the truck. You have to go back to the *kastom*. So, if you have somebody sick you will have to carry them' and then us we live in town and we have a huge impact. (David, ex-patriate NGO worker)

This highlights questions raised by Agrawal and Narain (2012) about the failures to distinguish between 'luxury emissions' compared with 'survival emissions': the emissions Pacific Island villagers produce in order to meet their basic needs are put on a par with high carbon Western consumerist lifestyles. And in many ways my conclusions initially concurred with Agrawal and Narain, as well as those of the above participant. As many social scientists might (Rudiak-Gould 2014: 366), I perceived this as a flawed political imaginary. In this narrative of sin, preparation and universal responsibility it seemed the wider injustices, the disproportionate nature of the causes and consequences of greenhouse gas emissions are at danger of being overlooked. This approach fails to hold industrial nations thoroughly to account as those who the big nations owe the most too have already shouldered the responsibility of building their own boats.

While this political imaginary may be incompatible with narratives of historic responsibility and colonial legacies, it still offers possibilities for rethinking notions of ethics and agency in response to climate change. Reflecting back on the first story of Noah, what originally appeared to lead simply to fatalism and denial, through Kempf's (2017) interpretation can be read as a counter-narrative, one that affirms the superiority of locally endorsed religious knowledges, in contrast to externally imposed scientific epistemologies. Similarly, this narrative of Islander responsibility can be read as a political imaginary that centres Islander agency rather than the responsibility and capacities of the industrialised nations. Hereniko shares this view, arguing

that the damage that Islanders have caused to their island environments and the carbon dioxide emissions that Oceania is responsible for need to be taken into account. In doing so, Islanders are able to take action, rather than action just being the prerogative of bigger continental states. He declares that 'the sooner we realise that we are also contributors to our own demise, the sooner we will empower ourselves to be part of the solution and not part of the problem' (2014: 234). This perspective also echoes Hau'ofa's world enlargement, as discussed in Chapter Four, as it centres Oceania as the site for the resolution of global problems. Rudiak-Gould echoes the agentive potential of having carbon sin, as he argues that 'innocence implies impotence' (2015: 58).

Indeed, as Peter Rudiak-Gould (2014) has comparably highlighted with respect to understandings of universal climate blame in the Marshall Islands, there is a great sense of empowerment to be found with the solutions to climate change being in local rather than distant foreign hands. As one NGO worker who was taking positive sustainable steps in her own life and with her community explained:

> It gives me strength like I'm not waiting, I'm not depending on...yeah and I can do, like individual people can do something else to reduce their own emissions and everybody, it's everybody's business to adjust their own lifestyle and it gives me strength to influence...that strength can help me and my family and other people in my community that we can do something and we do do something.
> (Abigail, NGO worker)

As Hulme (2009) has highlighted, climate change can be mobilised in support of a multitude of ideological projects. Consequently, this sense of collective responsibility for climate change becomes more comprehensible through a framework of wider moral decline, again a parallel with Rudiak-Gould's (2012) work in the Marshall Islands. In a process he refers to as 'promiscuous collaboration', explanations for sociocultural changes are brought under the umbrella of anthropogenic climate change in locally meaningful ways. Thus, in Vanuatu, scientific knowledge is used to supplement religious and *kastom* understandings of the world. As one pastor explained, the failure to enact these more sustainable lifestyle practices, for example through not littering, leads to a despoiling of creation and a failure of stewardship.

> We see that many things are coming and before Vanuatu was just natural. When a leaf falls it rots, but plastic cannot rot, metal cannot rot. With good life, easy life it has implications as well. There are impacts that will hit us hard if we are not careful. We have to

> properly dispose plastics, tins that we use. Care for the environment because when we do, the environment will help us. Without that, the environment can become our enemy. That's probably why our world is changing, and climate change is happening. We will ask why? God has created it perfectly, but we humans maybe are not careful. (Amos, SDA preacher)

Some embraced the *tufala save* approach, welcoming the extent to which science now supported biblical arguments for moral decline. This mirrors a process identified by Kempf with respect to the first reading of Noah, in which 'the Western climate narrative was co-opted on the basis of Biblical exegesis' (2017: 42). Similarly, here science is used to bolster pre-existing religious understanding, as opposed to being superior or in antagonism with it.

> Speaking from a Christian point of view, we know that this world is never going to be a good world because you know because it's going to get worse and worse, worse as we come, you know, because of many things that happen, because of the human activity, what we have done is against, against the nature, you know…Because of this, as we develop, we will get those consequences…And science has proven that. Even though we have not proven that as a Christian, but science has proven that, yes. This world is becoming hotter and hotter. So, we are glad that science has proven that. (Isaac, NGO worker)

This despoiling of creation was not limited just to human impacts upon the natural world but spoke to the wider moral infractions occurring within Ni-Vanuatu society. For instance, one Presbyterian pastor spoke of how the cyclone could be seen as an admonishment of changing sexual practices:

> What is God speaking to us through the hurricane? In Vanuatu there's a lot of corruption in high places and also the homosexual issue has never been mentioned but now people are recently that publicly, prostitution issues are becoming visible and sex before marriage is now common. These are the areas that people are saying maybe we've gone so far in these areas that maybe God is speaking to us like Sodom and Gomorrah. (Peter, Presbyterian Church)

A thread that connected these concerns was that of a systematic movement away from devout Christian practice and the maintenance of *kastom* traditions (highlighting the interrelation between Christian and *kastom* knowledges), and in its place the adoption of a Western selfish individualism.

> In Vanuatu's context before, people lived together and shared things in common, everything is under the chief's authority and everything is in common with people, but today different cultures have come, many different attitudes changing the mentality of man. It makes man more individualistic. So, man becomes more self-centred. He wants this and that. He wants a truck, a good house, he wants everything…So people are yes, compared to before, people nowadays only want things for themselves. (Amos, SDA preacher)

While this critique was levelled at Ni-Vanuatu society in general, accusations were particularly targeted at young people who were living in urban areas, rather than remaining on their islands of origin and contributing to the agricultural work of the family. As one Catholic priest explained:

> Now, because some of them have been to school too much. So now they want to study. They've been overseas, and they've seen that lifestyle, and now they want to take that lifestyle. It's good that they bring it, but that they adjust it with life here, then they can build back their relationships. Because sometimes when they go there and come back, the relationships that we have here, they don't have it anymore. Like now, this only using the phone, but there's no real contact. (Joel, Catholic preacher)

This concern about moral decline in Vanuatu, including the loss of respect for elders and move away from *kastom* practices is well documented (Mitchell 2011; Smith, 2016; Taylor 2016b). It also highlights further tensions surrounding which knowledges are valorised. At the centre of this repeated refrain, that chastised the population for letting go of their traditional knowledge and their resilience, failing to act like the prepared and resourceful Noah and succumbing instead to the dependency and lethargy of Western lifestyles, was a yearning for a future past. One NGO worker put it bluntly:

> It's the attitude of the people. I think it's just the people, they need to be trained, they need to be you know trained to go back to the way our ancestors were living before. Make their own gardens. We have more and more youth in town. What are they doing here? Nothing. They are supposed to be sent back there, work with the community, those people who are like our fathers and grandfathers, going to the garden. This youth is supposed to be following the grandfather, going to the garden and learn all the techniques, instead of you know...To me, if food is an issue, it's just because it is our responsibility. We are lazy, sorry to say that, but it's true. In fact, in the island I think people are sitting there crying 'we have no food because of Pam'. Pam just came in. Our attitude of making gardening and drinking kava and

> then during the day we sit, relax, we waste a lot of time, when we should be out there in the bush. Pam just came in and addressed the issue that yes, we are not working hard enough, like our ancestors. So, I think for me, I think, there needs to be a lot of awareness, for people to start going back to the garden to olden days.
> (Phoebe, NGO worker)

There is an undeniable romanticism to this vision of the better times before, one that is far from unique to Vanuatu. Indeed, it mirrors Tsing et al.'s (2017) call to shift away from the linear, teleological march of progress that has occasioned the Anthropocene, and instead 'return to multiple pasts, human and not-human' (2017: 2G). Further, what is significant is the manner in which climate change and extreme weather events have moved beyond a purely scientific domain of causation and consequence, and are made locally meaningful through being situated within this pre-existing moral framework. This moral dilemma between 'tradition' and 'modernity' played out throughout discussions of Cyclone Pam. As just one example, of the thankfully few deaths that happened during the cyclone, many were reportedly caused by flying copper sheeting, torn from the roofs. In many accounts I heard of those, responsibility wasn't centred on the relationship between excessive emissions in faraway countries and increases in extreme weather events, but the failure to keep *kastom*, traditional practices and beliefs. *Kastom* thatched houses aren't deadly if they collapse in high winds, whereas those who had perished in the cyclone had become literal victims of Westernisation and its dangerous and unstable brick houses.

Jacka (2009) highlights how the impacts of El Nino in the Porgera Valley in Papua New Guinea were accommodated within Christian narratives of punishment and apocalypse or were understood as revenge for the destruction of significant ritual sites through colonial road building. Both Jacka's work and examples from my own fieldwork problematise the anthropogenic dimension of climate change. Potentially Ni-Vanuatu, Western scientific and Porgeran accounts can all concur regarding the human responsibility for global warming, but not in terms of *which* human actions have caused it. This raises the question of whether it is a case of religious infraction, cultural corruption or excessive carbon emissions, and to what extent these different narratives of causation converge or diverge from each other.

It must be recognised that this discourse of local responsibility and preparedness reflects a wider sentiment: Vanuatu becomes the centre not just of the problem but also the solution. Naomi Klein (2014) in one of her recent volumes envisions climate change as an unrivalled opportunity

for positive social transformation. Within Vanuatu it became evident that climate change was an opportunity to articulate the importance of indigenous knowledge, the practical and moral superiority of Ni-Vanuatu *kastom* practices, Christian forms of connection and care for nature and community, and potentially advocate for a renaissance of pre-capitalist values and forms of livelihood, in the face of increasing urbanisation and Westernisation. This mirrors Rudiak-Gould's argument that emphasising local responsibility for climate change as a means of reinforcing existing cultural narratives 'carries postcolonial and counterhegemonic potentialities of its own' (2014: 367).

And following the logic of this political imaginary, all can become Noah, righteously following God's path in the spite of the sin and scepticism that surrounds them by building their arks. Thus, the second reading of Noah, like the first, becomes the vehicle for agency, although in this case, also tied to fervent climate change belief. Rather than being in opposition, *kastom*, Christian and scientific knowledges form a productive entanglement, that highlights the contributions spiritual understandings and religious institutions can make to climate change responses.

7C. Divine accompaniment, global justice and the rejection of retributive suffering

Both the first and second Noah stories produce political imaginaries that centre Islander agency, albeit in different forms, and based upon different configurations of knowledges. While the first emphasises the supremacy of religious knowledges over scientific knowledges, to the point of denying the later, the second story illustrates a convergence of religious, *kastom* and scientific knowledges, with the former two bolstered by the latter. Agency is demonstrated in the first story by the very act of validating biblical perspectives, and potentially through acts of prayer and an emphasis upon spiritual concerns. By contrast, the agency of the second narrative is focus upon the worldly, particularly the world as pertains to Oceania, both in terms of Oceania's responsibility to adapt to and mitigate climate change, and the attempt to restore a former moral order. Yet neither of these approaches capture the religious perspectives nor political imaginaries expressed by the Pacific Climate Warriors' actions. Their protest encompassed both the importance of prayer and trust in the divine but as tied to climate change belief, and emphasised worldly agency, yet laying moral responsibility at the feet of the industrialised nations, rather than Pacific Islanders themselves.

Consequently, in response to the third narrative, I highlight ideas of divine accompaniment (faith that God is always by one's side), and in doing so I problematise the retributive suffering

highlighted by the Noah story. Instead, I will emphasise injustice, and the moral responsibility of those nations historically and currently to blame for the greatest proportion of carbon emissions.

Firstly, the third telling of Noah refigures the meaning of the rainbow. No longer is it a promise built on false hope, as in the first telling, nor a warning of sin and coming disaster, as emphasised in the second. Instead Ezekiel, one of the third narrative's major proponents, argues that:

> Although the rainbow is there, it's just a sign showing that God is with us. God is present in our struggle. I think that's one message of hope. (Ezekiel, Church of Tuvalu)

This reading resonates with Upolu Vaai's (2015) work on Samoan embodied theology, where he contends that a common misreading of the Noah story is that there will be no more floods. Instead, God is promising through his rainbow to be with humankind in their suffering, and it has pained Him to unleash such suffering upon his creation through the flood. This telling's message of divine accompaniment, of God being beside Pacific Islanders in this time of trouble, did resonate with the sentiments of many pastors. For instance, one Catholic priest spoke of Luke 8, the story of Jesus and his disciplines crossing a tumultuous lake, in order to help his parishioners understand climate change. He explained:

> It's that at bad times or good times, He is still with you. He won't let you go. Because sometimes, we feel like He has abandoned us. But He is still there. Like in this boat, as it is going to sink, the disciples are leaving the boat, but He is still there. So whatever situation they are in, He is with them. (Joel, Catholic preacher)

Cyclone Pam was also addressed in a similar manner by many pastors. One parishioner relayed the metaphor his preacher had used—that of a tree that stands—to recognise the place of God alongside those in struggle. It was the tree that had lost all its branches, yet still stood that had felt the full force of the cyclone, compared to that which had been uprooted. Thus, in order to endure a cyclone one needed to be firmly rooted in faith: 'you just have to have faith in God that God will take you through a cyclone'. With the lack of action and fatalism this could potentially engender, this reaffirms the tension between trust in the divine and action, as explored in Section 7A.

And this sense that God was beside them during troubling times was something a number of participants shared in terms of their own experiences of the cyclone. The same parishioner

described how his faith had kept him and his family safe during the height of the winds.

> Right throughout the night I was walking around the room praying and everyone was sleeping. And I said, 'I need you guys to join me in faith' and we were going to go through the cyclone with God. And we did not receive a scratch on the house. The roof, nothing.
> (Elijah, former government official)

Indeed, one preacher attributed her survival to direct divine intervention.

> I said 'God, you look for a small place like this, and you will protect me, give me a way out'. When I said that, I saw that the word of God came to me then. He said, 'You're going to be out.' He opened the back door; the door was heavy because the wind was strong. The door came out, I fell down with it. It threw me down. When it threw me down like that I carried the door and I threw it away and I went under a small roof like that one and I said 'God, you don't take out this one. You leave this one like it is'. So, this place, like I said, 'Please don't come, please don't fly away', it stands to this day, right there.
> (Gabrielle, Anglican Church)

This sentiment of recognising God's protective presence during struggle was also shared by many of the Pacific Climate Warriors in the run-up to the flotilla. One Warrior spoke of her lack of fear due to the confidence that God was beside them, in their boats.

> I believe that God will go with us, yeah. So, there will not...nothing will happen to me. (Priscilla, 350 Solomon Islands)

Reflecting back on the social movement literature, the notion that God accompanies activists in their struggles resonates with Skrimshire's (2008) analysis of faith in environmental protest groups in the UK. He argues that direct action involves both practical risk, such as the possibility of arrest or injury, (similar to the Warriors' fears documented in Chapter Five) as well as epistemological risk, as participants are inevitably acting under a condition of uncertainty regarding the scale and timing of climate impacts. He contends that given this uncertainty direct action therefore requires faith: faith not in the security of religious salvation, but in the value of ongoing human life. Skrimshire's words are valuable here, as Pacific Islander activists face far greater climate uncertainty than their UK counterparts. However, I reject the secular binary Skrimshire presents: the Warriors demonstrate that one can act buoyed by faith both in the value of life and in salvation.

For many Warriors the sense that God was on their side also dovetailed with an understanding that through their action they were doing God's work, recognising their climate activism as a form of spiritual devotion. As highlighted in Chapter Four, the Warriors' shared spirituality also helped to unify the group, creating familial-like bonds and overcoming national differences. One of the Warriors spoke of how through his involvement in 350 Pacific he felt certain that God had a plan for him that he was now able to fulfil, and another echoed similar thoughts, interpreting climate change as a righteous challenge that brought the Warriors together.

> In order for God to answer your prayers you need to work towards for it, you need to work hard for it. So, I think this is God's way of bringing youth together, raising issues to fight and work towards the solutions...Because in my personal opinion, God works in miraculous ways and that he loves to work in the right time, the time you least expect it. (Maria, 350 Fiji)

For one Warrior the sense that God was on their side and they were doing His work was again framed within the story of Noah. During a speech at a post-flotilla speaking event in Melbourne, Reuben from Tokelau invoked the flood as an example of human failure to care for creation, leading God to set an example through His act of global destruction. The same mistakes committed by humanity before the flood were being repeated in this day and age, through deforestation, oil spills and the pollution of creation. Therefore, through the act of blockading coal ships and occupying financial institutions that enabled the expansion of the fossil fuel industry, the Warriors were acting like Noah. They were following his commandments and upholding their part of the covenant. This interpretation resembles that of the second reading through the identification with the figure of Noah, and the positive relation between trust in God and action. However, it radically differs in terms of how holy work is understood: rather than preparing themselves through ensuring their own safety in the face of calamity, the Warriors are directly confronting those who seek to secure themselves at the cost of defiling the planet.

Fusi, a Tuvaluan scholar, also concurs with some dimensions of this. He suggests that the people of Tuvalu must begin 'protesting against injustices in the governments of the world and the ways of the big and rich nations of the world' (2005: 31-32), but sees these acts of challenging injustice as a form of repentance and renewing of relations with God, and thereby living in a more godly way, again suggesting that climate activism can be a realisation of one's duty to God in the world.

Some even understood their involvement in activism as potentially an act of salvation. As one Warrior expressed it, climate activism was a means for them to prepare their own soul for judgement and to safeguard the souls of others:

> It's like you know we're trying to save the Earth you know. With our Christian belief, in my Christian belief, I also believe that it's also a time to prepare, like spiritually you have to prepare your soul. You don't know, anything could happen to you any time and so it also falls on individual people you know, to actually prepare themselves, not just talking about climate change and but it's also you have to prepare yourself…So if I help to campaign and stop climate change it's also like saving the souls of some people who are struggling and if they died from climate change or anything related to climate change. (Moses, 350 Vanuatu)

As well as demonstrating how trust in God (via faith in divine accompaniment) can combine with action, and highlighting how climate activism can be interpreted as a form of spiritual devotion, this third story also challenges the narrative of sin presented in the previous section (7B). Following Lusama (2007), I argue that the 'outside of the ark' reading of Noah moves away from a retributive model of suffering (suffering as a deserved punishment) and instead attributes sin to those causing climate change on a global scale.

Lusama (2007) recognises some of the incongruity of applying the Noah story to the current situation regarding climate change in the Pacific Islands. While Noah can be seen as a figure of righteousness in contrast to the sin surrounding him, and consequently does not lose his life, those currently most affected by climate change, such as those in Tuvalu, are the poor and the marginalised, not the wrongdoers. This is thus at odds with a retributive theory of suffering (2004: 23). The reverend rejects the minimal emissions of the atoll state as justification of their predicament, in clear contradiction to the second narrative, contending that:

> The people of Tuvalu have no part at all in the sin that brought about global warming and its negative impacts. They are so innocent that to believe that they have been punished for being innocent is impossible to comprehend. (Lusama 2007: 23)

Thus, Lusama also rejects the first narrative's divine punishment dimensions. Continuing with the ark metaphor, he directly advocates for the place of Tuvaluans on the ship, but noting their absence suggests that perhaps 'they were mutinied and thrown overboard the ark' (2007: 25), leaving them indeed outside of the ark as Ezekiel suggests. Indeed, in a more extended piece,

Lusama articulates a more systemic critique of capitalism, globalisation and consumption as the root causes of climate change, arguing that 'lying behind this problem of global warming and sea level rise are the major systems of injustice that serves only the good of a few powerful in the whole world' (2004: 6). This is mirrored by Davis, who despite emphasising the sin of Islanders is also adamant that 'Capitalist greed, originally and primarily of the West but now extending its tentacles over the whole globe, with its continued and ever more aggressive violations of mother Earth is what lies behind climate change' (2015: 39). Returning to the second narrative and the emphasis upon moral decline in Vanuatu, these different moral outlooks have a clear point of convergence: both highlight selfishness and greed of Western consumerist lifestyles. However, the previous perspective emphasised the impacts of these at their most marginal outposts (Pacific Islands), whereas this reading highlights the source.

While both Lusama and Ezekiel stress the position of Islanders as metaphorically overboard, Fusi argues that being outside of the ark actually gives them a stronger voice. He contends that:

> We will never be silenced even if we sink. Our sinking itself will amplify our voice in urging the nations and peoples of the world as a whole to do something about the global warming before it is too late. (Fusi 2005: 46)

To reiterate this position in terms of the Pacific Climate Warriors, Fusi's stance seems to be that 'in our drowning, we are fighting'. His analysis also echoes yet inverts Farbotko's (2005) concept of 'wishful sinking'. Fusi suggests that climate change is a holy message to the world that is articulated through the loss of Tuvalu, as it is 'God's will and purpose, making Tuvalu become landless so that the world may be saved from worse situations in the future caused by global warming' (2005: 42). Here, instead of a passive sacrifice that demonstrates the severity of climate change ('wishful sinking'), Tuvalu is presented as a martyr, acting for the sake of the globe, another instance of world enlargement, and portraying Tuvalu in an almost Christ-like position.

Indeed, for Lusama it is the figure of Jesus, not Noah, who sheds most light on the situation, as Jesus' death epitomises the undeserved suffering, such as those in Tuvalu now face, and demonstrates that God is by the side of those who are so afflicted, reaffirming the emphasis upon divine accompaniment. Moreover, he invokes the figure of Christ as a rallying cry for Islander-led justice, arguing that 'Tuvalu, though small in size and population, has the obligation to stand for justice, this is the lesson we learned from the Cross' (2007: 23). He

suggests that in blaming some humans, rather than God, for climate change, it enables us to fight with rather than against God, in opposition to systems of oppression and inequality. Echoing the words of the Warriors in Chapter Four, in their world enlarging claims that their actions are not for the islands alone, but on behalf of a global population, Lusama also notes that 'Tuvalu is not alone in this, even though Tuvalu is probably the most vulnerable country to the devastating impacts of global warming and sea level rise, salvation from such scenario is a collective salvation, and should be sought as such' (2007: 23).

Therefore, in this rejection of local blame and pinpointing of the sin of industrialised nations, this third reading of Noah provides a religious basis for political action that directly confronts those most responsible for carbon emissions, as is manifested in the case of the Pacific Climate Warriors. It returns to the question of trust in the divine posed by the first narrative, and incorporates that into a call to action, emphasising divine accompaniment: one can have faith in God's presence despite the unjust suffering caused by climate change.

8. Conclusion

In this chapter, I have demonstrated not only the social and cultural importance of Christianity in the Pacific Islands, but also, through examples from Vanuatu and across the Pacific Island region, the potential for faith-based institutions to engage in climate change responses. In doing so, I have made three main contributions. Firstly, I have looked beyond institutional capacity and also considered different instances of religiously informed thought and action, thereby addressing the shortage Haluza-DeLay (2014) has identified of social scientific accounts that address how religion shapes what people are saying and doing about climate change. Secondly, I have attempted to challenge scholarly representations of religion as a barrier to climate change communication, and instead highlight the potential of religious belief as a resource. Thirdly, in identifying these instances of thought and action, I have sought to elucidate the heterogeneity of religious responses. I have highlighted some of the potential for multiple faith-based narratives regarding climate change, recognising how different understandings of climate change emerge from different ethical positions (Hulme 2009: xxvi). Through this focus on narrative – primarily the biblical story of Noah and the flood – I have also contributed to my wider thesis goal of exploring counter-narratives of the Anthropocene, which disrupt that inevitable inundation discourse.

I focused on the story of Noah because of its presence in Pacific discourses of climate change, its rich polysemous nature, and because of the controversy surrounding it and faith-based

climate denial. Following Rubow and Kempf, I recognise that those presenting religion as a barrier to climate responses often correspondingly demand a purification of scientific and religious knowledges, to the exclusion of the latter. I have utilised the Noah story to an alternate end: to highlight the interrelationship between multiple knowledges of climate change (religious, scientific and *kastom*) and the potential for both convergence and tension between these. Moreover, I have argued that these different combinations of knowledges and ethical positions generate different narratives – different readings of the Noah story – that present different possibilities for action, highlighting some political imaginaries and foreclosing others.

The three tellings of Noah showcase different tensions and entanglements between scientific, religious and *kastom* knowledges. In the case of the first story, there is evidence of an antagonism between knowledges, as opposed to a *tufala save* balancing of multiple ways of knowing. Tied to this pitting of the scientific against the religious, there is a consequential belittlement or distancing of religious modes of thought (and consequently a failure to recognise their value) by scholars who are disturbed by the climate scepticism present in the narratives. There is also an emphasis by advocates of this narrative on faith in divine protection in a manner that inhibits action, and excludes the scientific. Meanwhile both the second and third stories demonstrate productive convergences between scientific and religious knowledges, yet convergences that produce very different and even contrary political imaginaries.

All three narratives engaged to different extents with matters of sin: a theological reframing of the questions of blame and responsibility for climate change that have been considered in Chapters Four and Five. Given our postlapsarian state, in the first story's denial of an oncoming flood there is not necessarily a confirmation of Islander innocence. Yet in the more apocalyptic manifestations of this first narrative, there is a greater emphasis upon the coming destruction of the material world and on spiritual welfare, with our primary duties being to God, as opposed to the two other narratives' focus upon worldly endeavours. While questions of sin and moral decline were central to that second narrative through the concern with Islander climate mitigation, the encroachment of Western consumerism and loss of *kastom* practice, in the third narrative Islanders were by contrast labelled innocents, in comparison with the sin of the polluting nations. The third story transcends the retributive theory of suffering suggested by the second story, shifting its focus from Noah and the individual, to Christ and collective political action.

None of the narratives explored were inimical to a focus upon Islander agency, yet they

presented relationships between trust in the divine and action in highly contrasting ways. With the first narrative – the rainbow covenant as denial – while the potential for fatalism and apathy was highlighted, the very act of faith was itself an exercise in agency through a valorisation of religious knowledge and rejection of the externally imposed scientific understanding of the ecological futures of the Pacific Islands. Meanwhile both the second and third narratives combined spiritual faith with a belief in scientific prediction, yet reached different conclusions regarding appropriate courses of action. The third narrative emphasised political action orientated towards the major polluting nations; in the preparation narrative, the focus was more local and self-directed.

While Chapter Four demonstrated how climate change created an opportunity for the performance of Oceanic regionalism and a contestation of power relations between the Pacific Islands and larger neighbouring states, this examination of religious perspectives on climate change presents a further example of 'what climate change can do for us' (Hulme: 2009: 326). Within Vanuatu it became evident that climate change was an opportunity to articulate the importance of indigenous knowledge, the practical and moral superiority of Ni-Vanuatu *kastom* practices, Christian forms of connection and care for nature and community, and potentially advocate for a renaissance of pre-capitalist values and forms of livelihood, in the face of increasing urbanisation and Westernisation.

None of these narratives are the *right* one: none should be treated as an exclusive vehicle for future climate communication. But the diversity of courses of action they demonstrate suggests the richness and heterogeneity of religious responses to climate change and the potential for fruitful connections between religious and scientific knowledges. Returning to the 'horror stories' of the Anthropocene Buck warns us of, the limitations of purely scientific responses to climate change noted by Hulme, and the lifelessness of the rationalist unenchanted world that Bennett rejects, these stories offer us an alternative. They demonstrate the potential for more-than-scientific yet not anti-scientific responses to climate change, that are locally meaningful, morally compelling, and in their own manner challenge the disempowering narratives of climate doom and victimhood that surround the Pacific Islands. The Warriors' words carry through all these stories: while the first denies the very act of drowning, the latter two show us what a spiritual battle against climate change might look like.

7. Conclusion

Yumi no draon, yumi faet! The crowd's chant, a Bislama translation of the 350 Pacific slogan, intensifies in the half light of the beach on Nguna, a small island off the coast of Efate. The slogan has become literalised, corporealised, as it is viscerally manifested in the figures of two men boxing in a temporarily constructed ring, surrounded by an exuberant audience of all ages. One of the boxers, a champion across Vanuatu, encourages onlookers to step forward and challenge him: in doing so, he instructs them not to fight him, but to fight climate change. He fights generously, letting many men score a victory against their meteorological foe.

I conclude with this image, as in it many strands of this thesis coalesce. The contest was the festive conclusion to a week of workshops run for and by Ni-Vanuatu volunteers from across the country. It reflects the research's focus on Islander agency in the face of climate change, as it was an opportunity for them to share knowledge about conservation and climate change adaptation. With a number of pastors participating, discussions of faith and the value of scripture permeated throughout the workshops. The fight also reiterates the sensual encounters and affectual charge of the Warriors' actions, centring the role of combat and antagonism, while foregrounding joy - the affect that is paramount to Bennett's notion of enchantment - through the exhilaration of the crowd.

The encounter in the ring also suggests the inability of authors to tame and control narratives, or to foresee the shapes they may take. In the vision of the assertive yet non-aggressive Warrior laid out by 350 Pacific, and manifested in the peaceful direct actions of the Newcastle flotilla, this flurry of playful punches is not anticipated. In this moment, we are literally asked to witness the human face of climate change, not in terms of the impacts endured or opposition marshalled against it, but in the form of one man standing in as climate change, in order that others can pummel out their fury. And here the second narrative of Noah, the universal acceptance of responsibility for global warming, as well as the ethical questions posed by the Anthropocene reach their logical, embodied conclusion: as humans we must bear the brunt of the impacts we have had upon the Earth.

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I begin by summarising the key insights of the preceding chapters, focusing first on the substantive empirical contributions and then turning to the main theoretical developments my research provides. I then offer a number of critical reflections upon this research, indicate

potential areas for future research, and end by considering the subsequent actions of the Pacific Climate Warriors and shifts in the terrain of Pacific climate change advocacy since my fieldwork.

1. Summary of chapters

In Chapter Two, I introduced some of the main debates surrounding the emergent epoch commonly but not exclusively known as the Anthropocene, highlighting the work of Tsing et al., Haraway and Buck and their concerns regarding existing narratives of the Anthropocene. Particular shortcomings included an emphasis on the apocalyptic and discourses that were exclusively secular, rationalist and scientific. Following Rudiak-Gould in interpreting climate change as a metonym for the Anthropocene, I noted parallels between these discussions and those regarding the framings of climate change. Having established the global significance of climate change in Oceania, I identified the inevitable inundation discourse found across journalistic and academic accounts of the Pacific Islands as a dominant yet inadequate narrative framing of climate change. I outlined its limitations such as the denial of Pacific Islander agency, the disincentivising of climate change mitigation, the sensationalism of sea level rise and marginalisation of less dramatic climate change impacts, and the congruence between this narrative and depoliticised environmental discourses. Consequently, as a further contribution to the critical literature challenging the inevitable inundation discourse, and a response to the call for new stories of the Anthropocene, I have endeavoured throughout this thesis to illuminate alternative narratives of climate change and the Pacific Islands.

My methodological process was recounted in Chapter Three, as I explained my rationale for a qualitative case study approach and adoption of participant observation and interviews as my main research methods. I highlighted the deviations from my original research design, made in order to engage with a broader range of participants and to enable a deeper contextual understanding of practices and perspectives in one country, rather than multiple national settings.

During the process of reflecting upon my research practice, I have made three methodological contributions. Firstly, I have highlighted the insufficiency of the presumed default of anonymity and requirement for this demanded by UK data protection regulations. As I have shown, anonymisation can be at odds with both indigenous research methods in terms of an insistence on participant ownership of stories and recognition, and with the faith-based perspectives of participants, who are seeking to share their truth with the world. Consequently, I follow Kaiser

(2009) in advocating an ongoing dialogue about confidentiality and the precise uses and purposes of participants' data, recognising that participants' views on this may shift over the course of the research process. I have also built upon Chilsa's notion of methodologically appreciating 'sagacity', as opposed to imposing Western epistemologies. Through focusing upon the scriptural knowledge of priests and the application of their wisdom to climate change as an issue, I have managed to explore questions that are resonant and meaningful to my participants and which re-configure power relations between researcher and participants, while also addressing a current gap in the literature. Thirdly, I have demonstrated that, despite best intentions, reciprocity or 'being useful' (Taylor 2014) may most meaningfully take the form of practical contributions towards groups and initiatives, as opposed to academic insights.

In Chapter Four, I presented an alternative narrative of Pacific Islander strength in the face of climate change, in contrast to the inevitable inundation discourse's representations of weakness or victimhood. I found resonances between Hau'ofa's analysis and the Pacific Climate Warriors' practices, and thereby translated his Sea of Islands vision onto an empirical case study. Through the production of fictive kinships and the performance of fluid Pan-Pacific identities, his vision of Oceanic regionalism was being enacted. I also interpreted the Warriors' actions as examples of world enlargement. I identified the manner in which the Warriors, in their movement from islands affected by climate change to the coal-exporting Australian port that could be partially held responsible for these impacts, brought Pacific concerns home to Australia, concerns that could no longer be contained within the islands but engulfed their larger neighbour. Climate change activism also presented an opportunity for the Warriors to contest the existing hierarchies between Australia and the Pacific, resisting the representation of the Islands as peripheral and instead placing Oceania at the centre, through their claims to action on behalf of the world and their desire to re-educate Australia. I deem this an example of world expansion as it re-sized Oceania in terms of its significance and potency.

Using the Sea of Islands as a lens to understand the Warriors became increasingly apt when their shared shortcomings became apparent, namely the inequitable representation of the different island groups and overall Polynesian bias. There were other inequities at play in this manifestation of Oceanic regionalism, namely in terms of gendered power dynamics. However, I contend that this model of regionalism centres on a recognition of difference, particularly with regard to the differential exposure to climate impacts, a concept I term relative altitudinal privilege. I argue that Hau'ofa's work helps us to understand the actions the Warriors took and the manner in which they were contesting the marginalisation of the Pacific. Not only that, but

the threat climate change poses to the Pacific, the manner in which the Pacific Islands have been presented as an iconic victim of it, and the opportunity this presented for the Warriors to challenge not just the inevitable inundation discourse but the more general belittlement of Oceania, helps us to understand Hau'ofa and what his vision can look like in practice and what it can achieve.

In Chapter Five, the alternative narrative that I conveyed was that of the Pacific Climate Warriors as determined political actors, again as opposed to the passive victims of the inevitable inundation discourse. I explored the process of becoming Warriors: the production of activist subjectivities through disciplinary processes and transformative affectual encounters. In particular I highlighted a series of key emotional events: experiences of sorrow, particularly when encountering the mined landscapes of Maules Creek; fear and uncertainty, in anticipation of the risks the Warriors would endure through taking direct action, such as the possibility of injury, arrest or deportation; and anger, when faced by the punitive actions of the Australia police force, such as the capsizing of kayaks, detaining of Warriors, and damaging of the Vanuatu canoe. Throughout this chapter I noted the ambivalent and mutable role of antagonism in the Warriors' campaign. Firstly, in terms of the shift in focus of antagonism from the fossil fuel companies to also include the Australian government, and secondly, in the attempts to manage antagonism by the 350 Pacific organisers, through their setting of limits on permissible actions by the Warriors, particularly those aged under twenty-five. Consequently, I highlighted a tension in organisational practice between Western activist emphases on individual autonomy and 350 Pacific's attempts to curtail individual actions through an emphasis upon the risk of familial shame. Thus, another theme that emerged through these stories was that of a decidedly Pacific mode of activism, one that was supported by existing kin relations and formed new ones; one that emphasised an obligation to the group at points that exceeded the autonomy of the individual; and one that treasured compassionate connections to the land and placed Christian faith at the centre of their practice.

In Chapter Six, I built upon this concern with faith and explored narratives of climate change that directly challenged the secularity of the rationalist horror stories of the Anthropocene. I identified the actions taken in the Pacific region and Vanuatu by ecumenical organisations and churches to promote understanding of climate change and encourage practical adaptations. I highlighted a need to look beyond the role of the church simply in terms of institutional capacity, and instead consider the place of scripture in the shaping of climate change narratives, given the moral and ethical questions about how we wish to live that climate change poses.

Focusing upon one small element of scripture – the story of Noah – I illuminated three manifestations of this tale in the Pacific Island region. The first, already commonly noted in the literature, utilises the promise of the rainbow covenant as a basis for climate change denial, whilst the second centres Noah as an aspirational figure, a parable of preparation, and therefore resonated with the practical actions Ni-Vanuatu pastors and parishioners had taken in response to Cyclone Pam. Meanwhile the third critiques the actions of Noah as selfish and identifies Pacific Islanders with those who have been left to suffer outside of the ark. These three different articulations of the same story opened up highly contrasting avenues for action, be it purely trusting in the divine, contributing to climate change mitigation projects as a means of absolving carbon sin in spite of the Pacific Islands' meagre contributions to global greenhouse gas emissions, or rallying together to encourage greater action on the part of the industrialised nations. This therefore highlighted the heterogeneity of religious responses, as well as demonstrating the contrasting ways in which agency could be exercised in response to climate change, with greater or lesser degrees of alignment with global narratives of climate justice that generally portray Pacific Islanders as undeservingly punished by climate change.

2. Theoretical contributions

Having established the empirical contributions of this thesis, I now turn to my five main theoretical contributions. Firstly, I have furthered critical discussions of the inevitable inundation discourse, building on the work of authors such as Bettini, Farbotko and Barnett and Campbell, by highlighting alternative co-existing narratives of climate change and the Pacific Islands that could be offered in its place. Bettini describes two waves of critical discourse concerning climate change and migration, that, based on empirical and political/ analytical grounds respectively, critique the inevitable inundation discourse. The approach that I have taken, which illuminates alternative discourses rather than simply further refining refutations of the dominant discourse, constitutes a third wave of critique. This third wave addresses the concerns with disempowerment and the absence of Islander voices raised by the second wave by centring alternative Pacific Islander perspectives on climate change, rather than simply focusing on deconstructing dominant narrative framings. Crucially it also reduces the emphasis on migration and Pacific Islanders as potential climate refugees, and instead more holistically illuminates the multitude of ways in which Pacific Islanders are actively responding to climate change, such as through practically adapting to extreme weather events, mitigating their own carbon emissions, and acting as global advocates.

Secondly, I have contributed to Pacific Studies through my analysis and application of Hau'ofa's Sea of Islands theory. I have not only sought to empirically investigate and validate Hau'ofa's work through substantively applying it to a case study, but have critically reworked his previously under-utilised concept of world enlargement, to fit not just movements of diaspora but the globalised intentions and actions of Pacific Islander climate activist networks, exploring further ways in which other nations could be conceptually subsumed within Oceania. In doing so, I have expanded upon the manner in which actors may seek to contest the belittlement of the Pacific, inverting both power dynamics between Pacific Islands and their continental neighbours and challenging concepts of relative scale and size. I have also addressed the concerns raised about the inclusivity of his vision of Oceania and the extent to which a vision occludes divisions and disparities between different Pacific nations. In my identification of the concept of relative altitudinal privilege I have demonstrated an empirical resolution of such a concern, in the expressions of regional unity that are predicated upon a recognition of difference. Such an approach could have further global application in understandings of regional identity and cooperation.

Thirdly, I have placed different bodies of literature in novel arrangements, seeking to temper post-politics' emphasis upon antagonism with Bennett's concerns with affect, transformation and joy, and to trace links between Bennett's theory and the experiences and practices documented by the geographies of social movements literature. I have attempted to reground post-political discussions of environmental discourse in sites other than the urban, and return attention to climate change as an issue, focusing less on post-politics' critique of depoliticisation but rather on its insistence upon the need for novel political entanglements with climate change, a shift from policy to politics. Consequently, this research should be of interest to researchers working in the field of climate change and migration, as I have emphasised understanding those threatened by climate-induced migration as political subjects, a framing, according to Ransan-Cooper et al., that is sorely underexplored. And while my account of emergent, specifically Pacific modes of activism is predominately empirical, it contributes to a wider debate crosscutting activist scholarship and practice regarding the decolonisation of environmental justice movements, and the need to decentre Western perspectives and foreground indigenous understandings and practices (Smith 1999; Chilisa 2011; Virasami and Wanjiku Kelbert 2015).

Fourthly, I have contributed to the literature concerning religious responses to climate change, raising questions that have a bearing on social science scholarship beyond a regional or theological focus on the Pacific and Christianity. I have highlighted the inadequacy of existing

accounts of religious understandings of climate change, following Kempf (2017) in contending that the academic 'religion as a barrier' narrative is often accompanied by attempts to purify religion and science. Rather than ceding to this purification or the marginalisation of religion, I have made two theoretical contributions. Firstly, I have emphasised a model of *tufala save* which seeks to balance different, at points contrary, epistemologies of climate change. And a *tufala save* model could be adopted far beyond Vanuatu: it speaks to a need, highlighted by the horror stories of the Anthropocene (Buck 2015) and Hulme's (2009) renunciation of a purely scientific approach to climate change, to keep multiple perspectives and framings of climate change in view at once. No one framing will resolve all the questions of ethics, magnitude, costs, responsibility and meaning that surround climate change. New narratives of climate change must be sought and placed in dialogue with other framings in order to expand our understandings of it and our capacities for action. Secondly, and relatedly, I have absolved the Noah Story of its purely climate denial based associations in the Pacific, and contributed to literature concerning the heterogeneity of religious responses (Hulme 2017), through highlighting the multiplicity of tellings of particular biblical stories, and the concomitant diversity of avenues of political action emerging from one tale. This multiplicity of articulations also reflects again the *tufala save* emphasis upon placing manifold different narratives in relation with each other.

Finally, I have contributed to the emergent literature regarding narrative framings of the Anthropocene through demonstrating what Anthropocenic story-telling might look like, through an emphasis upon plurality and care. Firstly, with regards to plurality, I follow Stenmark (2015) in her argument that story-telling helps to ameliorate an excessive dependence upon myths of the Absolute. She defines such myths in terms of an indisputable and infallible certainty beyond the human. Such myths can motivate us in times of despair yet can also inhibit action if they create an expectation of a certainty that can never be met. She argues the latter to be the case with climate change as a 'wicked problem' (Hulme 2009), as no one neat, certain solution can be reached. Looking back on the horror stories of the Anthropocene described by Buck – disenchanted tales of 'calculability or control' (2015: 376) – and the attempts by social scientists to negate religiously-based narratives of climate denial with increased quantities of scientific facts and 'awareness', both can be understood as suffocating entanglements in myths of the Absolute. To counter such myths Stenmark recommends embracing the ambiguity, complexity and partiality of story-telling, a suggestion echoed by Hulme (2017). I contend that such an approach both responds to Haraway and Tsing et al.'s calls for new stories of the

Anthropocene, and encapsulates the method of story-telling I have demonstrated in this research. Stenmark observes that one should 'explore the plurality and multiplicity *within* each story' (932), as I have done through eliciting the diverse and contrary readings of the Noah story. She also contends that stories let us 'hold these different perspectives in tension without ever resolving them' (932), a practice embodied by *tufala save* and the balancing of different epistemologies of climate change. My efforts to represent such a plurality of narratives of climate change suggests a means of story-telling the ambiguities and uncertainties of the Anthropocene.

Following Haraway and Tsing et al., as a further contribution to Anthropocene story-telling, this research attempts to embody an ethics of care and compassion. It is embedded within my methodological approach through my concern with reciprocity, and also my fears about the harm I could cause participants through an insufficiently sympathetic dissection of their perspectives and actions. It also unites my three empirical chapters. It is the Warriors' care for each other, expressed through their forging of sibling-like attachment, that lays the foundation for their regional cooperation. It is their care for land that is experiencing or facing destruction (be it their homelands or the mountains of overburden in northern New South Wales) and their care for the wellbeing of distant others (manifested in the Warriors' world enlarging actions taken on behalf of everyone) that motivates them to take action. And it is the act of caretaking for the world entrusted to us by God, acts of Christian stewardship, that unite the different denominations in their responses to climate change. Perhaps my theoretical unease with dimensions of post-political analysis emerges from the emphasis upon confrontation and antagonism, at the expense of solidarity and compassion. And it is this care for others, crossing national, religious and species divides, that is integral to both storying and living in the Anthropocene.

3. Critical Reflections

Having established my main academic contributions, I now reflect upon questions that have permeated throughout my thesis, empirically, theoretically and methodologically. These coalesce around one main theme: questions of representation and representativeness. I acknowledge the current enthusiasm for moving beyond representation in social theory, yet argue for the importance of attending to questions of representation, as it remains a politically significant practice, even while acknowledging its limits as a concept.

These questions initially emerge in the literature review, as I critique the triad of over-

representation, misrepresentation, and under-representation. The first can be found in the excessive focus upon Pacific Islands as subject to existentially threatening sea level rise, whilst marginalising other more immediate climate change concerns. The second, misrepresentation, is seen in the portrayal of Pacific Islanders as passive, helpless victims and the third is apparent through the failure of the inevitable inundation discourse to convey the perspectives of Pacific Islanders, particularly those taking action in response to climate change. Having identified these issues with the extant literature, it is important to ask whether I successfully navigate them in my own research.

Questions of representation persisted through my methodology, especially with respect to the suitability and demographic breadth of my interviewees, and thereby bring up the issue of research validity. While I have been rigorous in my recruitment of interviewees, transcription and analysis of data, potentially this research contributes to an over-representation of the Warriors themselves. There is still generally a shortage of Pacific Islander voices in the climate debates. However, as a consequence of the media attention garnered by the Newcastle blockade, the ten Warrior media spokespeople have been repeatedly asked to speak for all Pacific Islanders in dozens of media accounts, and are also becoming the focus of increased academic attention. Thinking back to the Anthropocene literature, despite Buck's cautions against the dangers of hero stories, in the centring of these figures who I have followed through an emotional gamut of anger, sadness and joy, I fear I have fallen afoul of that same narrative form. Yet unlike the heroes Buck cautions against, these Warriors are not isolated, spear-carrying individuals. Instead the complex patterns of kinship and interconnection they have formed, the multiple knowledges of climate change they articulate, and the affectual embodied experiences that have transformed them all speak more to Le Guin's holistic carrier bag model of story-telling, in its emphasis on bringing together diverse components and their rich connections.

The issue of potential misrepresentation brings to light the question of my ability as a white, Western researcher to accurately and meaningfully represent the Warriors' and Ni-Vanuatu participants' perspectives. I recognise that there is an inescapable partiality to all academic accounts, and that I can never fully extract myself from the text that I produce (Haraway 1988). In my selection of arguments, vignettes and interview extracts inevitably some details that may be meaningful to my participants will be excluded or occluded. However, the debates I raised regarding anonymity in Chapter Three make this issue somewhat thornier. Torn between indigenous and faith-based demands for recognition on the one hand, professional and legal

strictures regarding anonymity on the other, somewhat paradoxically I have produced a thesis about telling and re-empowering stories of climate change, in which the names of the authors of these stories have been censored. While this has given me more freedom as a researcher to reflect critically upon these narratives, it also distances them from their origins. In spite of this remove, I hope that as much as possible this thesis has continued to document how Pacific Islanders are representing their own understandings of and responses to climate change, as opposed to simply my representations of those Islanders.

Finally, there is a question of who my research participants represent, and correspondingly, how representative they are of wider populations. This can first be considered with respect to the demographics of the Pacific Climate Warriors. As established in Chapter Four, the group does not represent all Pacific Island nations, but nor could it ever represent all Pacific Islanders meaningfully, if we move from a national to an island-level of affiliation. And with regards to those islands and nations that have a formal delegate, can the Warriors themselves be said to be representative of the communities they speak of and on behalf of? As I observed during the campaign, and as one of the organisers also admitted, many of the Warriors held positions in government, were in higher education, or were closely related to elite political figures. Perhaps they were not the 'ordinary Pacific islanders' Hau'ofa hoped for. The extent to which they were predominately based in urban rather than rural settings, and largely employed in salaried positions, as opposed to relying primarily on subsistence agriculture may also have put them at a distance to many of the climate change impacts of which they spoke, compared to the experience of many of their compatriots. Yet the urban environment of Port Vila is a far cry from say that of London: many of those who were formally employed still took enormous pride in working the land, growing their own food, and championing self-sufficiency.

Yet this question of the distance between the Warriors and the climate change impacts of which they spoke is also present in the discourses of relative altitudinal privilege. Many of the Warriors disavowed their own future suffering compared to those from lower lying nations. This is in contrast to the very format of the protest and overriding message of the campaign, which positioned them as being on the climate change front lines. Thus, how the Warriors represented themselves was at points at odds with how they were represented in Western-oriented media narratives. A parallel can be drawn between this and the invoking of the narrative of universal responsibility for climate change in Vanuatu, again a rejection of the mainstream climate justice narratives.

However, in the Warriors' refusal to represent themselves in such a way, through instead recognising their own relative altitudinal privilege, they prevent homogenisation of the Pacific and resist victim status. Again, this resonates with the expressions of agency associated with the second Noah story: the emphasis upon Islander mitigation efforts and refusals to point the finger of climate change responsibility at the larger nations. This suggests the problem lies not in the deviations of the Warriors from representations of themselves as the apotheosis of climate change suffering, but in the media and NGO narratives that seek to represent indigenous communities in such a way.

What does this mean for the alternatives to the drowning islands discourse, and the stories we are telling for earthly survival? I reconcile myself with the question of their representativeness with the reasoning that they, as well as the priests, climate activists and NGO workers I worked with in Vanuatu, are chiefly placed to be story-tellers. In their positions of relative privilege they have the potential to shape narratives and weave stories that will reach across the globe, so these are some of the voices that we need to be listening to if we are looking for new tales for the Anthropocene.

4. Areas for further research

I suggest two further areas of research that could complement and develop the ideas presented in this thesis. Firstly, the concern with care, as illustrated in Section 2, could be expanded upon. Haraway (2016a) and Tsing et al. (2017) in their demand for new stories of the Anthropocene promote a multispecies ethics through an emphasis on multispecies storytelling. One potentially fruitful new avenue of research into climate change and the Pacific Islands is that of the more-than-human, documenting not just connections to land (which has substantial coverage in the literature) or to ecosystem services, but reflecting upon the new relations of care or competition between humans and other creatures that are generated by changing climatic conditions. It opens the questions of the extent to which the vision of cross-species compassion invoked by Rigby's (2008) reading of the ark manifests in the waters or sands of Vanuatu. And the boxers and spectators of the chapter's opening vignette might provide an empirical starting point for this, as many of them are volunteer environmental stewards who have spent years tagging rather than killing turtles, or tending to coral through the building of marine nurseries or the removal of crown of thorn starfish, enacting an ethics of care and conscientious action, albeit from a human-centred perspective.

Secondly, the examination of the heterogeneity of religious responses highlighted by Hulme

(2017) is also far from complete. My work has showcased the diversity of meanings and political avenues that derive from the multiple readings of one biblical story, in one geographical region, by members of a handful of Christian denominations. Largely absent from my account are the smaller yet increasingly popular evangelical churches, distinguished by their intolerance of *kastom* and their pre-millenialist approach, an outlook which can interpret climate change as a necessary precursor to the time of divine rule, as opposed to an environmental ill to be remedied (Hulme 2009: 154-155), and which is characterised by a temporal concern with prophetic time as opposed to the near future (Guyer 2007). Such a theological disposition is likely to produce different epistemological tensions, convergences and courses of action than those documented here, as are the perspectives of other faiths. In addition to considering religious responses to climate change, there is also a need to bring religious perspectives to bear on the concept of the Anthropocene itself: what does it mean for our purpose on this planet if we have encroached upon the domain of the gods (Donner 2007), to the extent that acts of God now bear human origins?

5. Epilogue: still fighting

While I myself am pursuing new courses of research, the Warriors too have taken steps in new directions since the time of my fieldwork, 2014-2015. Cyclone Pam has been succeeded by the destruction of Cyclone Winston in Fiji and Cyclone Gita in Tonga, new record breakers. In 2016 another flotilla was held in Newcastle Harbour, organised by 350 Australia, yet led by members of the Pacific diaspora in Sydney, front-runners of world enlargement.

More distant continents have been enveloped within Oceania's concerns by the Warriors' actions. A trio of the original Newcastle contingent visited Canada to meet with First Nations communities. Upon witnessing the Albertan tar sands, the Warriors again spoke of the heinous disrespect paid to the land and, as with Maules Creek, recognised that the area being desecrated dwarfed many Pacific Islands. Together with members of the Tsleil Waututh Nation, they prayed upon the waters, asking Prime Minister Trudeau to reverse his decision on the Kinder Morgan pipeline. Warriors have held kava ceremonies in Bonn at the COP23, led the People's Climate March in London, and sailed in a flotilla down the Seine in advance of the Paris Agreement. Tears have been shed in the Rhineland by those who bore witness to similar desecration at Maules Creek.

The composition of 350 Pacific has also significantly shifted since the 2014 blockade: the one white member has moved to a different area of focus within 350.org, enabling 350 Pacific to

be truly Islander-led, and his successor unexpectedly passed away in summer 2017, mourned by the hundreds who had been touched by her words, actions and spirit. The tactics employed by 350 Pacific also appear to have morphed since the start of the Stand Up for the Pacific campaign. While, as already indicated, they continue to be aquatic in nature, they appear considerably less confrontational than the original flotilla. The missive to the Pope with which I opened the thesis epitomises this: a year on from the Newcastle blockade, instead of direct action, instead of issuing a demand for the Vatican to divest from fossil fuels (the campaign within which the visit was originally situated) the Warriors laud the pontiff's achievements and petition in a classical sense. This suggests that the place of faith is still central but that the tactics, membership and processes of Pacific Islander climate advocacy are still evolving. While I cannot see where their campaign will go next, I hope that they and their nations will continue to fight, not drown.

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Appendices

Appendix 1 – Sample consent form

Informed Consent Form

Please complete this form after you have read the Information Sheet and/or listened to an explanation about the research.

Title of Project: **Responding to climate change in the Pacific**

This study has been approved by the UCL Research Ethics Committee (Project ID Number): **5819/001**

Thank you for your interest in taking part in this research. Before you agree to take part, the person organising the research must explain the project to you.

If you have any questions arising from the Information Sheet or explanation already given to you, please ask the researcher before you to decide whether to join in. You will be given a copy of this Consent Form to keep and refer to at any time.

Participant's Statement

I

- have read the notes written above and the Information Sheet (or have heard the researcher's explanation), and understand what the study involves.

- understand that if I decide at any time that I no longer wish to take part in this project, I can notify the researcher involved and withdraw immediately.

- consent to the processing of my personal information for the purposes of this research study.

- agree that my non-personal research data may be used by others for future research. I am assured that the confidentiality of my personal data will be upheld through the removal of identifiers.

- understand that such information will be treated as strictly confidential and handled in accordance with the provisions of the UK Data Protection Act 1998.

- agree that the research project named above has been explained to me to my satisfaction and I agree to take part in this study.

Signed: Date:

Appendix 2 – Participant information sheet

Information Sheet for Participants

Title of Project: **Responding to climate change in the Pacific**

This study has been approved by the UCL Research Ethics Committee (Project ID Number): **5819/001**

Researcher	Hannah Fair
Work Address	University College London, Gower Street, London, WC1E 6BT
Contact Details	hannah.fair@ucl.ac.uk

I would like to invite you to participate in this research project.

Why am I doing this research?

I am passionate about tackling climate change and have been involved in climate change activism in the United Kingdom since 2008. I believe that the voices of those who may be most affected by climate change (such as Pacific Islanders) are the ones that need to be most urgently listened to and that those are the people who should be leading the debate. The aim of this study is to learn more about Pacific climate change campaigning, in particular what motivates activists and what futures they want to see in the Pacific.

Who am I looking to interview?

I am looking to interview people involved in climate advocacy in the Pacific, particularly the Pacific Climate Warriors and individuals who have actively supported or been involved in the Pacific Climate Warriors campaign. If you agree to take part in the interview then I will ask you a series of questions and the interview will take approximately up to one hour to conduct. You are free to choose to not answer any of the questions that you do not wish to. You are free to end the interview at any time. I may also invite you to follow-up interviews.

What will happen to the information that I collect?

If you wish, I will remove any identifying personal information when I transcribe the interviews and publish my data. All information will be stored securely in accordance with the UK Data Protection Act 1998.

I plan to share the results of the research with 350 Pacific and all the participants who wish to receive it, either via a presentation before the end of the research project or in a written report using anonymised data. I hope that my research will be beneficial to everyone involved in 350 Pacific, as it will document their work, preserving an account for the future, it will help reflect on the work of climate campaigners and what is successful and what could be improved, and it will raise international awareness of the work of Pacific climate campaigners. The results of my research will also be used to produce my PhD thesis at University College London, and presented at international conferences and in academic publications.

What if you don't want to be involved?

No worries. It is up to you to decide whether or not to take part. If you do decide to take part you are still free to withdraw at any time and without giving a reason. You may also withdraw your data from the project at any time up until October 2015.

Please discuss the information above with others if you wish or ask me if there is anything that is not clear or if you would like more information.

Appendix 3 – Research consent from 350 Pacific

This Facebook discussion was forwarded onto me via email. The names and Facebook profile pictures of 350 Pacific members have been anonymised. The opening message is from the 350 Pacific co-ordinator that I began discussions with in April 2014.

Appendix 4 – Interview Schedule (Phase I)

Contextual Information

1. Which country are you from?
2. How many other people from your country are here?
3. Did you all know each other before you came?
4. Have you met anyone else involved in the tour before?
5. Do you belong to a church? Which church?

Relationship with 350 Pacific

1. How long have you been involved in 350 Pacific?
2. Why did you get involved in 350 Pacific?
   - How did you get involved?
3. Have you been involved in campaigning before?
4. What roles have you played in the campaign?
   - Are you a media spokesperson?
   - Were you involved in building a canoe?
   - Can you tell me a bit about that?
5. What has the best part of being involved with 350 so far?
6. What do you hope this campaign will achieve?

350 Pacific: local context

1. What do your friends and family think about you coming on this tour?
2. Are any of your friends or family involved in 350 Pacific or other forms of campaigning or advocacy?
3. How many people are involved in 350 Pacific in your home country?
4. Have you tried to make other people in your home country aware of what you're doing?
   - What sort of things have you been doing to raise awareness?
   - Did you hold any events about 350 Pacific in your home island before the tour?
5. How have other people responded to the campaigning that you have been doing?
   - Have other people helped out at all?
   - Does 350 Pacific in your home country work with any other local groups or organisations?

Climate Change

1. Have you noticed any kinds of environmental changes in your home country?
   - Have these affected everyday life? If so, how?
   - What do you think are the biggest environmental challenges facing your island?
   - How has the government responded to these challenges?
   - How have people responded to these?
   - Are there any NGOs or civil society groups active in this island who have responded to these challenges?

2. What do you know about the predicted impacts of climate change on your home

country?
3. What do you know about the predicted impacts of climate change in other parts of the Pacific?
4. Why do you think we are facing the prospect of climate change? What do you think is the cause of the problem?
5. Who do you think should be responsible for tackling climate change?
    - Do you think it is the responsibility of the United Nations?
    - Of the Australian government?
    - Of island governments?
    - Of companies?
    - Of everyone?
6. What do you think should be done about climate change?
7. What future do you want to see for your home country?
    - for the Pacific?
    - for the planet?

Warriors

1. Can you tell me more about what being a Pacific Climate Warrior means to you?
2. What message do you want to get across to the people of the Australia?
3. What do you hope people in Australia who see this campaign will learn about Pacific Islanders?
4. What motivates you to campaign against climate change?

Closing Up

1. Have you taken part in academic research before?
    - Can you remember what it was about?
2. Have you taken part in any media interviews before?
3. Would you be happy to potentially take part in a follow-up interview in the future?
4. Do you have any questions for me or any thoughts you'd like to add?

Thank you for your time!

Appendix 5 – Appreciation from 350 Vanuatu